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The term ‘prosthetic’ is used increasingly across the social sciences and has taken on a 
theoretical life as a result of debates springing from contemporary studies of science and 
technology, medical anthropology and citizenship. This research considers whether the 
usage of ‘prosthetic’ and ‘prosthesis’ has however, become all too distanced from a 
grounded understanding of these terms, and is now in many ways synonymous with the 
term ‘cyborg’, therefore obscuring the specific relationships that prostheses represent. It 
asks if these terms have become a ‘catchall’ of technological subjectivities, without any 
basis in lived experience. 
Through ethnographic research into the manufacture, marketing and usage of medical 
prostheses in a Serbian inpatient rehabilitation centre, as well as interviews with 
prosthesis manufacturers, salespeople, as well with various citizens young and old, I 
present a nuanced view of the way in which citizenship itself is enacted. Citizenship is 
also a process of augmenting the body, both explicitly, such as in the (re)construction of 
socially acceptable bodies who have the capacity to labour, and implicitly, such as in the 
process of acquiring passports and identity documents. This process of externalising, and 
of the distributing of elements of the self into objects and relationships outside of the 
biological body forms the basis of what I term prosthetic citizenship.
In my search for a grounded and ethnographically informed understanding of prostheses, 
and of prosthetic citizenship, key themes emerge, such as hope, normality, morality and 
the relationship of technology to the bodies. I find that prostheses are always sites of 
entanglement and paradox, but that they are also equally full of promise, and that in 
understanding how, why and in what capacities they are used, they emerge as capable of 
bridging the divide between theoretically complex abstract relationships, and the 




Growing up, my exposure to amputees and prosthetic aids was for the most part through popular 
media: villainous Captain Hook and other peg-legged pirates of my youth, the sinister ‘one-
armed man’ from The Fugitive, and veteran soldiers with pinned up trouser-legs and empty 
sleeves during televised ANZAC services. Later, cancer claimed body parts of two of my family 
members (one of whom became active in the national amputees’ society) and through them I 
gained personal exposure to the world of prostheses. I grew up knowing that one of my great 
uncles had been a prosthetist in Germany, only to be retrained as a cabinet maker upon arrival 
in Australia after World War Two (which seemed to me strangely illogical until I learned of the 
history of wooden limbs). Unlike many, I learned relatively early in life about residual limb and 
muscle pain. To this day, ‘the phantoms’ remain a code phrase in my family for irritability, bad 
moods, and periods of bed rest: no visitors welcome. 
More recently, after four years of dealing with material culture in municipal museums and ten 
years of studying social and medical anthropology, I still find it curious that the mundane material 
by-products of our lives have a provenance and a story that remains for the most part untold. 
The histories of these objects and persons are often vernacular; too commonplace to make it 
into prestigious collections and museums, and yet the complex relationships that emerge when 
we merely scrape the surface of these products show us just how extraordinary they really are. 
Prostheses are for me one of these great untold histories. 
The history of Serbia in some ways is also an untold in contemporary anthropological texts or at 
least the Serbia that I experienced on a daily basis during my fieldwork. When I was young, I 
learned that my biological grandfather had come from Yugoslavia; although, at the time, it might 
as well have been the moon. Most of my friends growing up had relatives who had come from 
somewhere else. In New Zealand it was almost inevitable, and so, apart from a passing interest 
in locating Yugoslavia on a map, I filed it away in my memory together with much other 
meaningless information. Then, suddenly, all too suddenly it seems, as the turn of the century 
loomed, like everyone else in my small sleepy provincial township, I watched in gruesome 
fascination as Yugoslavia tore itself apart. I vividly remember watching a current affairs 
programme about a teenage couple, a couple of years older than myself he Orthodox, she 
Muslim1 - killed, hand in hand, trying to cross a bridge in Sarajevo, as if Shakespeare's Romeo 
and Juliet had been gunned down at teatime. The banality of the violence in the Balkans was 
dished up daily on the news and delivered into our living room at 6pm for consumption along 
with our dinner. The real horror of what was happening was the speed at which it could just be 
forgotten, switched off. Soon a muddle of countries existed where my school atlas still showed 
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1 Living in Serbia, I finally learned the name of that ill-fated couple, Boško Brkić and Admira 
Ismić, their names forever fated to become synonymous with the sad realities of many Serb-
Muslim relationships during the crisis of the nineties.
Yugoslavia to be. My 13-year-old-self was ambivalent, and more than a bit disturbed to learn that 
my grandfather had been Serbian - after all, on the telly, Serbs were always the bad guys. 
I never met my grandfather, and knew only that my father had spoken German growing up, and 
that my grandparents had left Europe as Yugoslavia was still being forged from the ashes of 
World War Two. In fact, besides occasional teasing about my surname (Milosevic and 
Milosavljevic were the same name to many of my classmates) my Serbian-ness (or lack thereof) 
was a non-event in New Zealand. Insulated from the world, in rural southern New Zealand, it 
wasn’t until 2003 that I met my first Serb, whom my father bought home from a conference while 
I was still an undergraduate student. ‘Janko2’ was desperately trying to immigrate to New 
Zealand to escape the ‘bad situation’ which, in my little corner of the Pacific, I struggled to 
comprehend. Their friendship remains; sometimes enthusiastic, sometimes awkward, always 
tinged with the disappointments of the failed attempt to remain in NZ, but they have stayed in 
touch to this day. 
Later, married and settled in Oslo with a Norwegian husband, my name began to attract more 
attention. Where I had always considered myself, and been considered a ‘true blue Kiwi’, 
suddenly I found that I was (at least on paper) a much more ethnically ambiguous, and 
potentially East European immigrant spouse. Having exhausted job possibilities without success 
I decided to pursue my interest in the material culture of the body and enrolled in a PhD course 
in Edinburgh. Where to conduct research though...the Pacific? I couldn’t justify studying so far 
away if my husband wasn’t going to be joining me. Norway? The very place that I was trying to 
escape? It seemed a little counter intuitive. However, it did give me an idea. Why not go to the 
very place that everyone believed I came from anyway. I researched foreign anthropologists who 
had studied Serbia. There were precious few ethnographers to choose from. Much of the social 
science literature was from the political sciences, dealing with religion and identity, war crimes 
and history. In the end, that chance meeting five years earlier and a few key articles made up my 
mind, particularly Van de Port’s writing on wild gypsies and obstinate others, and his reticent 
participants’ insistence that only a Serb could know and understand a Serb (1998, 1999). I sent 
an email to Janko. He had contacts in the prosthetics industry. I could live with his family and his 
children could teach me Serbian. As quickly as I had stumbled onto the idea of Serbia, I decided 
I would go. Having been successful in grant applications and worked for a couple of months to 
raise enough capital to live on, I bid a temporary adieu to my husband and touched down into 
Belgrade airport late on a wet February night. 
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2 All names within this dissertation have been changed
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AN INTRODUCTION
Man has become, so to speak, a god with artificial limbs. He is quite 
impressive when he dons all his auxiliary organs, But they have not 
become part of him and still give him a good deal of trouble on 
occasion. Distant ages will bring new and probably unimaginable 
great advances in this field of civilisation and so enhance his god-like 
nature. But in the interests of our investigations let us also remember 
that modern man does not feel happy with his god-like status. 




We have to live. 
When I began my doctoral research, it was with a feeling of expectation; a sense of 
setting out, as I imagine it is for all PhD students; of being both under and over prepared. 
It was also with a feeling of skepticism, which in many ways frames this thesis, of the 
ways in which a blending of popular and scholarly debate within medical 
anthropological literature, science and technology studies, science fiction, and the arts, 
have appropriated technical terms pertaining to an ontology of the body. Of these, most 
relevantly for my research, are the terms ‘prosthesis’ and ‘prosthetic’, which are 
increasingly used in all matter of settings, taken out of context, juggled about, and 
reinserted into text. In this form, rather than engaging with ethnographically rich 
understandings, these terms instead widen the divide between theory and lived 
experience in an endless solipsist philosophising about questions regarding the future of 
our relationships with the world. 
As there remains a scarcity of research into physical prosthetic relationships, this 
dissertation aims to bring together quite disparate forms of knowledge. The fieldwork 
that I have undertaken serves only to reiterate the continuing need for rich ethnographic 
detail as new technologies appear, and as we search for ways in which to make them 
transparent and understandable even as they become commonplace. In this respect this 
dissertation is still really just the beginning of a much larger body of research, ripe for 
undertaking in social anthropology. Ethnography carries within it the capability to 
embed new technologies into lives, and I believe that many of the criticisms that have 
been levelled at studies of science and technology (for example that they are all too often 
skewed toward North American models of health consumption) can be countered by 
ethnographic studies of the taking up of technologies in unfamiliar settings.
3
So these words - we have to live: moramo da živimo - said first and foremost; told with a 
shrug and a smile (as told to me during an interview at the rehabilitative hospital where I 
conducted the bulk of my fieldwork), serve then as a touchstone to this thesis. It is with a 
description of this interview that I will start.
Sanja
Sanja was a Serb refugee from Knin in Croatia, and had lived in Belgrade for 15 years. 
Unlike many of the geriatric patients here at the clinic, her amputation was a traumatic 
injury. It was an accident, as she was climbing off a bus, the bus driver closed the door 
and her leg was caught3, pinning her to the side of the bus before it drove off. In the city 
here, she and her husband rented a little apartment together. Both she and her husband 
were seventy-seven years old at the time she came here (to the institution that I 
henceforth call the Bela Clinic4), to receive her prosthesis, and begin her rehabilitation. 
She had been here for a month. Before this she was in another hospital for three months, 
and following this recuperation, she travelled to Croatia together with her husband to try 
to get her official papers so that she could apply for a disability allowance. Sanja was 
however unable to retrieve anything from the municipality in her village. In addition she 
found that her house has been taken over by a Croatian family. Still, she told me, if it 
were possible, she would like to go back to Croatia, where she grew up and both her and 
her husband’s families come from. 
4
3 Buses in Serbia are a good example of the lack of ability to take reliable functioning of state 
functioning as a given. At any given stop passengers pressed in, as others attempted to push 
out, and I was often left feeling that the drivers simply closed the doors and began to drive when 
they felt the bus was full. 
4 The Specialised Hospital for Prosthetic and Orthotic Rehabilitation (referred to henceforth as 
the Bela Clinic), is a real institution. I have chosen not to disguise its location or its name (Bela 
clinic is simply an easier name to contend with) as it is an immediately recognisable feature of 
the Belgrade landscape, and of the Serbian prosthetics industry. All persons mentioned within 
this dissertation, as well as their positions have however been anonymised, and their origins 
made less explicit. 
On the day that we spoke together, Sanja had been measured and had had a plaster cast 
of her residual limb made, in preparation for the construction of her prosthesis to begin. 
She had also been to two hours of exercises in the therapy rooms known as the pre-
prosthetic clinic. Since her amputation, Sanja had used a wheelchair as her only mobility 
aid. She told me with a sad smile that she thought that she was probably ‘too old’ to 
learn how to use a prosthesis, but that unless she tried she would never be able to return 
home (to the apartment in Belgrade), as there were steps to her apartment on the third 
floor and no elevator. She had not been back to her apartment since her accident. Her 
husband, also frail, was too weak to carry a wheelchair up and down the stairs. When I 
asked about him, Sanja told me that he was entitled to a Croatian pension due to his 
previous occupation, but that due to the bureaucratic and political barriers that exist 
between the two countries he had yet to receive it. The elderly couple had two sons who 
also now both lived in Belgrade, however, when I asked about them, Sanja changed 
subject completely and told me forcibly that the Croatian government needed to solve 
the problem of pensions and external Serb populations before they joined the EU. The 
provision of pensions, according to Sanja, is one of the promises that was made to her 
and to others in her situation, but so far there had been no movement on the issue. In the 
meantime she and her husband simply waited. While she had been at the centre, her 
husband had had to learn to fend for himself. She had taught him to cook, nothing fancy, 
mostly soup and beans. It was a ‘hard time’ but they could manage it, she told me. 
Family was clearly a difficult issue with Sanja, because as I asked about her sons a 
second time, if sometimes her sons’ spouses prepared food for her and her husband, she 
switched subject again, telling me that she could’t get any benefits because of her status 
as a Croatian national. She wanted to get this over and done with and go home. I asked 
where home is, and she said with her husband of course. With the pension money he 
should get, and the disability allowance that she should be entitled to, Sanja hopes to get 
a care person to come and help, but, she concedes, it will likely never happen. I must 
have looked a distressed by her story by this stage because she suddenly broke into an 
ironic grin, patting my arm in comfort. ‘What can we do?’ she said. ‘We have to live’
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We have to live. It is a reminder that although countless possibilities may exist for 
fruitful theory building upon ideas of prostheses, phantom limbs, prosthetic identities 
and amputated identities, citizens and/or states; it is in the end the way in which real 
people are constituted through their immediate relationships with specific and practical 
technologies, as well as with ideas and people (and what meanings these relationships 
hold for them), that is the basis for my discussion. The ‘we’ is complicit, for while it is 
both their and my experiences that ground this work, it is you the reader who interprets 
my musings, giving fresh meaning to the vernacular, the daily, the decidedly mundane 
qualities of prostheses, and the externalising of the self. Sanja, part of the Serb ethnic 
nation, cut of from her geographic state, was in the process of becoming a citizen again, 
and the relationships that were open to her to negotiate this position were dependent 
both on her capacity to generate physical action (for example - to get up stairs) and to 
negotiate the workings of cross boarder bureaucracy (to access her pension). The Bela 
clinic was in many ways an intermediary institution, a kind of all-mans-land, where no 
one was turned away. It was a space of rehabilitation, both of bodies, and of citizens.
Rather than laying out an explicit argument, I follow the themes that arise, whilst 
describing the ways in which ‘normal,’ ‘hope,’ and even ‘health’ are constructed within 
the field of amputation and prosthetics in my Serbian setting. I use these ideas to lead 
into a discussion of how these terms both frame and are framed by their disparate and at 
times contradictory relationship to broadly liberal-democratic economic reforms that 
have been ongoing in Serbia since 2001. These reforms have had an impact on the way 
that the prosthetics industry operates, even given the fact that state run health institutions 
remain cushioned to a certain extent by ongoing subsidies (Crnobrnja 2007). 
So what is a prosthetic citizen, and what does it mean to be one? I take Cresswell’s 
defining statement on this issue to be my starting point. He writes that
prosthetic citizenship insists on the fact that bodies are part of 
assemblages that connect them to things such as infrastructures, laws 
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and regulations, notions of place and mobility and the geographical 
landscape around them (2009: 271).
 
I hope that you will bear with my train of description, and the layout of this PhD, as it 
moves outwards, in much the same way as gait rehabilitation does for amputees, from 
the internal and individual components involved, to the external; the social and 
technological networks that are implicated in the creation of a prosthetic citizen. First 
though, to answer the question above we need to understand what a prosthesis is. 
Prosthetic Roots
Many of us, myself included, tend use the words prosthetic and prosthesis 
interchangeably, and both come from the same Greek root: prosthitenai, an addition 
(from ‘pros’ towards, and ‘tithenai’ to place). In its arguably more common lay capacity, 
today prosthetic refers most often to a medical or cosmetic prosthesis, that is, to an 
artificial object in some way added on to the body, whether temporarily or as a 
permanent fixture. Prostheses may replace or simply augment the body. These types of 
prostheses are by their very nature prosthetic, perhaps accounting for the synonymity in 
usage. 
However, the term prosthesis began its English usage in 1553, synonymous with the 
term prothesis (Wills 1995) as a term for the addition of a phoneme (a letter or syllable) 
to the beginning of a word, for the purposes of simplifying pronunciation. This addition 
still exists in the study of linguistics, where scholars note that unlike the term prefix, a 
prosthetic addition is a metaplasm5 which does not alter the meaning of the word, 
instead referring a change in pronunciation and spelling. This often occurs in the transfer 
of a word from one language to another, such as in anglicised form of Hrvatska 
(Croatia). It is only much later that these terms crossed into the realm of the physical 
body. 
7
5 The linguistic term for the addition of a sound to a word 
So how does prosthesis, from these humble beginnings, shape our understandings of 
citizenship? This is the meta-question that this thesis seeks to investigate, because our 
understandings of the limits of ourselves clearly do shape understandings of what it 
means to be a citizen, on a daily basis. As to what a prosthetic citizen is, in this regard I 
take my lead from Cresswell (2009). I wish to argue that besides focussing on recent 
transformations of the nation-state, we need to expand our ideas of what how citizens are 
defined, from groupings of self-sufficient individual bodies bound together in obligation 
and privilege, to products of the ‘assemblage of the body and the world’ (ibid: 259). 
While these assemblages increasingly fall under the rubric of the ‘cyborg6’ (Haraway 
1985), as I hope to explain here, this is a category that, although perhaps initially well 
suited to describing the hybrid nature of prosthetic people, disguises the ways in which 
technology is historically constituted, and has the power to disable, even as it enables us. 
Prostheses, after all, have been around much longer than new cyborgian descriptions of 
them. 
Cresswell is not interested in physical medical prostheses per se, he is interested in the 
possibilities that are inherent in the ‘incomplete project of citizenship’ (ibid: 259). He 
investigates how citizenship itself is tied to ideas of mobility, surveillance and welfare. 
While Cresswell actually borrows the term ‘Prosthetic Citizen’ from Langan (2001), 
who was fundamentally concerned with issues of mobility in public transport as applied 
to disability rights, and more specifically, wheelchair users, he expands this concept, 
arguing that citizenship relies not only on the production of ‘mobility as its foundation 
of equity’, which is Langan’s argument (2001: 482), but ‘that mobility itself is an 
achievement of assemblages of people and things’ (Cresswell 2009: 271). Citizenship is 
also demarcated as a category by the production of its inverse - non-citizens - and is 
itself invested in the logic of othering, the non-citizen, the non-compliant patient, the 
immigrant, the gendered, raced, the pathological, which then ‘confirms the status as 
8
6 From Cybernetic Organism. Chapter 6 provides a full investigation of the origins of cyborgs and 
cyborg theory.
citizenship as something to be valued’ (Cresswell 2009: 263). Cresswell further links 
identity documents and citizenship, to mobility, showing how the need for legitimate 
forms of identity are a result of the movement of populations, as he states, 
  
In a place where everyone is known from birth to death, identity is 
pre-given. It is only the mobile strangers arriving en-masse that 
provoke the need to be certain of who someone is (2009: 261). 
  
Thus, in addition to human-technology relationships that are investigated within this 
thesis, the governing theme herein is a critique of the normative corporeality of the body 
as applied to questions of citizenship. In this respect my ethnography serves to contrast 
and compare the lived experience of prostheses, with what has been argued in theory. I 
am fully aware that what science and technology studies take as ‘prosthetic’ is much 
more loosely defined and broader in scope that this lived reality of prosthetic limbs. Nor 
do I wish to suggest that these terms should be limited to physical description. However, 
I would like to argue that an understanding of the lives of prostheses could help to 
ground metaphoric prostheses so that they refer to something tangible. Throughout this 
project I am informed by a thorough grounding in Critical Medical Anthropology, as 
well as an ongoing interest in the constantly evolving field of Science and Technology 
Studies and a lifelong enthusiasm for practices of rehabilitation. 
Metzl (2010) maintains that the quantifying of these tropes of body movement and 
aesthetics through ideas of ‘normal’ or ‘natural’, under the rubric of ‘health’, allows us 
to ‘seamlessly construct certain bodies as desirable while relegating others as 
obscene’ (ibid: 3). What he is getting at here are the subtle and insidious ways in which 
the language of health creates a moral deficit, by first implying that there is a golden 
standard of normative body aesthetics that we should all be aiming for, and then 
suggesting that it is due to our individual lifestyle choices that we fall short. We are all 
guilty, if not of living badly, then at least of not living well enough; and through this 
rhetoric, we deserve what we get. 
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I suggest that within the prosthetics industry this golden standard of normality meshes 
with desirable ‘enhancement’ aesthetics found in popular science fiction (which are in 
turn appropriated in the advertising of prostheses) to create the illusion of a 
consumerist’s dreamworld of body parts that one can select from, like the overhauling of 
a computer; replacing and upgrading sections. These new body components are 
marketed as superior to the ageing and fallible biological body: titanium teeth with shiny 
porcelain veneers, gravity defying silicon breasts, the plumping out and/or sculpting of 
the body in the name of normalcy. 
It isn’t that I do not find these types of bodies interesting in and of themselves, 
especially in relation to prosthetic aids, as they are strongly emblematic: of our fears 
about death and ageing, the speeding up of time through technology, as well as our 
obsession with the aesthetics of health. They are tied intimately to the consumption of 
customised products and consequentially to the idea of a customisable body. Why 
shouldn’t a stylish and masculine Eames inspired oak veneer limb, or one of Aviya 
Serfaty’s ‘sexy and feminine’ ‘Outfeet7’ (a glamorous and feminine prosthetic limb 
prototype marketed at specifically at women) be available for a potential client after all? 
The burgeoning of avant garde prosthesis design from students of industrial and product 
design provides evidence that every part of the body has its price as a commodity - 
though unlike double amputee and international paralympian model and sportswoman 
Aimee Mullins (2009), I am not quite ready to concede that buying a prosthesis is really 
just the same as buying a pair of glasses much less concede that many amputees would 
be unhappy owning 12 pairs of limbs just to maintain their jet-setting model 
spokeswoman lifestyle. New and upcoming designers such as Joanna Hawley 8 (who 
proposes the ‘Eames’ limb mentioned above) maintain that the ‘traditional’ prosthetic 
limbs struggle with themes such as grace, humanity and style. Most often new prototype 
models remain just this however, as designers struggle either to engage with the 
mundane daily lifestyle requirements of actual amputees, or to find prosthetists and 
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7 see http://www.aviyaserfaty.com/ for a visual of her ‘outfeet’ project
8 see http://www.joannahawley.com/ for her Eames inspired prosthesis
biomechanists to work with, let alone a customer base willing to pay. The field of 
prosthetic limbs proves that disability paints the body with an all too different brush to 
enhancement. 
So, this thesis takes the possibility of replication of the human body, which has been the 
subject of much scholarly debate recently, and looks at the reality of the conjuncture of 
machine and humans, because grafted onto much less desirable fleshy bodies, these 
technologies that appear so full of promise and potential, reveal themselves, as the quote 
from Freud suggests at the beginning of this introduction, as having a wounding capacity 
(Wills 1995) that always tempers the allure of replacing flesh with machine. It should 
not be forgotten that in later life, Freud himself wore what were, by all accounts, a 
succession of extremely painful prosthetic oral palates, without which he could neither 
speak nor eat, which he referred to as ‘monsters’ or ‘necessary evils’, lending a certain 
poignancy to his assertion that present day man is unhappy in his godlike character 
(Freud 1930). 
In this regard my thesis is in many ways comparable research to Winance’s (2006) study 
of periods of wheelchair testing among patients with neuromuscular conditions, and, like 
Winance, I hold that different configurations of both technological and relational 
fragments not only produce different state/citizen relationships, but that they also 
necessarily produce divergent power differentials with distinct elements as more (or 
less) pivotal to the process. To take Winance at her word then, it follows that in choosing 
to talk about prostheses in some ways throughout the body of this thesis, I have 
effectively closed down the possibility to talk about them in some of their many other 
capacities. 
Our fears of being usurped by hyper-technological beings are revealed to be for the most 
part ungrounded when we start to investigate the actual physical capabilities of current 
prosthetic technologies. Originally barred from ‘able-bodied’ athletics competitions due 
to the ‘advantage’ of having carbon fibre prostheses, bilateral amputee sprinter Oscar 
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Pistorius’ trainers have been known to quip "If you think having carbon-fibre legs will 
make you a faster sprinter, have the operation and we’ll see you at the track" (McHugh 
2007). The fact that Pistorius runs very fast indeed on his cheetah® limbs is not up for 
debate. However the cheetah model has been used by para-Olympians for at least the last 
15 years. If it was only these limbs giving him an unfair advantage, surely other ‘super-
runners’ would have surfaced before him. Could it be that he is simply a talented runner? 
In that case, how are his prostheses different from hyper-engineered running shoes? Will 
there come a day when physical prosthetic aids really do surpass the physical limits of 
the human body? What are the physical limits of the body? In what capabilities do we 
define them? 
In the last 50 years, runners have shaved more that 17 seconds off the 4 minute mile, a 
feat in itself once deemed impossible. We know more than ever about the micro 
processes of optimising performance through diet, design and training. Could today’s 
runners accomplish the feats they do without the vast sport science industry that 
surrounds them? Do we count our pens, cameras, cellphones and computers as prosthetic 
aids, extending our memory, our hearing, our ability to speak and our eyesight over vast 
distances as Haraway (1997) and Case (2009) suggest? What is new about our 
relationship to these technologies? At times it seems that these theoretical or even 
abstract prostheses offer the limitless potential of a body without boundaries, touted as 
the buzz words of cyborg anthropology - more interesting by far than actual physical 
prostheses, which serve mostly to remind us of what De Laet and Mol (2000) refer to as 
the fragility of technological networks. 
Rather then hopping up onto this bandwagon, and theorising about what prosthetics 
could and should be in the future, I am fundamentally interested in what they can do, 
and are; because if, as Wills (1995), and Jain (1999) both argue, technology is 
fundamentally about the speeding up of time through efficiency, in the case of 
prostheses, the mismatch of these two has the effect of producing unstable boundaries 
and uncertain futures. 
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So this in itself, one might argue, is all rather interesting, perhaps interesting enough in 
itself to inform a PhD or two. So why add Serbia as a site of enquiry? The answer lies in 
my initial lines of inquiry. When I moved to the Vojvodina, an autonomous province in 
the north of Serbia in late winter 2008, my original idea was to look at the ways in which 
war amputees and prostheses become a visual metaphor for the past in a (post)socialist 
country with a history of violence and conflict. At the time I wrote,
Memories of war and suffering in a post-conflict country exist not only at 
a national commemorative and collective community level but are also 
represented ‘in the flesh’. Elaine Scarry (1985) elaborates further: 
‘Whether or not it is verbally memorialised, the record of war survives in 
the bodies, both alive and buried, of the people who were hurt 
there’ (1985: 83). Actions and experiential events are remembered, 
memorialised and mythologized not only through storytelling and oral 
histories that reinforce citizenship and solidarity, but also in the very 
presence of people whose physical injuries signify their experience of 
conflict at a bodily level. Memories of war and violence are thus 
materialised in the absence of bodily limbs and the presence of prostheses 
(Milosavljevic 2007: 2).
I began fieldwork in a village in the endless plains of the Vojvodina, and eventually, like 
many of amputees who I met, the trajectory of their rehabilitation journeys led me to the 
Bela clinic, in Belgrade. By 2008, when I began fieldwork, this inpatient clinic 
contained mostly geriatric patients, the poor and the disenfranchised, as the current 
transitioning to a health care system more in line with Serbia’s close EU neighbours, had 
opened a space for private prosthetists to set up shop, attracting anyone with a 
disposable income (or a wealth of friends, colleagues and/or relatives who could share 
the costs involved). I did an initial interview round with some of these prosthetists 
together with Janko, my contact in the industry, to get a feel for them, and through these 
initial meetings discovered that while they were willing to chat with me, many were 
fundamentally opposed to me accessing their patients9. The Serbian army also had its 
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9 I was initially upset about this, even though Janko told me that they were likely worried about 
me referring their patients on to other ‘better’ clinics.
own rehabilitation centres which were off limits to me, thus thwarting my desire to work 
with war veterans. This is not to say that my initial MSc inquiry was rendered 
ineffectual; through it I found that the field of prostheses remains in many ways a 
product of war and violence, an industry so bound up in the militarisation of medicine 
that it is impossible to extricate one from the other. Furthermore, looking back, without 
these minor setbacks I might not ever even have made it to the Bela Clinic. 
Making this PhD about prostheses, patients, and prosthetists in Serbia is also a way of 
muddying the waters where Balkan research is concerned. While there is a burgeoning 
body of work on Balkan identities in all their many facets, far predating the time when I 
was beginning my research, there were few ethnographic descriptions written by 
anthropologists outside the country of the kind of Serbia that I was experiencing, nor the 
kind that I had an interest in, primary exceptions being Van der Port (1998, 1999), on 
lumpovanje10 and the wilderness within, Zivkovic (2000, 2007) on domestic media 
representations and consumption, and on Serbian forms of self irony, Jansen (2000, 
2003, 2005, 2009) who writes on disparate themes, ranging from student protests, to 
everyday discourse, to the place of statistics in imaginations of the past, and finally, 
Šuber (2006) on the mythologising of time. Much was written about the country during 
the escalation of violence in the 1990s, and more again in the period directly following 
the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 1999. Throughout the first decade of the 
aftermath of the bloody violence, Increasing piles of research seemed to emerge that 
reinforced victim / perpetrator ideologies, investigated post traumatic stress, either at 
individual or state level, or (taking its lead from a German ‘volk’ tradition dealing with 
rural / urban divides), searched for the ‘authentic’ homos balkanicus in the changing 
political (and geographic) landscape. Within the larger geopolitical Balkan region, 
however, there were signs of emerging scholarship that I could identify with; I tracked 
down, for instance Čolović’s work on political symbols (2002), and Green’s (2007) 
research on what she calls the Balkan fractal, which she maintains is the way that 
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10 this loosely translates to ‘binge’ drinking, though doesn’t really approximate the carnivalesque 
carousing with Roma peoples that it actually points to in Serbian
competing and overlapping regional ethnicities all make claims to an authentic 
homeland, which can then be either proven or disproved based on historical scale.
That is not to say that questions of Balkan identities are not of interest to me, simply, a 
more basic question arrises in this regard, why shouldn’t we be able to discuss prosthesis 
use in Serbia? The formation of identity simply, largely, falls out of the framework of 
this thesis, as the possibilities to talk about the nature of prostheses and the formation of 
a prosthetic citizenship close down a discussion of the formation of a personal identity, 
and additionally, I see no reason to pigeon hole either studies of technology to specific 
locations, or to limit geographic regions by theme.
Instead, I wish to pick up from where Jain leaves off in 1999 in ‘The prosthetic 
imagination: enabling and disabling the prosthesis trope’, a text that I found to be 
increasingly important one for understanding how it is that we have come to imagine 
that prostheses must augment a naturally incomplete body. I wish to continue on from 
her final argument that despite our increasing usage of the terms prosthetic and 
prosthesis about psychological understanding, ‘identity differences and their material 
consequences are simply incomprehensible through the prosthetic lens’ (ibid: 50).
I cannot, and have no desire to make a claim as to the existence of a particular and 
singular ‘prosthetic’ identity, for the simple reason that within the limits of the theories 
laid out within this thesis, the prosthetic body is the rule rather than a variation. That is 
to say, prostheses work by way of structures (whether physical or linguistic) that allow 
for, and ease, communication. We all make use of various supportive elements - 
technological, relational, language based, or semiotic to ‘prop up’ or augment our 
physical selves. Wills (1995) takes language itself to be prosthetic to the body, and 
Mitchell and Snyder (1997, 2000) posit that just as the body has a relationship to 
language that cannot be normal or average, so the universal model of a body exists in a 
fundamentally abstract way that ‘really real’ bodies (which are inherently variable), will 
always fall short of. 
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If we accept that even language is prosthetic to one’s self, this leaves me, already at this 
early stage of my dissertation, with a burning question. Is this dissertation a prosthesis of 
my own? What does it do, this text, if it not externalise and augment my thoughts into 
text? Time and space is collapsed, as you the reader travel with me across Serbia, and 
back through history, as well as into an imagined cyborg future. Even citations, jogging 
our memories, serve as shorthand, sending us back to texts previously read. What is this 
text, if not the speeding up of time itself, just as Jain (1999) imagines? Language and 
technology are in many ways the prostheses that we are all dependent on. 
The theories and works that this book builds upon therefore require some quite lateral 
moves through a theoretical landscape. This might seem a rather daunting endeavour, or 
at the very least a weakness through scarcity of empirical evidence (in that I can only 
refer to my own direct experience) and scant relevant previous scholarship within this 
immediate theoretical area. However, in this task I prefer to see the possibility for 
erudition, the broad foundation of which, like the connections that I have studied, has 
been a process of juxtaposition - the deconstructing and reassembling of that which I 
consider the object of anthropological study. This serves to fuel my belief that 
ethnography is not only the bread and butter that anthropologists think about, but it is 
also good to think with, moreover, the same can be said for prostheses. 
My field sites, within clinics and workshops, in dusty laboratories and patient wards, and 
shiny marketing offices, might then be considered primary spaces within a larger field. I 
also worked whilst in Serbia, teaching academic writing at a private university, and I feel 
that it would be remiss not to consider my Serbian students, colleagues and friends’ 
desires to be ‘normal’, or their exclamations that Serbia was not a ‘normal’ country, to 
be as indicative of a state of affairs as the opinions of the staff and amputee patients with 
whom I discussed the aesthetics of normalcy within the Bela Clinic. 
Ultimately, these voices of my friends, colleagues and students, whilst not ‘the field’ per 
se, are extraordinarily important. It is their musings that give richness and depth to the 
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otherwise amorphous discourse of ‘normal’ that would likely plunge this thesis into a 
geographically obscure political economy of physical disability. Likewise terms that I 
first met with in the clinic take on different qualities when removed from their 
biomedical confines, such as - ‘health’ and ‘hope’ - have been instrumental in forming 
the building blocks of this thesis. Looking outside of the clinic allows the use of the 
phrase ‘nisi / nije normalan’ (you’re / it’s not normal) to delineate an ontological 
position not yet reached, or lost. As I hope to show, this is a positioning both of oneself 
and of the nation which both creates and is created by very particular Serbian experience 
of being ‘outside’ of time. In this regard being ‘not normal’ becomes an internalised 
value judgment about aspects of Serbian life, that pro-European Serbian citizens 
compare with imagined European equivalents. These desires are articulated by Serbians 
as though from a European perspective - how they imagine themselves as being seen. 
Thus the hope for a ‘normal’ life, although not necessarily a return to ‘normality’ (as 
what and when a period of normal existed is constantly reinvented through desires for a 
European future) has become infused with ideas of creating action geared toward moral 
agency in rehabilitation (either of the self or of the nation) (Greenberg 2011), but is 
complicated by competing informal veze11 networks that people have historically relied 
on for acquiring goods and services. 
Prosthetic limbs are emblematic of many things, but in working with prosthetists, 
trawling manufacturing websites, talking with sales representatives, and watching and 
interviewing amputee inpatients whilst they were learning to wear and walk with 
prosthetic aids, I feel that I can say that they speak most potently of the specific ways 
that we all negotiate being in the world - not in the future, but very much in the present. 
The very tactile and material qualities that they have, and the physical skills that make 
all the difference in their success or failure as products, makes me suspect that cyborg 
anthropology, much like the marketing of limbs, focuses all too intently on the 
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11 Veze translates roughly as connections or network. These links are however familial and/or 
geographic, sometimes enacted the Kum (godparent) family relationships, through friends, or 
local community. They are networks of people who can help one get jobs, acquire visas, access 
the health system, buy a car, in fact, any interaction with state or private enterprise can be 
smoothed though the production of veze connections. 
generalising and homogenising of relationships, and on the relationship of technology to 
time, that is to say, the speeding up of time through consuming technology (Jain 1999, 
Cerqui 2002). The potential that prostheses hold for overcoming life’s obstacles 
generated by the idea of prosthetic aids and their use in praxis appear to be two very 
different phenomena. It is my intention to try to unpack them.
The first section of this thesis sets our scene. In ‘How to look at a prosthesis’, I first 
examine the history of the terms prosthetic and prosthesis, looking at histories of 
amputees and the amputated body, before showing how the prosthetics industry in Serbia 
is bound up in increasingly complex global trajectories of trade and exchange. In ‘a 
(slightly abridged) history of Serbia, I lay out the field, examining and defining how 
these categories, themes and motifs are historically constituted.
 I aim to create a ‘genealogy’ of amputee-prosthesis-prosthetist-therapist relationships in 
Serbia, which in turn serves to inform the two next chapters. I examine what desires for 
‘a normal life’ mean in Serbia, how the types of citizenship that emerge are positioned 
vis-a-vis the state, as well as in relation to an abstract and universal citizen. I investigate 
how the loss of state integrity generates uncertainty and a stagnation of the progress of 
liberal democratic transitioning leads a situation described as the ‘twilight zone’, which 
is then implicated in the loss of the capacity to generate moral action.
The second section then takes these historically constituted subjects and examines them 
in situ within the clinic, the workshop, and the rehabilitation centre. Questions of body 
integrity, aesthetics, gender and mobility are of importance here. In ‘Hope in Motion’ I 
look at the spaces of the clinic, and performances of recovery, while in ‘The Ghost in the 
machine’ I look at the presence of phantom limbs, and the various readings of bodies. 
These two chapters place the Bela clinic experiences in Serbia into a wider context of 
global health practices; looking at how terms such as ‘normal’, and ‘healthy’ are both 
created by, and create, their own trajectories of (bio)power and (self)governance in new 
geopolitical hierarchies that arise through the ‘Europeanising’ of health care practice. 
This Europeanising is evidenced in a series of (somewhat mandatory) liberal economic 
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and social reforms that Serbia must achieve to demonstrate it’s suitability to become a 
member of the European Union. The last chapter investigates the uneasy relationship 
between the daily experience of using prostheses to augment one’s self, and the critiques 
the concept of cyborgs, seen here as a relatively recent theoretical positioning of the 
body’s relationship alongside technological elements. 
Finally, after these tangible and tactile relationships have been examined, I wish to 
propose that a more grounded understanding of the nature of prostheses could engage 
critically with ideas of ‘the prosthetic’, now continually emerging from within cyborg 
anthropology (for example, Case 2009, Cleland 2010, Howe 2011). While cyborgs are 
undeniably good tools for deconstructing ideas of human / non-human relationships and 
for thinking about the future with, I wish to argue that an anthropology of prostheses 
should speak with ‘the force of history’ (Kohrman 2005), and that the unpacking of what 
a prosthetic can and cannot do is a necessary precursor to qualifying a priori terms such 
as enhanced or disabled. The interactions that are tied up in the creation of what we call 
a citizen, further show that a phenomenology of personhood must be not only be 
inclusive of multiple human elements, but also increasingly include technological and 
even neurological phenomena if it is to avoid solipsism. Bodies, phantom limbs, 
prostheses, families, therapists, medical staff, the state, and multinational prosthetics 
industries are all evident in the creation of prosthetic citizens, who become truly global 
‘assemblages’ (Collier and Ong 2005) and simultaneously state citizens. I find that 
cyborgs are essentially abstractions, ways of describing the uneven dispersal of 
technology into populations. As with hybridity, they are neither one thing nor the other, 
and the mixing of two tropes creates a moral ambiguity that raises tensions. I argue that 
we are always hybrids, and that talk of blurring boundaries assumes that at one point 
these categories were more solid. I do not believe that we have a new relationship to 
technology, rather that relationships to new technologies are always in the process of 
becoming normal, and that the propping up of the body into this category is an ongoing 
and continuously renegotiated process.
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Laying out the field of literature
In 2007, at the time that I began my research, there was a slow but steady stream of 
social science research on prostheses and the prosthetic; Brahm and Driscoll’s 
‘Prosthetic Territories’ (1995), Wills’ ‘Prosthesis’ - a somewhat difficult experiment in 
critical writing (1995), Jain’s ‘Prosthetic Imagination’ (1999), Kurzman’s somewhat 
barbed ‘discussion’ with Nelson and Wright in the periodical Cultural Anthropology 
(2001). Additionally, a couple of edited volumes were available; Ott, Serlin, and Mihm’s 
seminal volume on prostheses as objects of daily life (2002), Smith and Morra’s 
‘Prosthetic impulse’ (2006), and ‘Psychoprosthetics’ from Gallagher, Desmond and 
Maclachlan (2008) are the few that spring readily to hand. Not to say that prostheses are 
missing from literature per se, rather that they are not often made explicit as objects of 
enquiry, and when they are, it is often from the perspective of an amputee as in the 
writings of Sobchack (1995), and Kurzman (2001, 2002). In the four years that have 
passed, the field of cyborg anthropology appears to have forged ahead, evidenced by a 
burgeoning scope of articles on cyborgs, prosthetic culture and technological lives, and 
yet practical prosthesis based research remains scant. Some of the more interesting 
writing to emerge in recent years is a PhD on phantom-prosthetic relationships from 
Crawford (2007), Warren and Manderson’s ethnography of amputee rehabilitation 
clinics in Eastern Australia (2008), as well as occasional articles coming through 
localised university based journals, see Wright (2009).
While I thought that prosthesis based research was difficult to come by, anthropological 
research on amputation was limited almost entirely to G. Frank’s case study of 
congenital limb deficiency (1986) and French’s chapter on Cambodian amputees in 
Csordas’ ‘Embodiment and Experience’ (1994). However, if we have been slow in 
anthropology to show our interest in the way ‘really real’ bodies attach themselves to 
machines, there are disciplines that have continued to produce reams of data about 
amputation, prostheses and rehabilitation. There is a continuing wide-ranging fascination 
in all facets of amputation from the disciplines of psychiatry, neurology and psychology, 
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including: the strategies which patients employ in order to cope with altered bodies, the 
prevalence of a fear of falling, psychological adjustment to limb loss, longitudinal 
studies of body image, investigations of Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) (where 
a person expresses a desire to remove a biologically ‘healthy’ limb), and the more 
disturbing neurological disorder apotemnophilia (where an erotic interest in being or 
looking like an amputee leads in extreme cases to self-amputation) (First 2005). 
Like psychological and psychiatric discussions of amputation, scientific and historical 
writing on the history of prostheses as the progress of technology, with or without ‘social 
factors’ taken into consideration, is plentiful, as is advice to amputees and physicians on 
how to cope with the news of amputation, the surgery and recovery, rehabilitation, limb 
fitting, fitting back into family and society roles, as well as ongoing maintenance of both 
stump and prosthesis. Particularly in the case of advice to amputees and physicians, 
much of this information is given as non-gender specific, a-cultural forms, implying that 
a preconceived archetypal prosthetic patient is constructed from within a biomedical 
model of health and rehabilitation. 
It is also worth noting that discussions of physical difference are plentiful from within 
the increasingly interdisciplinary field of disability studies, most interestingly for me in 
the works of Mitchell and Snyder (1997, 2000) and Paterson and Hughes (1999). It isn’t 
that these scholars have been unimportant to many of broadly accepted criticisms 
levelled at state institutions for the ways in which disabilities have been managed, nor 
that they have not provided the foundation of many of the terms that we now take as 
given in anthropology, such as social or medial models of disability; but many disability 
studies articles are also written in a deeply personal testimonial style that prioritises 
individual experience, in what might be termed a ‘phenomenology’ of disability (such as 
Murphy 1990). As Mitchell and Snyder themselves note, for many scholars in the 
discipline
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In stories about characters with disabilities, an underlying issue is 
whether their disability is the foundation of the character itself. The 
question is not whether disability is a cause or symptom of, or 
distraction from, a disturbing behavioural trait, but whether its mystery 
can be pierced by the storyteller (Mitchell and Snyder 2000: 6).
Not only is this a stunning good example of the use of language to prop up and 
prosthetize the ‘deficient’ body, but it also appears to be exactly what Jain (1999) 
proposes that we need to argue against, in that it proposes that the body being 
augmented is somehow naturally unnatural. In these kinds of stories we can only have 
individuals overcoming obstacles to achieve their potential, and in this regard I believe 
strongly that what is interesting for anthropological investigation about prostheses is the 
potential to move beyond the individual. Prosthesis based research has the ability to 
speak to the social, national, and to the international interests of multinational 
companies; to the processes of globalisation, and the increasing technologising of life as 
we know it, played out through bodies that not only emerge as sleek, replicable and 
desirable but that are also historically constituted - also fleshy, porous and fallible. An 
investigation of culturally embedded prosthetic citizenship allows active and engaged 
agents to be revealed, each of whom has their own personal social and political agenda. 
In this regard it is anthropologists writing about disability, aesthetics and politics to 
whom I have turned for erudition, most notably in regard to this thesis the works of 
Kohrman (2003, 2003b, 2005), Staples (2003), and Dreger (2007); in Kohrman’s case, 
on the ways in which the classification of impairment by the state leads to the defining 
of disability through narrow classificatory schema, which guarantee the rights of some at  
the expense of others, in Staples’, on the politics of display and concealment of 
deformity among leper communities in India, and Dreger’s, on the medicalisation and 
subsequent scientific display of inter-sexed individuals with unusual anatomies. 
Even for Mitchell and Snyder (1997, 2000), who collaborate continuously across the 
field of expertise on physical difference, fleshy materiality (what we might call ‘lived 
experience’) and text remain two distinct phenomena. They write: 
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while an actual prosthesis is always somewhat discomforting, a textual 
prosthesis alleviates discomfort by removing the unsightly from view 
(ibid. 2000: 8).
I propose that not only is this not the case, but that a broader and more anthropological 
understanding of the body as a readable text and a site of social interaction could 
reconcile the divide between discourse and materiality, because, if we accept language 
as a construction of a common system of signs used in communication, then an actual 
prosthesis also alleviates discomfort, whilst simultaneously aiding the pronunciation of a 
difficult ‘symbol’ in much the same manner as a textual one. The symbol or word in 
question is the body itself. 
People have always attached things to themselves, made tools to increase their 
efficiency, and adorned themselves in various ways. Additionally, people have always 
existed who are born with different anatomies, as have those who experience injury or 
accident12. Various ethnic groups mention deities with missing limbs, and subsequent 
prostheses13. Archaeologists have found peg legs and prosthetic toes dating back to 
between 900 and 300 BC, we know of the wooden hands and feet of the Middle Ages, 
and of knights with prosthetic components built into their armour. The vulcanised 
rubber, leather and ivory of the late nineteenth century is recorded in photographs and as 
material objects that appear from time to time in museum displays, as are the 
functionalist job specific workers’ limbs of the post World War One period. 
Later on came the acrylic and power-assisted prostheses of the mid twentieth century. 
Most recent are the computerised, the laser-created, the nerve-controlled, and the bone-
implanted nanotechnological prostheses that have marked the last decade of both 
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12 The inverse to this also applies, and records of the intentional removal of limbs exist, both as 
punishment, and for pleasure (see Berger et al. 2005, First 2005 and Ryan 2008 for a fuller 
description).
13 For example Greek, Peruvian, Aztec, and Celtic mythologies all make mention of prosthetic 
deities (Pelops, Aia Paec, Tezcatlitoca, and New Hah respectively).
military research and large scale 
prosthetics development in 
Europe and the United States. 
There is a certain macabre irony 
that the military hospitals and 
rehabilitation laboratories that 
engineer ever more advanced 
prostheses belong to that same 
great machine of destruction that 
finds ever more innovative ways 
to injure the same soldiers it goes 
on to patch up. 
The history of the prosthetics industry is infused with the history of surgery and 
rehabilitation, the history of warfare and conflict, of war veterans’ movements, of the 
rise of capitalist economics at the expense of apprenticed trades and home industries, the 
marrying together of such disparate technologies as wood lathing, myo-electric14 
controls, hydraulics, vacuum attachments, neoprene tensile strength, and computer 
engineering. As the work of a number of historical researchers, on the development of 
prostheses shows (for example the work of Gutfleisch 2003, Gallagher and MacLachlan 
1999, Reznick 2008), throughout this prosthetic history (a useful pun, if one considers 
the prosthetics industry as an inevitable add on to the greater forces of military history) 
the twin desires for rehabilitation both of form and of function have not always been 
mutually attainable. Most often the quest for one category comes at the sacrifice of the 
other. Aesthetically pleasing, lifelike, organic kinetics and cosmetic values have 
traditionally been pitted against mechanical, functional, robust and practical qualities, 
and have traditionally played second fiddle to them (Serlin 2002, Reznick 2008). 
Fig 1: German rehabilitation centre - 1942 Hugo Jaeger/
Time Inc
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14 Myo-electric prostheses have an external power source and are not reliant on physical muscle 
strength to mechanically control movements. They utilize the residual neuromuscular network 
through the use of sensors so that patients can control various hand and wrist movements by 
voluntarily contracting the muscles on their amputated limb. 
The field of medical prosthetics began and remains strongly connected to the military, 
documented from the time of the French field surgeon Ambroise Pare in 1529 (Reznick 
2008). Often considered the father of modern prostheses (Ott, Serlin and Mihm 2002) 
Pare created his first functional upper extremity prosthesis in 1536, and is also credited 
with some of the first ocular prostheses. This should perhaps come as no surprise when 
one considers that the violent injury sustained in warfare by both military personal (both 
formal and informal) and by civilians is still one of the highest causes of amputation. In 
the public eye, amputation has traditionally been more visible amongst war veterans and 
traumatic injury survivors who have lost limbs by way of agonising injuries: often in 
situations where surgery conditions were not ideal and their residual limb could not be 
sculpted into an appropriate form to which a prosthesis could be applied. These 
amputees, and those who chose not to (or for various reasons are unable to) wear 
prostheses have visibly different anatomies which, when on display within the public 
domain, are then read as having signified something important about the character of the 
individual on display. Short of wearing a sign around their necks however, the many 
reasons why an amputee might choose not to wear a limb are reduced to social norms for 
dealing with abnormal anatomies. So the relationship of person and prosthesis, whether 
we are considering prostheses to be only physical medical prosthetic limbs, or including 
all manner of medical structures such as wheelchairs, crutches, or exoskeletal brackets, 
mean that body will be read differently in any given social situation. 
Currently, leg amputations still outnumber upper body amputations four to one (Ott 
2002), men are still more likely to be amputees than women, through the gendering of 
amputation with traditional male roles such as physical labouring, high risk sports 
activities, and armed services. That being said, one of the fastest growing causes of 
amputation is amongst the elderly, through late onset diabetes and vascular failure, and 
as women tend to live longer than men, this is changing the demographics of 
rehabilitation centres such as the one that I studied in Belgrade. 
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I wish to explore this concept even further, suggesting that the practices of rehabilitation 
- in this instance of amputee patients in Serbia - are complicated by the nature of 
transition of the nation-state in the past decade. While this might seem like stating the 
obvious, the question of restoration of mobility through the physical prosthetising of the 
body is in many ways replicated in the rehabilitation of the state. Both processes are 
ultimately concerned with the possibility for generating moral action. This capability for 
moral action is in many ways what defined a feeling of normalcy for my Serbian friends 
and informants. In this regard prosthetic citizenship is the rule rather than the exception. 
Our lives may be ever more technological, and we use these emerging technologies to 
imagine ourselves in increasingly abstract ways, pondering anti-embodiment, the end of 
the body, the creation of virtual lives. We seem to have taken for granted the ‘really real’ 
physical, bureaucratic, statistical, cultural and national and regional ways in which we 
are all prosthetic citizens. 
As Jain (1999) argued, we are often preoccupied with our imaginings of the future and 
how we will eventually experience it. In wishing to stay ahead of the field where it 
comes to a medical ethics, we sometimes get caught up in the whirlwind of the latest and 
the greatest technologies, pondering what life will be like if they spread, becoming 
commonplace in society. I sometimes feel however these imaginings have become 
totally divorced from the way that humans actually go about shaping the daily practices 
that make up the bulk of our lives, and so by placing ‘moramo da živimo’ in the central 
space of this dissertation, I am constantly reminded that we still have to live, despite 
constantly mutating technological landscapes, the creation of social media, advances in 
telecommunications, increasingly digital representations of ourselves, artificial 
procreation we are at our core social creatures, we have to eat and drink, we need shelter 
and sleep. Fate can deal us terrible blows, horrible things can happen that we have no 
control over. Accepting that we have to live means that constantly forging connections 
with each other and with technology, in ways that are nothing if not pragmatic, bound up 
in our negotiations of the everyday.
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I
To prosthetize...is to institute a notion of the body within a regime of 
tolerable deviance (Mitchell and Snyder 2000: 7)
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How to Look at a Prosthesis
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When we imagine prostheses, what do we see?
It is the linguistic origins of the term that allows us to differentiate between prosthetic, 
and prosthesis. In its more recent usage, ‘prosthesis’, and its plural ‘prostheses’, refer to 
a finished structure, to what Wigley (1991) calls the ‘foreign elements’ that prop up the 
body (or a word, for that matter). As such, prosthesis has the heady whiff of materiality 
about it, and descriptively, becomes ó  that which has been added to an already existing 
structure. ‘Prosthetic’ however, is an adjective, and taken in this capacity lends itself to 
more complex analysis. A prosthesis is for example, composed of prosthetic 
components. Let us look again at the origins of the word: If prosthesis is an ‘addition’, 
then surely the term prosthetic denotes the orientation of this relationship towards an 
already existing phenomenon. Further, it not only provides an orientation, it also implies 
a power differential, because an addition must after all exist in relation to something 
other than itself. It is always ‘added’ onto something (Wigley 1991). I would argue that a 
prosthesis supplements that which it is added on to (be it linguistic, corporeal or 
metaphoric) in a peculiarly paradoxical way. This paradox is possibly caused by the 
appropriation of a linguistic term into a social and anatomical model. If we again look to 
its linguistic origins, its purpose is to provide ease of pronunciation without altering 
meaning, a quality difficult to achieve when the text in question is the physical schema 
of the human body.
Jain (1999) is one of a very small number of academics to have attempted a critical 
unpacking of the meanings of the term prosthetic, in order to examine a number of the 
assumptions that scholars working with the term prosthesis have made. In a singular 
concise article, she pulls together a broad cross section of the literature on prosthesis and 
prosthetics available in the humanities, attempting an answer to the question of how the 
term prosthesis has come to assume a body deemed deficient and in need of 
supplementation. Her investigation into how the normative is configured, as well as in 
what capacity and in whose interests prostheses are adopted is illuminating.
31
Jain shows that the term prosthetic ‘presumes an enhancement to the ‘natural’ body...
[where] bodies and prostheses are already naturalised rather than being understood as 
socially constructed’ (ibid: 39). All too often the use of the trope of prosthesis even as a 
metaphor prioritises the disabled body, resulting in the glazing over of the ironies 
inherent in prosthetising through the consumption of technologies by other types of 
imperfect bodies; be they gendered, raced, ageing, or colonial. In fact her description 
bears an uncanny resemblance to Metzl’s (2010) description of how the language of 
‘health’ allows for a glazing over of what might otherwise be considered uncomfortable 
positions on issues such as gender, sexuality, racial and economic stereotyping. The 
language of health, Metzl states, enables ‘troubling slippages between the health of 
individual bodies and economic ones...’ (ibid: 4). Within the following chapters I aim to 
expand this point even further, since undertaking research in Serbia has shown me that 
recent liberal-democratic healthcare transitioning (under the conditions of Serbia’s much 
stagnated application to join the EU) also creates such slippage between individual and 
national bodies, creating a geopolitical hierarchy of health and risk discourse that, 
without the normalising rhetoric (Metzl 2010) of health as an apolitical catchall term, 
would likely be challenged more directly from both the internal state healthcare sectors 
of postcolonial states, as well as from academic and political entities. 
The Bela Clinic
The militarisation of states and health systems is deserving of a vastly more robust 
investigation than is ventured within these pages. However, regarding the Serbian 
prosthetics industry, let it suffice to say for now, that I hope to show how the increasing 
militarism of the United States during the mid nineteenth century has had a direct impact 
on the rehabilitative trajectories of multiple generations of Serbian amputees, and is in 
many ways cemented in the very foundations of the Bela Clinic, and of Rudo. Like 
many countries, Yugoslavia suffered a massive loss of human life during the First World 
War (53% of the male population was a number often quoted to me by friends and 
acquaintances, though never a number that I could track down with any certainty) and 
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enormous numbers of injured servicemen (re)entered the work force in the post war 
period. At their inception Rudo and the Bela Clinic were joined together, formally 
founded in 1919 as The Prosthetic Company of the Kingdom of Serbia, paid for with the 
help of the organisation of Saint George (a French foundation) who wished to ‘help the 
invalids of Serbia’. The first six workers in the factory were themselves a mixture of 
French and Serbian amputees. They had learned the art of prosthetics manufacturing in 
Tunisia after years of conflict there. This workshop was first temporarily located in a 
southern Serbian town, but was quickly moved to its current location in 1918, an estate 
bought specifically for them from the previously owners, the Austro-Hungarian army, by 
the same French organisation. In the period between the two World Wars, the company 
continued to grow, building inpatient facilities and developing better working conditions 
for its (previously temporary) manufacturing workshops, as well as increasing its 
production of medical aids, orthoses, prostheses, orthotic shoes, wheelchairs and 
crutches. Then, as Tito’s communist party came into power, in 1954 the company was 
re-founded as a state enterprise. The rehabilitation hospital was expanded, and whole 
institution renamed Rudo, after its town of origin.
Fig 2: Prosthetists at work in their workshop in 1919. Source: Rudo archives.
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The manufacturing branch of Rudo was sold off and privatised in 1995 when the Serbian 
Government urgently needed to generate revenue15, taking with it the (by now, well 
known) brand name. Until this point the company had had a monopoly over the industry, 
but it was run badly during this period, and Bojana, the librarian and translator (and my 
occasional research assistant) of the Bela Clinic, told me that she thought it was likely 
that it had been run down in order to be sold again cheaply to a foreign conglomerate in 
2007. In any case, Rudo now had a small but strong customer base, and had expanded 
into production of mainstream ergonomic children’s shoes as well as the manufacturing 
of customised prostheses orthotic aids. The company now employed 106 workers. Due 
to their shared premises, they also maintained a deal with the Bela Clinic to manufacture 
prostheses and orthoses in accordance with the government beneficiary regulations so 
that patients who wished to, could have their limbs subsidised semi-privately, while still 
going through the state funded inpatient gait clinic at the Bela clinic, if they so desired. 
Both the Bela clinic and Rudo 
still exist on these grounds, 
though a large flyover 
motorway now separates 
them from the serenely 
flowing Sava River, the so 
called ‘aorta’ of Serbia, which 
was one of the original 
aesthetic reasons for the 
choice of site. Here they form 
a series of sprawling 
mismatched buildings, hunched between the city and the river, sometimes acting in 
competition, and other times in co-operation. The two institutions maintain separate 
fitting rooms, prosthetics workshops, and prosthetists, but share the park and an onsite 
Fig 3: the original premises of the prosthetic company of the 
Kingdom of Serbia. Source: Rudo archives.
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15 between 1989 and 1995 approximated 60% of Serbian state and worker owned companies 
were privatized, through insider trading 
bakery with an outside seating area, where in the summer months, patients spent a great 
deal of their time; occasionally practicing walking, but more often sitting in groups 
playing chess and smoking. Despite official administrative differences, the daily reality 
was that the prosthetist staff pool were well integrated, and most patients in the 
prosthetics department used the gait clinic in the Bela clinic. It wasn’t uncommon to see 
the prosthetists from Rudo in the gait clinic as they no longer used their own, although 
they still had one on site, complete with plastic pot-plants, parallel bars, and changing 
booths, all blanketed in a thick layer of dust, in which I spent a couple of very wheezy 
hours one afternoon watching a patient have her socket recast. 
Much more recently, as a result of international standardised practice procedures (so 
called ISOs), the centre had been gradually shoehorned into European/American models 
of practice, which, for example, required a physician to be employed within the 
prosthetics department, decree that the hospital should be a non-smoking area, and lay 
down health and safety guidelines for working with potentially hazardous materials 
(such as the epoxy plastic commonly used in socket manufacture). All well-intentioned 
initiatives, though as I hope to show, in many instances they increased the workload of 
staff, or were impossible to enforce to such a degree that they were only ever half 
heartedly taken up. 
Despite these new changes, the Bela clinic for the most part remains resolutely the 
hulking relic of a bygone era. It is a disproportionately large clinic for the size of the 
population, having at one stage served (together with two smaller sister hospitals in 
Zagreb and Ljubljana) the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Burger et al., 2004). It 
used to boast 200 beds, but now, as a result of the increasing number of private clinics, it 
was in danger of being scaled down. There are approximately 200 employees, divided 
into medical staff (who comprised just over half), administration, and housekeeping. 16 
doctors, who each have approximately 11 patients in their care, 38 nurses16 (11 during 
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16 During an interview with one of the nurses, she informed me that as 63 of the current patients 
had no family that could, or would, come to visit, one of their primary roles was to give moral and 
emotional support to these patients in particular.
any given shift), 14 prosthetists, and 35 therapists for the now 180 beds17, an impressive 
ratio of approximately 1:5. Most of the therapists worked in the gait clinic and the pre-
prosthetic therapy room. There are however others who I occasionally ran into; 
occupational therapists, staff who work with electrical therapies, and with massage, with 
light and radiation therapies.
At the time that I researched at Bela, there was a vague and yet constant rumour floating 
about the staff that the clinic was in danger of being closed down and moved to a smaller 
premises. There was therefore a perception among the staff, that it was their best 
interests to keep the beds full, and as such, a high turnover rate of patients was not really  
encouraged. In contrast to the outside world, where Serbia shoved and jostled its way 
through ‘transition’, life seemed to meander at a leisurely pace within the Clinic walls. 
And leisurely, through the streets of Belgrade, were my morning walks, arriving as I did, 
three times weekly from the central train station on the banks of the Sava, to interview 
and to observe, for nine months of the sixteen that I spent18 in the country. Under the 
distant, but watchful gaze of the clinic director (who had, at my first meeting with her, 
taken a cursory glance at my carefully formatted and worded information sheet and 
consent form, dismissed them as trivial, and had signed them on behalf of the entire 
clinic, telling me that I could interview whomever I wished as long as they weren’t 
busy), I got to know a core number of the staff, initially interviewing 3 Doctors, 3 
Nurses, 2 Social Workers, the head Prosthetist, the computer technician, and one of the 
accounting bookkeepers, along with 15 patients over the course of just two months. I 
was interested in quickly establishing a group of people within the clinic who would 
know who I was. During most of this time I was accompanied by Bojana, and I also 
spent long periods of time discussing the clinic as she saw it. These were also some of 
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17 the clinic was not often full, aside from in the middle of winter
18 I was actually resident in Serbia for 18 months, though travelled to New Zealand to visit my 
family, and to India for a month each. 
the longer and more structured interviews that I conducted, as I wanted to build up a 
picture of the clinic, from each group’s perspective19. 
As the months went by gradually as I became less of a novelty, and I was left mostly to 
my own devices, unless I requested that Bojana join me (which I often did if I was 
interviewing particularly elderly patients, or those with difficult dialects), and so a 
pattern emerged where I spent my mornings observing for 3 hours in the gait clinic, 
tucked against a wall with notepad in hand and a bottomless cup of coffee. The initial 
patients I had met, would occasionally introduce me to their ‘classmates’ so that we 
could chat as they waited their turn, and the therapists could snatch five minute 
conversations in between patients. Many times in the gait clinic however, there would be 
a mix of patients that I knew and didn’t know. None of them seemed to mind that we 
hadn’t been formally introduced, as by this stage I had become part of the gait clinic 
landscape. The same with the therapists. All of these had, by this stage heard of me 
however, and many interviews started with a request to know how my research was 
going. I stopped counting these snatched ‘interviews’ in the gait clinic (as they merged 
with my field notes and observations) when they hit 60, as it seemed a little audacious to 
count what were essentially conversations, though the process of their collection proved 
to be pivotal in understanding the importance of gait clinic in social as well as physical 
rehabilitation. During these morning sessions, one or another of the initial doctors or 
therapists that I had interviewed would usually drop by, and give me the names and 
room numbers of patients that they thought would make ‘interesting cases’ for me to 
interview. I was initially very thankful for these suggestions, although after some time I 
realised that they had been selecting out patients with various psychological traumas, 
that distinguished them from the other patients. Eventually I began to suggest patients 
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19 Part of the reason that I only interviewed on Monday, Wednesday and Friday, was to give 
myself a breathing space between what what were often quite emotionally draining interviews, I 
could spend the morning writing up my notes, and updating my field diary, although eventually I 
was also offered a teaching position at the University of Southeastern Europe, on their Novi Sad 
campus, which comprised of two afternoons (conveniently spaced on Tuesdays and Thursdays) 
a week. 
names to doctors myself, and to check whether they would be interested in talking with 
me.
In the afternoons, I would seek out patients or staff that I had spoken with in the 
morning for longer conversations, either in their offices, rooms, or, more often in the 
case of patients, in one of the quieter upstairs therapy rooms. During these interviews I 
was careful to have another member of staff with me. This wasn’t a particularly difficult 
undertaking, given that, in the spirit of multi-tasking, the doctor in charge of the patient 
would often come and do their daily check up on their patient at the same time. When 
this wasn’t the case, most of the time, I could draw on the help of Bojana, though on the 
(very seldom) chance that she was busy, a therapist with whom I had established a 
rapport, named Miljan stepped in. As the director had made clear that she had consented 
on behalf of the clinic and I didn’t wish to antagonise her20, I also reiterated to the 
patients that while talking to me that they could stop the interviews whenever they 
wished, and that they would be not be identified in my research. In addition to the initial 
15, I conducted interviews with 20 more patients, either preceded or followed (or both) 
by talks in the gait lab, and I have also used materials from interviews from more staff 
members, 3 more of the doctors, 2 of the prosthetists and 4 of the therapists, Bojana, 
Nikolina and Gordana I met with often, sometimes twice weekly, either to interview, or 
in the course of interviewing patients. Additionally, from Rudo, I interviewed 3 patients, 
2 prosthetists and the marketing manager, and physician in charge of prosthetics 
marketing (whom I interviewed repeatedly). From Ottobock, I talked with the then 
director, his secretary and the company’s business lawyer (at a Serbian ‘business’ 
lunch21). Janko conducted surveys with the 4 private prosthetists operating in Novi Sad 
on my behalf. However, it is the Bela clinic, that occupied the bulk of my time, simply 
because of its proximity and the welcome I received. I believe that my presence in the 
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20 The Bela clinic was in many ways an anomaly. It was run primarily by women of ‘strong’ 
opinion and character: the director, the head prosthetist, the majority of the doctors, and 
therapists. Only in the prosthetics manufacturing department were the staff mostly men.
21 See Momo Kapor’s book ‘a guide to the Serbian mentality’ for a tongue in cheek description of 
this unique cultural phenomenon. 
clinic was accepted so easily, and with such little resistance, because a previous member 
of staff, who had recently retired, had also been a social anthropologist22. He had been a 
popular staff member, and his anecdotes and observations of the patients were missed in 
the staffroom23.
Putting History into Context
I have mentioned already that the field of prosthetics and of prostheses led rehabilitation 
is conceptually, as well as physically located within a wider industry of military 
rehabilitation (Reznick 2008). After all, as Scarry notes (1985), the ‘real’ purpose of 
territorial war might be considered as one of injuring (as opposed to killing) as many of 
the enemy as possible. It takes no large measure of cynicism to consider prosthetics the 
ultimate self driving industry. Just as military powers create ever more diverse methods 
to out-injure each other, so they also create increasingly advanced tool kits for piecing 
back together soldiers. There will always be newly injured bodies, who, apart from their 
missing limbs, are (or at least were) healthy, active citizens. 
During conflict, whilst in active service, military servicemen and women literally 
become the nation made corporeal, acting both for and as the state, whether defending 
state integrity or extending the reach of their patrons, their actions are the desires of the 
state made manifest. Perhaps this is best explained by a visual aid. In figure 4 (overleaf) 
the arrows represent the advancement of Soviet controlled territories west toward Berlin 
in 1945, but what is really being shown? In very real terms these red and blue arrows are 
the movements and journeys taken and the dispersal of people; troops, battalions; 
individual bodies. As citizens who have physically defended the boundaries and agendas 
of the state, who have become the nation manifest, these returned service people become 
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22 though not employed as such.
23 Outside of the clinic, I have referred to informal conversations that I had with my students, all 
ranging in age from 18 to 25, and to my six Serbian (and one Canadian) colleagues at the Novi 
Sad campus of the University of Southeastern Europe. My own friends, Serbian teachers, family 
connections, Janko and his family and friends, who range from academic staff to subsistence 
farmers, make up the rest of my peripheral research subjects.
the ultimate subjects for rehabilitation, 
as governments show that they are 
willing to guarantee the sovereignty of 
these bodies, these fleshy territories of 
the state. 
At least they are guaranteed to a certain 
degree, for returning soldiers often 
have trouble returning to, and fitting 
into ‘civilian life. Serlin (2002) shows 
however, that rehabilitation of the body 
is seen as a precursor to rehabilitation 
of the mind. In any case, rehabilitating 
bodies, while perhaps less 
controversial than rehabilitating minds, 
is nonetheless a costly undertaking. 
They are expensive, the newly 
developed military prostheses currently  
available on the market. $60 000 US 
for an Ottobock24 C (computerised)-leg; as much as $100 000 for a myo-electric arm. 
For military veterans, these costs are borne for the most part by the state. Sadly, though 
not entirely unexpectedly, while I was in Serbia I never had the opportunity to deal with 
the military rehabilitation teams and their patients, who were treated differently to 
civilian cases. I was however, repeated told by the staff at both the Bela Clinic, Rudo 
and Ottobock that the military amputees could get whichever limbs they wanted, 
excluding the prestigious ‘c-leg’ prosthetic components. Rehabilitation of military 
amputees, it seems, is guaranteed, as is compensation. 
Fig 4: Attack of the red army - Source: ministry of 
defense of USSR
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24 Ottobock healthcare is a global brand in medical aids, orthoses, and prostheses. They are 
based originally in Germany, and the dominate the Serbian prosthetics market. They are 
introduced at length on page 66. 
So how does the militarisation of rehabilitation fit in to my Serbian clinic? After the 
Second World War under the guidance of Josip Tito, the newly amalgamated Yugoslavia 
underwent a period of economic revival, and breaking with communist tradition, Tito 
often looked to the United States for inspiration. In the case of the Bela Clinic, a team of 
doctors and prosthetists were sent to the United States to research new rehabilitation 
practices. They returned, full of enthusiasm for something that they termed ‘the 
American Model’. I have yet to pin down exactly what this meant, as each time I 
interviewed staff in the various departments, I was told that the entire centre was based 
on ‘the American model’, as though this was an answer in itself. The model, as much as 
I could ascertain, consisted primarily of treatment managed through a set of 
psychosocial ‘teams’, the two most common being a prosthetics team and a patient care 
team. This teamwork was ostensibly to create a unified approach to the management of 
patients, but was used just as often to sort the truth from fiction regarding what patients 
said and did. It was widely accepted among the staff that the patients would lie about 
what they had eaten and how much exercise they had undertaken. In a surprising turn of 
events however, I discovered that nurses were not considered to be a part of these 
‘teams’ and were not invited to the weekly meetings that the staff attended. Those that I 
talked with felt that this was a slight on their profession and informed me that, as the 
nurses had the most contact hours with the patients, they were in fact better informed 
about patients’ health practices and behaviours. One of the head nurses cited two 
incidents where nurses had picked up underlying health conditions long before the 
physicians and therapists had noticed. 
The technologies developed in military labs trickle down into the mainstream prosthetics 
industries however, as technological advances in components or materials, and as 
accumulated knowledge in practitioners who are invariably involved in both military and 
civilian clinics. The history of the Bela clinic, and the overflow of military cases into 
public domains during the recent past also meant that it was possible to see a 
militarisation of what Mol (2008) calls the logic of care, where philosophies of triaging 
were woven into daily practice. Young patients, active patients, children, geriatric 
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patients, patients who smoked, those who had cancer, diabetes, vascular heart disease, 
obesity problems...all were evaluated, and everything from their prosthesis type, the 
allocation of their bed, to the staff members assigned, was a judgment call on creating a 
network that would be in the best interests of both staff and patients. Young patients with 
active lifestyles were assigned young enthusiastic prosthetists, and equally keen 
therapists. 
The clinic had its own ebb and flow throughout the year. The autumn harvesting months 
would bring in unskilled labourers, most often very young, poor and from the south, all 
‘agricultural injuries’ I learned. Now ‘agriculture injury’ is an umbrella term that doesn’t  
quite do justice to the raw horror of having one’s limb mangled by a hay thresher, or a 
baling machine. Later in the year, heading into winter, large numbers of geriatric patients 
would enter the clinic, either for socket replacements or repairs. Many of these amputees 
lived alone or in households where they felt that they were a financial burden on their 
children. A stay in the Bela Clinic was at least a month, most often longer, a warm, coal 
fired respite from the icy Korševa wind (said to blow down from Russia), and included 
three meals a day. The clinic was consequently often full over the winter and almost 
empty over summer, when everyone escaped back home to tend vegetable gardens, go 
fishing and/or meet friends, and toward the end of my research in June I wandered my 
way through almost empty corridors pleasantly cool in the 35 degree temperature. 
Patients were having ‘a holiday’ from their rehabilitation ‘work’, though the more 
cynical among us might reasonably ask how exactly one has a holiday from an 
amputation. In any case, only those who had absolutely nowhere else to go remained. 
On a chilly autumn morning I met with Gordana, the physician I had initially called 
about my research. She had invited me to the clinic. She was on admissions duty when I 
arrived, and asked if I could accompany her as she saw new patients. We discussed my 
research and my hopes for observing and interviewing in the clinic. It would not, she 
was sure, be a problem. In between evaluating new and returning patients, we talked. I 
learned that most of the patients were geriatric men (unilateral above knee vascular 
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amputees), and most had some form of clinical depression. Some had had their 
prostheses since the Second World War, coming in occasionally for repairs and new 
sockets. Gordana informed me that while the Bela Clinic used to manufacture their own 
components when they were connected to Rudo, this was no longer financially viable 
due to an influx of cheaper, good quality mass produced German parts. She was aware 
of some international organisations for amputees, but told me that as far as she knew, no 
national level amputees association existed in Serbia. She also mentioned that as a centre 
they are unable to do much for patient advocacy due to the tiny amount of financial 
support that they receive from the government. She told me that some of the (younger) 
patients receive a small amount of vocational training and have a computer room 
available to them. Although, as I found out a couple of months later, this computer room 
had been out of action for at least three months predating the interview. 
Gordana continued, telling me that during the 1990s there were many land mine victims 
who came as refugees but who have since returned to their communities. Before this 
conflict people used to travel from throughout Yugoslavia. Now it is only the poor and 
the sick who come. She laughed when I asked about the previous ‘permanent’ 
inhabitants who I had heard about ó  groups of ‘internally 25’ displaced refugees who had 
remained at the Bela Clinic for almost a decade during the 1990s, marooned in Belgrade 
because of bureaucratic loopholes in citizenship law. They were ‘long gone’ though she 
didn’t know where. ‘Although’, she asked, ‘did I know that when they were here, they 
even had their lična26 cards written up with the hospital as their permanent address?’ I 
said that I was surprised they were allowed to stay so long. ‘It was a crazy time’ she 
continued, adding that ‘the demographics of the centre were very different.’ At that time 
there were long queues for the elderly patients as the beds were all filled with soldiers. 
Now they normally have about 150 patients a year, but back then it was maybe 700 or 
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25 it is difficult to classify the refugees as internal or external, because, depending on one’s 
political orientation, the territories that they were leaving were either still part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia or already independent. 
26state identity card
800. ‘It was crazy’ she said, as she shook her head. I’m not sure if the craziness was 
surviving the whole thing, or that it happened at all. Both, I imagine. 
At the same time that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia’s national-scale manufacturing 
facilities of the Bela Clinic were being developed, the whole face of the prosthetics 
industry was changing in the aftermath of the first and second Balkan wars, and of the 
first World War in the early twentieth century. Perry (2002) writes of the birth of a large-
scale prosthetics industry in Germany after the First World War, and the mapping of 
class hierarchies onto prostheses to be distributed to veterans that occurred as the 
growing field of orthotics sought to reproduce the stability of pre-war German society. 
By shifting responsibility onto veterans to re-enter the workforce as quickly as possibly, 
these pioneering prosthetists recast the ubiquitous broken war hero into a potential 
stubborn state slacker, out to exploit the welfare system, were he not to receive a robust 
and job-ready limb. Prior to this era, the focus of the field of prosthetics had been 
primarily aesthetic, or as Mihm (2002) puts it, limbs that could be ‘presentable in 
society.’ Cosmetic limbs, which at the time were made of lightweight timber and without 
moving parts, are, as the name suggests, aesthetic. As one of the young patients I 
interviewed at the clinic said, they were ‘something to fill the empty space’. 
In the early 1910s however, in the face of enormous numbers of injured soldiers and in 
light of the failure to marry cosmetic and practical functions, German orthopedists 
simply gave up the idea of concealing injury. By employing Fordist production models, 
and by conceptualising the body as a machine, complete with the possibility of 
interchangeable parts to be used by the labouring classes, who were in turn imagined as 
interchangeable parts to the larger societal economic reserve, they tailored ‘work claw’ 
limbs to specific manual labouring professions, sometimes incorporating the limb fixture 
right into machinery so that amputees literally became part of the machines. Veterans 
were offered ‘job counselling’ and attended working classes to retrain, so that they could 
be slotted back into manual jobs. They were expected and often economically pressured 
to return into the manual work force as quickly as physically possible. In contrast, the 
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middle classes of officers were offered entry into intellectual professions such as 
clerking or teaching, a distinction also shown through the retention of the more 
aesthetically pleasing but mechanically nonfunctional, cosmetic ‘sontags27’ arm for 
them.
Eventually Germany turned more fully toward functionalist design and was at the same 
time plunged into a financial depression. The manufacture of these cosmetic arms was 
largely rendered obsolete in the following decades through an early manifestation of the 
rubric ‘form follows function’ because the sontags arm was eventually deemed to be 
‘devoid of any type of important function’ (this being any function that would allow for 
manual labour). Despite this, during the initial period of prosthetics invention it is 
possible to see the class structure of German society reworked through the military and 
then channelled through the very bodies of amputees, where in the lower classes, in the 
name of efficiency, manual workers literally became human prostheses to the machines 
they were often physically attached to (Perry 2002). Davis McDaid (2002) notes a 
similar discrepancy between the lower and middle classes in the US post civil war. She 
writes that while in the northern states, many war veterans hoped to hide their injury 
with a lifelike approximation, 
most Virginia veterans, however, were more interested in substance than 
style, looking to artificial limbs as a practical means to regain mobility 
and return to work (ibid: 131). 
Davis McDaid suggests that for many of these veterans, the ‘post-war battle for 
economic survival and physical mobility [was] nearly as difficult as the war itself’ (ibid: 
136). The binding together of mobility, labouring, and citizenship therefore has had 
many precedents. These findings are mirrored in those of Burger et al. (2004) who notes 
that during a 4 year study28 of 671 amputees from the three primary ethnic groups in 
Bosnia, the Serbs had higher levels of employment and mobility, due in good part to 
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27 a ‘Sunday’ arm, for occasions where one needed to be smartly dressed, such as church.
28 from 1998 until 2002
their being fitted with more basic limbs that were less likely to break. Technology, far 
from racing ahead with our cybernetic dreams, remains resolutely appropriate and 
culturally delineated. 
Another of the many staff who I spent time with in the Bela clinic was Nikolina, head of 
the department of prosthetics. She had studied originally at a specialised college for 
prosthetists 30 years ago, and after this went on to study something that Bojana 
translated as ‘defectology’, which she described as the study of how children with 
physical disabilities learn and experience the world. However both these schools had 
been under the old socialist system and institutions such as those where she had studied 
no longer existed. Now prospective new prosthetists interned at the centre for a couple 
of years after completing medical high school, and were occasionally sent off to 
commercial healthcare training seminars run by the German healthcare company 
Ottobock. This further reinforced the monopoly that Ottobock had over the Serbian 
prosthetics industry, as the courses offered to these fledgling prosthetics dealt solely with 
components that they produced. 
During one of our first conversations, I asked Nikolina how the department had changed 
over the 30 years that she had been working at the clinic. After pausing for thought, she 
told me that things had become much more technologically advanced, but that this was 
not necessarily a good turn of events. She felt that, in many ways, technology hindered 
patients from accepting ‘the situation’ and thus their amputation. To illustrate this point, 
Nikolina used the example of a woman who could knit herself her own stump sock. This 
hypothetical woman, she posited, whether or not she came to be able to don and doff her 
new prosthesis, would retain a feeling of accomplishment and perhaps a measure of 
ownership over her condition, as constant interaction with her stump, both measuring 
and handling it, might mean that she could come to terms with her altered body image 
faster. ‘People these days think of prostheses like shoes’, said Nikolina, ‘It’s not a good 
thing, like they are disposable, you just assemble all the parts and away you go’. The 
smooth shelled prostheses appear simpler and disguise both the complex workings of the 
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prosthesis and the hard work of the prosthetist. But, Nikolina reminded me, waggling 
her finger, ‘no matter how complex the prosthetic leg becomes, it still won’t walk on its 
own!’ Without training, it will remain a useless object. 
Nikolina was an excellent artist. Her own paintings adorned the walls of her office. She 
described how difficult and important it was to get the prosthesis to match the remaining 
leg or arm, and later showed me a brochure for cosmetic silicon glove prostheses. ‘Look 
at the skin’ she marvelled, telling me a story from when a previous head of prosthetics 
had looked at her art works. ‘He came and asked me if I could paint on the skin [of an 
arm prosthesis], all the veins and details, can you imagine that? ‘what an artwork it 
would be’. Unfortunately the head had retired before this project had been realised, but 
Nikolina held the memory tight, fingering the skin of her wrist, ‘can you imagine - all 
those veins?’ I didn’t really have to imagine hard. A sales brochure of cosmetic hands 
was open on the table in front of me. Dozens of disembodied hands waved at me from 
the pages of the promotional booklet, and I compared it in my head to a latex glove 
prosthesis that I’d seen on a patient’s hand a couple of days previously, which had been 
shiny and pink like new skin under a burn.
Nikolina told me that, in her opinion, the most important skill a prosthetist must have is 
creativity. She views each finished limb as a piece of art and is emotionally attached to 
each prosthesis, especially those for children. She remembered a one-year-old boy born 
without a leg who came to the centre, who they helped to walk and supported as he grew 
up. Though now in his 30s and married, he and his family still send birthday and 
Christmas cards to the prosthetists. Nikolina has seen how they can make an enormous 
difference in the lives of patients. They strive constantly for the best solution, even in 
difficult times. Nikolina told me that during the 1990s many of the prosthetists were 
making more than 50 limbs a year, with scarce resources, and overflowing wards. Now 
that things have quieted down, she has time ‘to think’ again, and now she thinks a lot. 
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Nikolina was very supportive of my fieldwork, and was very interested in the lives of 
the patients. She often wondered about how they survived and adjusted, especially the 
younger ones. She too told me the story of the marooned refugees during the 1990s with 
the Bela Clinic listed as their address on their government issued identity cards. It 
appeared that she followed up closely on her patients, so I ask her what became of the 
refugees, but like everyone else, she didn’t know. They have simply gone, like 
characters in a story. She does tell me however that these days military amputees have 
access to the latest technology and prostheses, and that it is very seldom that they turn up  
in the Bela Clinic. ‘One has a leg that cost €2000!’ she exclaimed, as though such a thing 
was inconceivable (which, in light of the type of patients that the clinic received, 
probably was). When I asked her if the soldiers were only covered for injuries acquired 
‘legitimately’ during the war, (i.e. in combat, or on active duty) I received instead a story 
of unfortunate Serb soldiers in Bosnia who lost arms whilst looting village houses that 
had been booby-trapped with mines in closets by the retreating enemy forces...The 
answer obliquely being ‘no’. 
Manufacturing Meaning: prostheses and technological innovation
The increasing mass production of limbs and limb components shows how closely the 
prosthetics industry is tied to the advancement of capitalist economics. The marketing of 
these prostheses is interesting for many reasons. Standardised mass-produced limb 
components are implicated in networks of technologies and materials, which are always 
in a precarious state of possible collapse and renewal as exhibited by the years of 
sanctioning in Serbia. These collapses may fuel new technologies - Ott (2002) for 
example notes how the development of the acrylic prosthetic eye in America was bought 
about through the disintegration of the trade of soda glass from the Black Forest region 
of Germany during the Second World War - or they may expose flaws in the logic of 
technological advancement for its own sake, as in the following. The Bela Clinic was 
actually mentioned specifically in a Burger et al.’s (2004) recent report on the provision 
of prosthetics to land-mine victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it was 
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hypothesised that the better conditions of 
the Serb amputees was partly attributable 
to the more simple nature of the 
prostheses (a much higher number of 
wooden or simple exoskeletal limbs) and 
the existence of the inpatient 
rehabilitation centre which was easily 
accessible to the Serb refugee population. 
Croatian and Bosniak amputees, who 
received higher quality aid treatment 
outside of Bosnia, had access to more 
technologically advanced limbs, but 
lacked the follow through treatment and 
access to replacement parts (ibid) which 
resulted in a higher percentage of limbs 
that were not in working order. 
Toward the end of my research, I met one 
of the last great timber prosthesis makers in Serbia, (possibly in the world, as searching 
for wooden prostheses these days turns up primarily historical articles) although rather 
than whole limbs, these days Milos mostly produces sockets. But, as he had heard that I 
was interested in the wooden limbs, he disappeared down a hallway in the labyrinthian 
network of Rudo workshops, and returned with a full wooden limb that he had once 
made. Great blocks of linden had been bored, lathed, sanded, finely adjusted with cork 
and polished to a high gloss. The inside gleamed with polish and the outside was painted 
a matt skin tone. 
Despite the beauty and functionality of these limbs, the management of Rudo seemed 
almost embarrassed that he was still producing these sockets, and told me that these 
sockets were only produced occasionally, primarily for veteran customers who had been 
Fig 5: Wooden exoskeletal prosthesis with 
SACH foot and shoulder harness, made by 
Milos 
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using timber all their lives, and refused to make the change to epoxy, or for those allergic 
to it. Milos told me proudly however that he had even had a New Zealander come to him 
for a socket refit and that the natural feel of the wood was good for the stump, which 
sweated less than in epoxy (I remembered that I had also seen for myself that there was 
at least one new user in the Bela Clinic using a wooden socket). 
A couple of days later Milos showed me 
around his workrooms. It took no longer 
to create the socket in wood than in 
epoxy, he said, as I looked at the 
collection of huge machines that seemed 
as though they would not be amiss in a 
giant dentistry practice. Rather than 
epoxy fumes, broad swaths of sawdust 
and wood chips covered the floor, and a 
fine wooden powder permeated the air. 
The dust and the aesthetics of the place 
led me to assume that these contraptions 
must have been from after the Second 
World War, but Rudo had invested in 
these machines from Ottobock healthcare 
back in the 1980s, Milos informed me. 
Ironically enough, right across from his 
workshop was the thermoplastic 
moulding workshop, a vastly more space-age setup, where staff made orthotic back 
supports and chest cages. Milos currently had two interns working with him,29 but he 
was concerned about the future of his craft. ‘They are not so interested in all this now’ 
he told me, gesturing to his machines, before sweeping his eyes across the hallway ‘It’s 
all much more technological these days’.
Fig 6: some of the lathes in the woodworking 
rooms.
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29 The interns at Rudo spent time in all the prosthetic and orthotic departments.
An incident later in the year showed me first hand some of the tensions that ran now 
between the high tech and low tech solutions that the Serbian prosthetists were dealing 
with. Bojana had been asked by the centre to make a presentation to the prosthetists 
about a new laser assisted alignment platform that the centre had invested in, and Dejan, 
the marketing officer for the company had come to Belgrade to walk her through the 
promotional DVD (in English) so that she would be able to assist the prosthetists with 
any instruction that they needed. 
As professionals, prosthetists have undergone a startling transformation from turn of the 
century purveyors of carpentry and leather working. Ones such as Milos and Nikolina, 
who had been in the Serbian industry for three decades, had experienced first hand the 
exponential superseding of materials and technologies, just as they had the disintegration 
of their land of birth. Far from existing solely in the high tech future, they were located 
within historical and cultural networks, and were very aware of the ambiguities of 
craftsmanship and technological precision. Both communicated to me that the work of 
being a prosthetist is fundamentally a negotiation between what is possible, and what is 
viable financially, aesthetically, physically and economically. 
The promotional DVD Bojana and I watched was a sleek, well-designed affair for a 
product from Ottobock called ‘L.A.S.A.R30 Posture’. Right from the beginning titles, the 
contrast with the Bela clinic was extraordinary. According to the DVD the future of 
prosthetic design had already arrived. In this future / present, the small L.A.S.A.R. 
platform itself guided the prosthetist to fine tune the limb of the patient by way of 
blinking lights and Laser lodes. On the DVD, prosthetist, laser platform and patient all 
worked quietly together, fully invested in the process of alignment. The room they were 
in was quiet, except from the quiet hum of machines. The floor was clean, the 
prosthetist’s lab coat spotless. It made the gait clinic on the floor below us seem 
positively carnivalesque. The prosthesis being aligned was cutting-edge. Both prosthetist 
and amputee smiled out of the monitor at us. The narrator, English speaking, with a soft 
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30 Laser Assisted Static Alignment Reference
and authoritative underlying German accent informed us in a friendly yet scientific tone 
that ‘the platform takes much of the guesswork out of static alignment’. This in turn 
allowed for ‘faster, more precise integration, less pain, and quicker rehabilitation and 
recovery’. The video went on to show a motion sensor lab and pressure pad software, 
though I confess that I had lost interest by then, though not due to boredom! 
My mind was spinning after seeing a particularly striking image on the screen. At one 
point the amputee had taken off his limb and the prosthetist placed it into a machine 
where a laser matrix had highlighted all the areas to be fine tuned. Together with the 
narration about removing the guesswork from prosthetics manufacture, I felt that this 
seemed to represent a new shift in the ever more technological work of prosthetics 
manufacture. It seemed to me that in this process both the prosthetist and the patient had 
been rendered somehow passive, that they were now prosthetic to a self-perpetuating 
technology which not only held the solution to the fallibility of the biological body, but 
also showed the shortcomings of the human mind, in that the messy ‘guesswork’ of the 
prosthetists could now be eliminated by clean science. I found it strangely distressing to 
watch. After the video ended, in a predictable series of before and after clips, I made my 
goodbyes, asking Dejan to pass my regards on to his company director, who I had met 
just months previously. ‘Oh! He’s no longer the director!’ laughed Dejan, ‘you know 
how these things go31’.
The increasing mass production of limbs and limb components show how closely the 
prosthetics industry is tied to the advancement of capitalist economics. The market of 
limb parts is interesting for many reasons. Standardised mass-produced limb 
components implicate networks of technologies and materials, and the globalisation of 
export and import. In Serbia, new and very European dichotomies are reproduced 
through the juxtaposition of localised internal industry (construed as inferior, poor 
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31 I did. In the new capitalist Serbia, the motto more than ever seemed to be get rich or die trying 
(Colin 2004). European brand-name shops sprouted like mushrooms in central Novi Sad and 
Belgrade, only to disappear as quickly months later. My friends enthusiastically watched reruns 
of ‘Only Fools and Horses’. ‘It’s the Serbian dream!’ one informed me. 
quality, cheaper, old fashioned, basic, only suitable for the old, the infirm, the poor, and 
refugees) and the external globalised industry as monopolised by the German super-
giant Ottobock (taken to be cutting-edge, expensive, privatised, and foreign). Rudo staff 
who told me that they had stopped manufacturing locally because their products would 
never hold up to the standards demanded in a ‘normal’ country were playing into the 
construction of normal as something that exists outside of Serbia as Greenberg has 
suggested just recently (2011). 
Early in the week after the video screening I was sitting again in Bojana’s office. I asked 
how the prosthetists were getting on with their new laser platform. Unsurprisingly it 
hadn’t been set up yet. ‘Do you think they will use it?’ I wondered aloud, ‘they’ll have 
to’ said Bojana and made a face, ‘the centre has invested a lot of money in it.’ Later that 
week Miljan, a therapist with whom I also spent time suggested to me that the 
prosthetists might not be so happy with their new platform. It was during one of our 
conversations about gait and sensory labs that I learned the centre had also bought the 
cameras and software required for a dynamic motion capture lab some months 
previously, but that they’d also never been set up. I wondered aloud if it was simply 
bureaucratic delay, or if some staff were actively resisting this change and if so why? 
Miljan thought that perhaps the prosthetists were worried about becoming less important 
in the process of rehabilitation and that some off them might be may redundant. I also 
wondered, given my observations in the gait lab, if the staff were afraid that these new 
precision machines would show up their shortcomings, mistakes and general sloppy 
workmanship, of which there was a fair amount. Either way, I didn’t really find their 
reticence particularly surprising; it was after all their hard work and professionalism that 
was at stake. 
Regardless of the type of prosthetic, the body can be considered fundamentally altered in 
this process of being re-membered (quite literally), as in order to achieve normalcy in 
both aesthetics and lifestyle, people with prosthetic parts seem to acquire what appear to 
be ‘super’ human qualities, limbs that can be replaced, artificial organs - at times it 
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seems to be a veritable capitalist economy of body bits, subject matter than many an 
anthropologist has waded into (see Sharp 2000 for example). The reality for many 
amputees however is that daily life in much of the world however is often far removed 
from these unlimited possibilities, the newest research, the latest developments, and is 
successful only with a socio-cultural understanding of ‘normalcy’ not only in terms of 
propriocentric kinetic or biomechanic capability but also in cultural, economic and 
aesthetic capacities. In the field of prosthetics, these very concepts are perhaps best 
evidenced in the development of the ‘Jaipurfoot’. 
The story of the ‘Jaipurfoot’ began in 1955 
when a British orthopaedic surgeon living in 
what was then Ceylon (Sri Lanka) remarked on 
the need for a foot prosthesis for amputees that 
could be worn barefoot, was rugged and 
waterproof, and was most importantly, cheap 
(Srinivasan 2002). His observation proved to 
be an astute one, though it was decades before 
his goal was achieved. The prostheses available 
in Sri Lanka and India, and indeed most 
prostheses available at the time required the 
user to wear a shoe (especially older models), 
and at his clinic in Jaipur in the northwest of 
India, another physician Pramod Karan Sethi 
noticed his patients were not wearing the 
prostheses that they had acquired from the 
army bases supplying limbs to them. 
Having read the remarks of the by now departed Brit, Sethi became convinced that ‘the 
shoe was the villain’ (Srinivasan 2002: 336) and became obsessed with creating a 
realistic foot prosthesis and socket that would allow the wearer to sit cross-legged, squat, 






and to go either barefoot or in sandals, three important performances of social and 
aesthetic normalcy in India. Moreover the limb needed to be cheap to make, easy to fit, 
waterproof and potentially be matched to the skin colour of the wearer. He found the 
answer in vulcanised rubber. The final foot and limb could be fitted in less than an hour 
and could be made by non-professional local artisans, thereby eliminating the need for 
expensive prosthetists. The ‘Jaipurfoot’ was born, and can now be found across India. 
The Jaipurfoot organisation also holds international teaching ‘camps’, working with 
local technicians so that they can continue to work when the Indian technicians return to 
their centres. As of 2007 camps have been run in over 20 countries, providing cheap 
robust limbs for over 19 000 people (outside of India)32. 
Whether high or low tech, both therapists and prosthetists in Serbia were keen to remind 
me that in the rehabilitation centre, in order for rehabilitation to be successful, an 
amputee must learn how to wield their prosthesis with finesse, and that as Nikolina said, 
technology on its own is not enough. This learning takes place in both formal and 
informal settings within the Bela Clinic, where the generic, mass produced prosthesis 
becomes tailored to a particular body, through the moulding of the epoxy socket to the 
stump; and the body in question learns to accommodate the prosthesis, through static 
and kinetic adjustments. This is the hard work of the prosthetists, the patients, and the 
therapists - what the DVD I had watched with Bojana referred to as ‘guesswork’. 
To the therapists and prosthetists at the Bela clinic, the form that the prosthesis took was 
less important than the learning of how to use it to its full potential. All were adamant 
that training and practice was the only way this could take place. It was for this reason 
that the Bela clinic was an inpatient clinic. The primacy of technique over technology is 
reinforced by the previously mentioned quantitative research by Burger et al.2004) into 
prosthesis usage among refugees from the three different ethnic groups in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
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32 http://www.jaipurfoot.org/05_fcamp.asp accessed 03.08.2012
Serbian patients generally had the simplest prosthetic components (i.e., 
the highest percentage of wood sockets and exoskeletal prostheses and the 
lowest percentage of thermoplastic or carbon fibre sockets and hydraulic 
knees...) (ibid: 26).
However, all the Serb patients had access to an inpatient rehabilitation centre - either the 
Bela Clinic or its mirror institution in Banja Luka (the second largest city and the 
administrative centre of the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina). While 
refugees from other ethnic groups had traveled abroad to receive more advanced limbs, 
Burger et al. infer that lack of rehabilitation, language difficulties and the distances 
required for follow up maintenance are likely to be barriers to successful rehabilitation 
and social integration, and finally conclude that their
data do not support the notion that high-technology prosthetic 
components are more effective than what are considered as more simple 
and traditional components. The group (Serbs) with the highest 
percentage of the simple prosthetic technology had the highest percentage 
of functional prostheses and the lowest unemployment rate (2004: 27).
Prostheses are culturally made material. Without consideration of the societies in which 
we live, they risk becoming unusable, for they are nothing if not pragmatic. They also 
require the acquisition of new skills, regardless of how technologically advanced they 
may be. The wooden limb components available at the time when the report was 
commissioned and occasionally still produced in Serbia might not have had the pizazz of 
hydraulics and computer technology, but they were robust, could be built and adjusted 
quickly and cheaply, and could be replaced from local materials. Their purpose was to 
allow people to move quickly back into their communities, and into their jobs. A 
prosthesis is primarily important as a tool after all, desired because of its ability to open 
up possibilities, which include mobility, physical jobs, normalised social interactions. 
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Politicising prosthetic relationships
A great number of the patients that I dealt with at the Bela Clinic however had no jobs to 
return to and no desire to return home, or no possibility to do so in the case of the 
refugees. The primary objective when dealing with these mostly geriatric patients was 
dealing with their co-morbidities which, more often than not, were more serious than the 
actual amputation. Both parties in this regard were happy to take things slowly, 
sometimes very slowly. With the staff wanting to keep beds full and many of the patients 
happy to stay put, it wasn’t uncommon to find people who had been at the Bela clinic for 
6 or 7 months, occasionally a year. The high level of rehabilitation care that the patients 
received over long periods of time was therefore just as politically and economically 
motivated as it was by professional clinical practice. 
Viktor, one of the three social workers at the clinic explained; regardless of whether they  
were officially citizens of Serbia, the patients (many of whom had ambiguous 
citizenship status) could be referred to geriatric homes, or that alternatively, he could 
help to organise financial aid for them. Most patients want to go into homes, he told me, 
adding that 80% of geriatric patients never go home, instead ending up in general or 
more specialised care homes. As the hospital is obliged to find them a bed in one of 
these care homes before they are released, many geriatric patients have long stays at the 
clinic, waiting for a space to open up for them. 
Viktor was, as one might expect from an amputee social worker, a wealth of information 
on the types of care and financial support that the amputees could receive. For example, 
the state gives a one off payment somewhere between 100 to 300 euro to those patients 
who do want to go home, depending on the nature of their amputation and the types of 
home aids that will need to be installed. Amputees are sometimes entitled to social 
financial aid and/or home aid along with this, which works out at approximately 100 
euro a month. There is a six month control on the financial aid that they are entitled to. 
With a wink Viktor told me that ever since one of his patients went to the benefit office 
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with their prosthesis on and was deemed fully rehabilitated (with the result that the 
patient’s benefit was cut off) he has encouraged his patients to go without their limbs, if 
possible, in a similar manner to how Staples (2003) describes leper communities 
managed the display and concealment of their sores for monetary gain. While he did not 
encourage them to lie outright, Viktor, in particular, had a strong sense of how the 
amputated body could be used for political and economic gain.
In much the same way that Staples (2003) maps the hierarchies of body parts in leper 
communities in India, parts of the body that are amputated are also ranked, by surgeons, 
amputees and prosthetists. This happens within a range of anatomical and biomechanical 
models. For example, the greater the expanse of limb lost, the higher the risk of elevated 
blood pressure. The smaller the residual stump, the more difficult it is to wield a 
prosthesis. Patients are much more likely to survive amputations at the extremities of the 
body (Ott 2002), and prostheses are often easier to wield below the knee or elbow 
(Kurzman 2002, Gutfleisch 2003). Additionally bodies are ranked in terms of aesthetics: 
amputations of the legs are less immediately visible than arm or facial prostheses. A 
missing finger is less likely to provoke a feeling of unease than a missing arm. From a 
biomechanical standpoint, prosthetic arms are more difficult to wield proficiently than 
legs. 
This hierarchy of amputation comes not only from within the medical institution, as 
Kohrman (2003b) has shown, but also government statistics play a vital role in 
legitimising categories of disability. To this end, amputations are also ranked by 
governments in a categorisation of disability. Losing both legs below the knee, one leg 
above it, or one arm in Serbia does not qualify a citizen for a disability pension, only the 
loss of both legs above the knee, or of both arms can. This is despite the fact that 
amputees with the same injury may require vastly different levels of support given their 
differing physical capabilities.
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Regarding governmental support, from Viktor, I learned that if the amputee was injured 
at work then they were entitled to compensation, and a commission was meant to 
undertake a work report to determine the amputee’s level of physical disability. The 
worse the injury, the more money they should get (this bureaucratising of disability, and 
the ways that many disabled fall through loopholes, is well recorded in the Chinese 
context by Kohrman 2003b). Similar to the benefit office, the categorisation of disability  
vis-a-vis prosthetic medical rehabilitation actually works against the amputees and those 
with a below knee amputation who use prostheses are not classified even as disabled. 
Additionally, almost all unilateral arm amputations are refused compensation. In 
contrast, bilateral amputees whether upper or lower extremity, are considered 100% 
disabled and receive a benefit roughly equivalent to €40 a month. In reality however, it 
is not always easy to claim any of these employment related benefits, as a large number 
of people in Serbia are engaged in either the black or grey markets. High risk jobs often 
have higher numbers of black-market workers, which complicates matters somewhat. 
Davor
Davor was one of the few patients who I interviewed with an upper extremity 
amputation. He had been at the Bela clinic for almost a month, having had his 
amputation 3 months before. He identified himself as a Hungarian (Serbia’s largest 
minority group), from Subotica in the north of Serbia, and said that he was 27 years old. 
Davor had spent a fair amount of his childhood in an orphanage. His mother was 
deceased and he was estranged from his father,33 he had dropped out of school at age 12 
and had lived alone since the age of 14. At the time of the amputation, Davor was 
working as a construction labourer for an unregistered company in Subotica and had had 
his left arm crushed in a work related accident. Now he is sorry that he ever decided to 
work there. He tells me that he has no family and no one to look out for him. He 
desperately wants to sue his former boss, who does not even admit that Davor worked 
for him. If this is unsuccessful, then he will have no access to money at all. He looks 
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33 His actual words were that his father did not ‘recognize’ him.
frantic at the thought of this, but calms when Dr Sonja (who is sitting in on the 
interview, as he is her patient) tells him that one of the social workers will help to do 
everything that needs to be done in order for him to be able to claim financial assistance. 
Davor’s concern about a job was actually well founded, and while I was living there, the 
official unemployment rate was at approximately 15%34 (Statistical Office of the 
Government of Serbia 2009). From Viktor again I learned that until recently the 
government had been offering a tax break to companies if their at least 14% of the 
workers on their payrolls were disabled. However, like so many well intentioned 
endeavours in Serbia, this had to be stopped as companies had started abusing the 
system by having disabled people on the books, but not actually employing them and 
certainly not paying them.
At the time, Davor was entitled to some official financial assistance via his cousin who 
had a contract with the benefit office to look after him, and should have handed him a 
small benefit (a little like procedures in a foster home). Davor had never seen or 
received any of his money and suspected that his cousin pocketed it. He had hoped that 
he would be able to live with this cousin but felt now that it would be impossible. He 
was unsure what he would do when he returned to Subotica, where he had a girlfriend to 
support, he knew that jobs were scarce and said with a shrug that he had had a job offer 
through a friend to become a bouncer, but now that he was here at the clinic doing his 
rehab course he would have lost the job to someone else. He sometimes felt that life was 
hopeless. 
To buoy the mood, Davor and I talked about his prosthesis and his progress. As his 
entire arm was crushed by a crane load of bricks, he was learning to use a unilateral 
mechanical left above elbow prosthetic limb. It was only his second day with it when I 
first interviewed him, so he only wore it for about half an hour per day. I asked him what 
he thought of it. ‘It fits well’, he said, though he didn’t seem so enthusiastic about it and 
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34 The informal (black) economy made up approximately 23% of the working population.
told me that it was just something ‘to fill the empty space’. Although it was a working 
prosthesis, he seemed skeptical about how much help it could provide. Luckily, he told 
me, he wrote with his right hand. Davor anticipated being in the centre for about a 
month to complete his occupational course. Currently he found it hard to put on 
clothing, and go to the toilet. Dr Sonja looked concerned and told him that surely a nurse 
should help him with that and could teach him the skills he needed? He just shrugged. 
Dr Sonja began to tell him a story about a boy born without limbs at all who learned to 
write with his mouth. He was also in an orphanage when he was small and shared the 
same name Davor. From the look that our Davor gave her, I gather that this must be a 
story that he had heard already, but he had at least a smile back on his face as he left for 
his afternoon therapy. After he had gone, Dr Sonja informed me that sadly the Bela 
Clinic could no longer afford to offer patients myo-electric arm prostheses. But, she said 
brightly, mechanical ones could be as successful if the patients learn how to wield them 
properly. 
Davor’s story was not uncommon, working in the informal economy of Serbia meant the 
possibility of a wage (whether it materialised is another topic altogether). Benefits due to 
the patients in principle often never made it into their possession. Their access to health 
care was limited severely by the lack of protection from accident and injury that a job in 
the formal economy should have guaranteed. This limited their options for the future 
considerably. The Bela Clinic remained a state run institution, where only the most basic 
type of prosthesis was covered by the health system. Components and limbs that were 
standard issue in more wealthy countries were available directly from the Ottobock 
Healthcare offices in Niš, or from Rudo directly, or from a handful of private dealers 
(but were not covered by the government in Serbia), So better limbs were only an option 
for the wealthy and/or those with an extensive veze net from which they could draw. Nor 
was there the possibility to substitute a particular basic component and pay the 
difference. Everyone I discussed this with thought that this was a backward move on 
behalf of the government. It used to be, Gordana told me, that the patients could chose a 
better element and make up the price difference. Now, officially, they would have to pay 
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for the entire limb themselves. In reality, the prosthetists informed me when I pressed 
them, they could and sometimes did manufacture some smaller technical components in-
house, in addition to customising epoxy sockets, and the occasional wooden ones, but 
that they were of a worse quality than imported components, and that they were only for 
patients who weren’t going to be walking much anyway. Top quality prosthetic 
components were available primarily to the army veteran amputees, who went through 
military clinics that I did not have access to, and from the handful of increasingly 
private, private dealers who, while initially positive to my research, had become steadily 
more reticent (until I finally gave up trying to contact them). 
During the decade of conflict in the 1990s, there had simply been too many patients to 
deal with at the Bela Clinic, and the lines between civilian and military patients had 
become blurred. Some of these patients had ended up in the Bela Clinic, and some were 
treated as out patients. It was, as Gordana told me ‘a crazy time’. No one seemed really 
to have the full story about what had happened. But then, as I discovered often, and as 
Čolović has written so eloquently (2002) this was commonplace in Serbia. Events that 
had happened from the 1990s onward had taken on a kind of mythic quality, and were 
placed outside of time, they had in effect been pushed away into the ‘slushy 
swamp’ (Zivkovic 2007) of the twilight zone, so that it was difficult to see the shape of 
them in the fog, and as diffuse and indeterminate historical events, they could then take 
on whatever qualities the narrator wished of them (Šuber 2006). 
The history of the Bela clinic, and of prostheses themselves, cannot be taken in isolation 
from wider historical changes in the nature of rehabilitation and welfare. The principles 
of physical rehabilitation, and of prosthesis manufacture itself have undergone a series 
of transformations, as new technologies have become available, whether of material or 
method. Perceptions of the goal of rehabilitation have also changed, as mutually 
exclusive desires for aesthetic or mechanical rehabilitation have gradually been bought 
closer together. However these technologies are often costly, and furthermore, not 
always appropriate for the settings in which they are deployed, such as in the case of the 
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Bosnian Serbs, or in the development of the Jaipurfoot. Prostheses are therefore 
distributed unevenly across geopolitical regions, implicated in, and affected by, the 
production of social norms. The negotiation of daily life as a prosthesis user requires no 
small measure of skill, both on the side of the patient, and in the manufacture of the limb 
itself. The take up of innovations and technologies may also be challenged from within 
institutions, such as by the Bela Clinic prosthetic technicians, or by patients who find 
that limbs may be more trouble than they are worth. 
The history of the Bela clinic produces its own trajectory of rehabilitation, and 
statements from the staff such as skill being more important that technology, may also 
been seen as a necessary guiding principle, considering the lack of access to the latest 
advances in prosthesis design. In keeping with the many messy transformations of the 
Serbian geographic state, and confusing relationship between Serbian civic citizenship, 
and desires for a Serb kin nation, the clinic has undergone transformations that cannot be 
taken out of historical context. 
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A (slightly abridged) history of Serbia
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Where and What is Serbia? 
It is not my intent here to attempt a complete history of Serbia. Such a feat would 
doubtless completely consume this thesis, and likely as not, still not enhance our 
understanding of prosthetic citizenship. Serbian history is a difficult object of enquiry, 
conflated by the elusive nature of what one is actually referring to (Rava 2010). Is the 
object of study the territory of the Serbian state, or the history of how its citizens have 
been identified, or do we mean the history of Serb ethnic nationalism? Regardless of 
which we chose to investigate, these histories are complicated by the multiplicity of state 
functioning (federal and national) in various conflagrations and manifestations. 
Throughout recent history, fluxes in geographic territory, the privileging of Serb ethnic 
citizenship, opaque and occasionally contradictory notions of the Serb ethnic nation and 
the Serbian State, have been both causative and a result of a multitude of wars and 
conflicts that have peppered the twentieth century (Rava 2010). In light of these facts, I 
present instead an abridged history, as it pertains to my own research.
Serbia - the hinterland of the Balkans, on the ‘immediate outside’ (Jansen 2009) of the 
European Union; with its long mythic histories, contested borders, subject of many a 
gusle35 accompanied epic verse, was formed most recently against its own will, by 
default, a consequence of the breaking away of the state of Montenegro in 2006. With 
that act, after 92 years in various collectives, kingdoms, and republics,36 modern Serbia 
was finally created as an independent state (Rava 2010). From 2006, Serbia has 
comprised three provinces: the Autonomous Region of Vojvodina, Central Serbia, and, 
from its own constitutional position at least, the (United Nations controlled) province of 
Kosovo and Metohija. In reality Serbia has not had any practical sovereignty over the 
region Kosovo and Metohija since 1999 and the province has existed in a tense political 
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35 A gusle is a one stringed bowed instrument, found throughout the Balkans, which has its own 
tonal scale and is used as an accompanying instrument to epic saga cycles of battles, heroes, 
and mythic histories. 
36 1918-41, Kingdom of Yugoslavia; 1945-63, Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia; 1963-92, 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 1992-2003 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; 2003-06 
State Union of Serbia and Montenegro.
(and economic) deadlock since the same period, when, in a last ditch effort to stop the 
Serbian government from purging thousands of ethnic Albanians out of the Kosovo 
province, a breakdown in communication and diplomacy between the Serbian 
government and the international community reached its peak, culminating in the 78 day  
aerial bombing of Serbia by NATO forces from March 24 to the 10th of June, and the 
deployment of a United Nations Peacekeeping force in Kosovo. This conflict was itself 
the final violent act in more than a decade of clashes that marked the brutal 
disintegration of: firstly, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, beginning with 
the succession of Slovenia and the independence of Macedonia in 1991, then war with 
and subsequent independence for Croatia (1991 - 1995) which also resulted in the 
violent territorial partitioning of the then tri-ethnic Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(which had also declared independence in 1992). 
Conflict raged in Bosnia until 1995, initially between Bosnian Serbs, the Bosniak 
(Muslim) army of the Republic, and the Bosnian Croats, but eventually involving Nato 
forces, after the massacre at Srebrenica. This conflict, and the state of affairs in Kosovo 
were the wars of my teenage years, where events such as the Siege of Sarajevo were 
analysed on current affairs programmes with an alarming sense of detachment, until the 
signing of the Dayton peace agreement in December 1995, and the arrival of Kosovo 
Force (KFor) peacekeeping troops into Kosovo in 1999. Although the deployment of 
KFor troops and the placing of Kosovo under UN protection was never planned to be a 
permanent solution, continuing disputes in the region have meant that the presence of an 
international peacekeeping force is still required on the basis of the UN security council 
Resolution 1244. This resolution itself was recently at the centre of a Serbian complaint 
to the International Court of Justice about the legality of the events described below. 
The relationship of Serbia to Kosovo, (already effectively held in stasis) was further 
complicated by an incident that occurred just as I was settling into the field in 2008, and 
another that occurred just after I left in December 2009. Two weeks after I touched down 
in the Vojvodina, the previously autonomous region of Kosovo and Metohija (already a 
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United Nations Protectorate) declared itself independent from Serbia. It was the 17th of 
February 2008, and rumours had been flying in the press and on the radio that an 
announcement of some sort was going to happen. By the time that our household awoke 
on the morning of the 18th of February, the international press had whipped up a storm, 
involving indolent Serbs rioting in the streets of Belgrade and Novi Sad. In the sleepy 
village that I was currently calling home, it seemed hard to believe. 
In the days that followed however, a palpable sense of fury seemed to pervade the air. 
Strangely though, this anger seemed to be directed not at Kosovo, but at the international 
community - who, by recognising the declaration, had suddenly given it legitimacy - and 
at the government, who increasingly seemed too complicit with the European 
community. In Novi Sad where I was commuting to study at the time, the students 
organised a protest, marching under the banner ‘Косово је Србија’ (Kosovo is Serbia). 
They filled the streets with noise and flags, attracting other, less peaceful protesters and 
an entourage of police officers, which gave the event an air of danger. The protests 
stopped all traffic, blocking the streets. 
The protests continued over the next week. My Serbian teacher, a masters student in 
linguistics, sighed one morning as she and I watched the students organising themselves 
in the grounds outside. ‘So young and idealistic...their generation still thinks they can 
make a difference.’ she exclaimed suddenly, and bitterly continued, ‘those of us who are 
now in our thirties know that nothing will change’. I found it profoundly sad at the time, 
that someone so young could be resigned and so disappointed. However, then history 
proves her point. The students of Novi Sad have a long tradition of protesting. To even 
safeguard this tradition, the autonomous nature of the university is such that neither 
police nor politicians have the right to enter university grounds without an invitation 
from the student body. Novi Sad was the site of some of the most emphatic protests in 
Serbia during the 1990s (see Jansen 2000). Rather than try to quash the rights of the 
students to protest, Milosevic simply imposed a media blackout on them. The students 
could rage and rant however much they wanted, there would be no one to hear them and 
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eventually they would (and did) wear themselves out. It would not be until 1996 that 
they would rise up and demand a change in regime. 
In the days that followed ‘the Kosovo declaration’, various countries came out to 
recognise the new Kosovo State, led by the United States. The Serbian president, Boris 
Tadić, who had narrowly held on to his seat just weeks before, and whose liberal, 
European leaning government had been criticised for its Pro-EU stance - seen by 
nationalists to be ‘selling out’ Serbia at the expense of EU membership, came out 
quickly with a statement that the situation was unacceptable, and that they would fight to 
prove the illegality of the Kosovo declaration through the International Court of Justice. 
A surprising move perhaps, given that many in Serbia believed that the court was 
unfairly biased against them. 
While my research did not explicitly involve Kosovo, the rhetoric with which Kosovo is 
discussed in Serbia begs its inclusion when discussing any citizenship politics. To 
understand the importance of Kosovo to Serbia, is to understand how Serb citizenship is 
constituted through territory, but also how the state itself is conceptualised as a body. 
Now, this conception of the form or shape of the state as a body is not a new idea, as 
Agnew (2009) has argued. Building on the works of seminal geographers Kantorowicz 
(1957) and Gottmann (1969), Agnew has shown how the representation of the state as a 
body, initially of the ‘sovereign ruler’ not only has its roots in medieval Europe, but that 
this metaphor both naturalises and normalises the state in one broad sweep. His work, 
which deconstructed sovereignty also builds heavily upon Hobbes influential text 
Leviathan (1651) on the structure of the state, and of legitimate governance (by an 
absolute sovereign). I saw first hand how the state acquired body-like status in the days 
following the Kosovo declaration, read and heard it made explicit as reportage from both 
within Serbia and from the international community referred to the ‘amputation’ of 
Kosovo from Serbia. I remember an article on the liberal Serbian news channel B9237 
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37 I regrettably never took the original source down, but even a quick internet check reveals this 
rhetoric to still be prominent in Serb chat rooms.
even going as far as to say that Kosovo had been the ‘gangrenous foot’ of Serbia, and 
that for the health of the nation it was probably best that it had been removed. 
The anthropomorphising of the state as a body that both gives birth to and shapes its 
citizens is also brought forth in these descriptions: as mentioned previously, the ‘Sava’ 
river is often referred to as the aorta of Serbia, and as Čolović has pointed out, in 
descriptions where the nation becomes ‘embodied in the landscape, individual rivers and 
mountains have become [...] the spine, the lungs or the lap of the nation-body’ (2002: 
130). At the same time as Kosovo was being ‘amputated’, I also heard it said that the 
province would always be Serbia, even if not a single Serb lived there. This was due to 
the presence of blood, spilled on the battlefields of yore. The food that grows on 
battlefields, that provides food and livelihoods, sustains the current citizens of the state, 
who are therefore nourished (literally) by the body of the nation. In this poetic 
imagination, states Čolović, Serbia is everywhere that Serb blood has been spilled 
(2002). 
In Serbia, as throughout the Balkans, the desire for national territory is complicated by 
the enduring ghosts of the historical ‘millet’ system of religious citizenship under which 
Serbs existed during the period of Ottoman rule following defeat in the 1371 battle of 
Marista, and on the battlefield of Kosovo in 1389. Whilst short-lived uprisings occurred 
(sometimes with the backing of the Austro-Hungarian and Hapsburg empires), Serbia 
remained officially under Ottoman rule until 1817. Under this enforced system of 
Ottoman governance, confessed non-Muslim communities were afforded the possibility 
of self governance (provided they pledged loyalty to the empire), based on religious 
rather than ethnic affiliation. The head of a millet was thus religious leader of its people. 
Various millets therefore grouped together quite divergent peoples. The Orthodox one 
for example, was composed of Bulgarians, Macedonians, Georgians, Arabs, Romanians, 
Serbs, Vlach and Greeks, despite their sizeable differences in language and ethnicity. 
Millet was established as a legal system primarily, due the fact that the Ottomans did not 
distinguish between nationality and ethnicity. The fact that it recognised religion as the 
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means of defining ones primary citizenry status, as well as the means of providing the 
legal and representational head of ‘state’ continues to have far reaching consequences in 
the Balkan region. 
Given its history and location at the confluence of two competing empires, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the defining modern characteristic associated with Serbia is that of 
barbarism and war. However, these characteristics were not only perpetuated by late 
twentieth century media reportage, they existed previously, cemented already in 
portrayals of Serbs from the end of the nineteenth century, through the first and second 
Balkan Wars, the assassination of the archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serb in Sarajevo; 
itself the catalyst that plunged Europe into the First World War. As West readily admits 
in the preface to her book of travels in the Former Yugoslavia in 1937, ‘violence was 
indeed all I knew of the Balkans: all I knew of the South Slavs (1943: 21). Drakulic 
(1994) echoes those same words in her look at life in Croatia half a century later. In fact 
by the end of the First World War the state of political affairs in the Balkans had even led 
to the development of the verb, ‘to Balkanise’, an inglorious contribution to the 
geopolitical dictionary, referring to the dividing of states into smaller and mutually 
hostile groups. 
The Balkans. Even the name that unites the countries of the region was bestowed upon 
them from outside of it: bal.kan (a Turkish word, referring to a mountainous woodland) 
is recorded in a 1490 description of the mountains of northern Bulgaria, and as various 
travellers expanded this description to refer to the entire mountainous chain that the 
ancient Greeks had previously called the mountains of Haemus, so it was that the Balkan 
name crept increasingly into popular usage; and the concept of the ‘Balkan peninsula’ 
was coined in 1808 by German geographer August Zeune.38
Throughout history, the term ‘Balkan’ has not only denoted a geographic region 
however, it has also acquired sociopolitical connotations. Perhaps due to its unstable and 
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38 Zeune used the term to denote territories remaining under Turkish rule after 1699.
contested histories, the region has been framed as a tinderbox, ready to spark, leading to 
either the collapse of unions, or to their flawed amalgamation. Balkan is a loaded term, 
and Serbia, in a similar manner to its neighbouring states, builds its identity on histories 
from which outsiders have been excluded, these histories are contested, told from the 
point of view of memories. Far from being willing to explain and elucidate, as Šuber 
(2006), Jansen (2005, 2009) and Van der Port (1998, 1999) all note, ‘you don’t/can’t 
understand our history’ is a claim often levelled at foreign researchers in Serbia (with the 
implication that one won’t/can’t if one isn’t a Serb). Van der Port even coins a term for 
this rectitude, terming it ‘obstinate otherness’ (1998). Šuber simply notes that during his 
fieldwork 
almost everybody I talked to raised severe doubts, to put it 
euphemistically, as to whether an undistorted ‘understanding’ of the 
Serbian self image and attitude towards their ‘other’ could be attained 
by non-Serbs (ibid: 2).
Conversely those who are from outside of Serbia, or the what my young Serbian 
students called the ‘normal’ world (which for many Serbs, equates to - western, 
European, civilised, rational) are perceived as being the only ones who can truly 
understand the ways in which Serbians are ‘not normal’ (Jansen 2009, Greenberg 2011). 
They can negotiate the ‘twilight zone’, a hazy state that conjures up ideas of the loss of a 
moral compass, of being outside of time, violence, corruption, backwardness, and the 
loss of civilised life (Zivkovic 2007). 
The Balkans as a geopolitical and geographical entity often appear as ‘othered’, 
although, unlike practices of orientalist description, they are often conceived of as 
masculine, prone to excesses whether they be of warfare, drinking, or passion, framed as 
corrupted states unable to be controlled or even logically reasoned with, unreasonable 
and quick of temper (Bakic-Hayes 1995, Van de Port 1999). More recently we can 
almost certainly add ‘traumatised’, and ‘weakened’ (Agovino 2001, Roberts 2003, 
Jankovic 2006) to this list of contemptible traits - both in terms of individual people and 
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of state capacity - to see how the continued need for foreign advisors on all matters of 
state both creates and is legitimated in part by the idea of a specific (Balkan) character 
(Escobar 1995). 
These traits have had consequences within the Bela Clinic as well, although one could 
well argue that this is a symptom of a more general change in emerging new global 
networks of western health models. Regardless, within Serbia, as in many countries, the 
reframing of health vis a vis European regulation has meant that these ‘excessive’ 
characteristics are read into the behaviours of patients, so that they become victims of 
their own fate, their wholeness of body compromised by the excesses of their lifestyles. 
They therefore become bad patients, and thus immoral citizens, their smoking in 
hallways, smuggling of fatty foods from home into their rooms, or refusal to partake in 
therapy, emblematic of a moral failing as well as of failing health (Klein 2010).
Not a non-Serb: Negotiating fieldwork sites and family history
Serbian blood is a powerful symbol in the creation of the meta-narrative of a Serb State, 
shown not only in official constitutional legal framework for defining citizens (Rava 
2010), but also in the daily politics of self exclusion. It is perhaps telling that the claims 
levelled at Šuber, Jansen, and Van der Port above were never raised with me. For 
months, I wondered if this was because I was not delving deep enough into the lives of 
the people who I interviewed, perhaps I was not pushing hard enough with more difficult 
questions. However, looking back at my field diary, I think that something else was 
going on. One of the entries was from a visit back to Janko’s village, after I moved to 
another town. 
Hopping off at the town hall, I was hit by a series of memories: the 
time that Janko’s wife and I were stranded here at the bus station in 
the pouring rain, only 200 metres from home, neither of us willing 
to get drenched, and both with dead batteries in our mobiles; the 
night that I had arrived in Serbia, watching the voting in the yellow 
hall. I’d been here a year. Walking along the street there are the 
74
familiar smells of bread and pigs, of drying corn piled high in 
household granaries. A little red zastava 39 zips past, ‘hey Kate, 
need a ride?’ Jelica, my old neighbour wants to know. I turn her 
down politely, we’re only a hundred metres from Janko’s after all. 
Opening the gate, I notice that the three roses Janko’s wife cared for 
so tenderly are finally in bloom, and the familiar ‘Koj je? (who’s 
there?)’ sounds as I knock on the door and let myself in. ‘To je samo 
Kato (it’s just Kate)’. ‘Eh, Kato? (eh, Kate?)’ Janko’s mother opens 
the downstairs kitchen door. ‘Pa Kato, ti si naš! gde si bila? (oh, 
our Kate! Where have you been)?’ she envelopes me in a cabbage 
scented hug, as the kids thunder down the stairs. There is fried liver, 
pickled cabbage, roasted peppers and the world’s best chicken 
noodle soup in the kitchen. Ti si naš. You are ours; You are one of 
us; You belong to us.
It made me smile at the time. This collection of friends who had become my family, and 
the mysterious nature of connections stretching across continents and time, though I had 
only met Janko once, five years ago. Here, it was comforting, though there were other 
circumstances where it was more than just belonging, more akin to being claimed, and 
another field diary entry, though infuriating at the time, showed me how, through my 
own blood lines. The history of my family flowing in my veins, was viewed as Serbian 
through and through. 
Last night I argued with a guest at a rakija fuelled BBQ in my 
neighbour’s backyard. The Rakija in question was a 23 year old 
bottle of sljivovica that had come from my own extended family, 
who I had visited for the first time two weeks ago. Zoran, my 
landlord, whilst introducing me to his friend, said, “She's a half-
Serb”. His friend made a joke that there was no such thing. “It’s 
because only my grandfather was a Serb, from Požarevac,” I 
countered. “In that case”, said the guest, “you are Serbian”. I bristle, 
saying that if that’s the case, I must also be German, English, as 
well as Scottish. The guest, whilst consuming ever more of my 
precious family Rakija brushes this logic aside. This is clearly not 
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39 Zastava Automobiles was a well know car manufacturing plant in central Serbia, making cars 
based on ‘Fiat’ designs, for sale on the Eastern European Market. The company also 
manufactures small military and sports weapons. The car manufacturing plant was bought by 
Fiat in 2008, while I was in Serbia, and I remember the newspaper articles both celebrating and 
mourning the end of the car manufacturing plant - the only one I had ever heard of that was still 
assembling cars by hand. It inspired equal amounts of embarrassment and pride.
the case. Why am I Serbian? Because I have the blood of my 
father’s father. This Paternal patriarchal Serbian blood is the most 
important, it negates all other type of identity. 
The practicalities of being simultaneously Serbian and not Serbian, extended to the 
classes that I taught, where most of the students, knowing that I was a native English 
speaker from New Zealand, simply assumed that I had married a Serb and moved to 
Novi Sad with him. The non-existence of my husband was not an issue, as students 
seldom saw me outside of the classroom. There was therefore much scope to manoeuvre 
within identity politics, due to my status as both foreign researcher and prodigal 
daughter, returning to the fatherland. This status of returning to the fold was such a 
positive characteristic that it always tempered my imperfect Serbian40, although my 
ability to pick up the language quickly was also ascribed to me being Serbian ‘on the 
inside’. It even negated my (sometimes extreme) lack of knowledge about the many 
sociocultural facts in Serbia that everyone just knows.41 Joj, come on, people would say 
of me, give her a break, she is only now coming home. ‘Ona je naš (she is ours/one of 
us)’, Bojana would placate skeptical patients in the rehab centre, ‘you know, her 
grandfather was from Požarevac42.’ 
Serb and not Serb, but not unserbian. I slipped and slid through these categories, an 
outsider, but perceived of as having inside knowledge, the opposite situation to what 
Zivkovic (2000) found as he experienced a sea-change in his PhD direction, whilst 
visiting family in Belgrade in the early 1990s43. Zivkovic notes however the flip side of 
Van der Port’s ‘obstinate otherness’. He argues that the rapid change during the 1990s 
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40 I spent a lot of time learning Serbian from Ukrainians and to this day, am often asked if I come 
from Russia by strangers with whom I inevitably have to interact whilst in Serbia.
41 For example, I initially relied on Janko to inform me of the name of my family saint and 
consequently the date of our slava (feast day). I was also questioned at length as to whether my 
grandfather had been a Četnik or a Partisan during the Second World War, of which, at the time, 
I had no clue. 
42 Požarevac is most (in)famously the birth and resting place of Slobodan Milošević, associated 
with Serbian right leaning nationalist politics. 
43 Immediately previous to conducting fieldwork in Belgrade, Zivkovic had been teaching 
Japanese in Chicago, and planning out the practicalities of his PhD fieldwork research in Japan. 
resulted in such a confusing state of affairs that many Serbs felt (and perhaps continue to 
feel) that their social reality ‘[was] as opaque to them as to any outside observer’ (ibid: 
50). In a world where he feels that nothing will stand still long enough for anyone to 
grasp at what is really going on, he resorts to narrative genres ranging from urban 
folklore, to social commentary and everyday talk, to try to make sense of a situation 
where ‘the authentic could not be distinguished from the cynical’ (2000: 57), or from the 
metaphoric. Van der Port (1998) goes one step further. Rather than argue against his 
informants who insist that only a Serb can know and understand Serbian history, Van der 
Port asks what it would mean if we were to accept the possibility ‘that some differences 
between Serbs and Westerners are for real, and unbridgeable’ (1998: 9). He has no easy 
answers, ultimately questioning what it is that we mean in anthropology when we talk 
about ‘understanding’ our informants, be they street children in Mexico, lepers in India, 
refugees from Kosovo, or amputees in Serbia. 
The focus on my Serb-ness, and the closeness of it to me was always the most glaringly 
obvious at the Bela Clinic, where many patients, well into retirement, were enthusiastic 
about being interviewed. Without exception however, while everyone was willing to talk 
with me, none were willing be audibly recorded. This made Bojana invaluable to me 
while interviewing multiple people, as we could both take notes during interviews and 
compare them. It was also often the case that patients’ interviews with me would also 
involve extra persons, other therapists, prosthetists, patients, as well as physicians, and 
often interviews involved a mix of me asking patients questions, and physicians 
checking up on them during weekly rounds. There were many occasions where doctors 
felt the need to inform me (after patients had left) that the patients were not being 
honest, or that they were not really giving me the whole story before setting me straight. 
There was very little private space in the Bela clinic, and the same room where I might 
be speaking to a patient was often being used simultaneously for massage and ultrasound 
therapies, as well being a staff gym, and housing an extra set of parallel bars for 
spillover patients from the gait clinic. Actually, there was very little private space at 
throughout my fieldwork. Offices, patient bedrooms, apartments, were shared, often 
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pushed to more than full capacity. During one memorable interview that I conducted 
with four women in their shared bedroom at the Bela clinic all four answered 
collectively while I interviewed each of them, correcting each other, and interrupting 
with extra details.
Whilst they were all in their early seventies, they came from vastly different 
backgrounds, One had been a German factory guest worker, another was the refugee 
spouse of a Croatian-Serb police superintendent, still another had travelled up from 
southern Serbia, where she was the widow of a smith who produced bread ovens. The 
final woman was, strangely enough, neither from outside of Belgrade, nor an amputee. 
She was the mother of a former patient and good friend of one of the doctors, who had 
recently had a stroke and lost the use of her legs. Her daughter had begged the centre to 
take her mother in (as she had been in and out of rehabilitation hospitals to no avail) and 
the doctors had agreed. They related their individual stories and illness trajectories to 
me, but, gradually these became embellished with the anecdotes of the others, so that 
they became epic in scope, the narrators becoming omnipotent, moving fluidly between 
geographical and historical locations. There was often no continuity of dialogue, and it 
was difficult to know if the events that the women were talking about had occurred over 
a series of months, years or decades, a quality that Šuber (2006) also finds present in his 
research on research on telling stories about trauma in Serbia. The womens’ stories, 
through their augmentation, had all acquired a mythologizing patina of age, whether 
recent or not. 
Out of time, Out of place
As might be expected, in the face of the many negative connotations that ‘Balkan’ 
conjures up, many of the nations do their utmost to dissociate themselves from the name, 
referring instead to regionally defined groupings such as ‘South Eastern Europe’ or 
‘Southern Central Europe’ (Bakic-Hayden 1995). No one, it seems, wants to bear the 
burden of the Balkan name. Those on the periphery of other larger unions align 
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themselves with the more seemly characteristics, more ‘enlightened’, more ‘devote’, 
more European than the rest of the Balkans. A kind of geo-ethnic political hierarchy of 
‘westernness’ is thus created from within the Balkan Peninsula as well as from outside. 
But by whose rules do we play? Should Romania and Bulgaria be considered outside of 
the Balkan boundary? What about Slovenia? Tito’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had 
been Balkan through and through, all ‘brotherhood and unity’, but now that it was 
separated, Catholic Croatians distinguished themselves from the ‘dark heart’ of the 
Balkans: Orthodox Serbia. Serbs from the Vojvodinian plains, formerly under the 
Hapsburg monarchy distinguished themselves from those from areas formerly ruled by 
the Ottoman empire, and in return, the Orthodox Serbs distanced themselves from 
European Muslims. Each one distinguished themselves as ‘less Balkan than the rest’. 
For a period during my fieldwork, I began secretly to wonder if the Balkans really even 
existed, given the nature of these assertions. I wasn’t alone in this speculation, as 
Todorova (1997, 2005), Bakic-Hayden (1995) and Green (2007) all note, a type of 
oppositional identity exists: a ‘wavering form’ between categories of east and west and 
as Bosković points out, ‘the question of location is central here: what and where is ‘the 
Balkans’, who decides, and on what basis?’ (2005: 8). 
In a series of fascinating articles and books, these four scholars have, in their own ways, 
shown how the Balkans has in reality functioned has Europe’s ‘other’ for generations. 
Indeed, coverage of the violent clashes and antagonism between groups on the Balkan 
Peninsula can be viewed as a continuation of centuries of instability that only seem to 
reinforce the ‘otherness’ of the region. In these meta narratives, have not these same 
groups been hacking each other to pieces for the last millennia? Isn’t it simply in their 
nature? It appears all to easy to blame the bloody violence that marked the last decade of 
the century on ethnic difference, a hugely ignorant reducing of historical, political and 
nationalistic processes that created the conditions in which such atrocities became 
possible. In media reporting of the Yugoslav wars, as with the contemporaneous 
Rwandan violence, ‘the idea that genocide was the result of primordial bloodlust’ rather 
than a modern premeditated, well-organised attempt to annihilate another group of 
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people ‘was, and remains, prevalent’ (Gourevitch 1998: 64). The Serbs especially, as 
Bosković notes, have ‘been vilified since the early 1990s and associated with the 
beginning of the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia’ (2005: 9, see also Collin 2004 
[2001]). 
Listening to the radio in the days immediately after the Kosovo declaration I was struck 
by the dialogue of the politicians. It seemed to me that there was very little talk of 
whether Kosovo should or should not be independent (in hindsight most probably 
because it was self evident that they should not). The discussion was all to do with the 
legality of the declaration. Kosovo had after all declared itself independent before in 
1990 to little avail, and had been under a UN mandate since the NATO bombardment in 
1999, a kind of no-mans-land caught in limbo. So what was different about this time? 
For many Serbs, it was the speed at which many states recognised Kosovo, and the 
perceived violation of the laws that the United Nations had itself laid down for the 
governance of the province. Never before had I seen a UN stipulation, the ‘1244’ 
mandate, dissected in such minutiae by people of all ages and political persuasions. In 
the tiny kitchenette of the family I was living with at the time, the 8 year old son 
summed up the fears of the nation with a wail: 
Next Vojvodina will turn independent, and then what will Serbia 
become? Just Belgrade and Central Serbia?
For the conservative nationalist leaning parties, this was the fear, as a small but resource 
strong nationalist Hungarian minority had slowly been advancing their own agenda in 
the northern parts of the Vojvodina, which was gradually having the autonomy that it 
lost under the Milosevic government reinstated. For others, the situation immediately 
post declaration highlighted the perceived blatant disregard for convention by the UN - 
was yet another in a string of attacks against Serbia, by an aggressive and anti-Serbian 
Europe that changed the rules as it pleased, violated international law and wished to see 
Serbia cowed. Even for the democratic European leaning parties, it was a bitter pill to 
swallow. A message had been sent. There was no European future for Serbia while 
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Kosovo was within its borders. ‘We will keep moving toward our Europeans goals’, 
stated President Tadic, ‘but on the matter of Kosovo we will have to agree to disagree’, 
earning him the title of ‘sell out’ from the nationalist right parties and ‘nationalist’ from 
the European looking liberals. ‘1244’, ‘1244’, on the radio, muttered in the bus, written 
in the news, I heard it everywhere. The 1244 resolution confirmed the sovereignty of the 
Serbian State over the region, but also called for a substantial degree of self autonomy 
and meaningful administration for Kosovo. In the resulting ICJ advisory opinion verdict, 
it was decided by a majority vote that the declaration was according to international law, 
and did not set an international precedent. This ruling itself, though, it must be said, has 
had little practical effect, unlike the acceptance of Serbia to the Schengen (visa free) 
travel area in 2009. Serbian citizens were granted entry to this reciprocal travel 
agreement, but only with provision that they carried new biometric passports, and only 
on the understanding that citizens resident in Kosovo would not be included in the 
scheme, thereby forcing the state to accept a split in its sovereign status. Also required 
were the capture and extradition of Serbia’s last remaining war criminals. Indeed, in the 
months before the Schengen and European trade settlements of December 2009 a cat and 
mouse game appeared to be played out, by the Serbian Government, and the European 
EU expansion advisory committee. The latter accused Serbia of not making enough 
‘progress’, vowing that Serbia would not acquire a position on the ‘white’ (Schengen) 
list or even be considered for candidate status, and then the former would miraculously 
capture a war criminal. Tit for tat. 
Unravelling and understanding the how’s, when’s and where’s of the transformation of 
the Serbian nation is a task that rapidly becomes politically embroiled in the history both 
of the Balkans and of countries far outside of the region. The shifting alliances, rulers, 
borders, and movement of populations mean that history becomes a contested space to 
which many groups lay claim. A popular saying in Serbia is that the country lies on the 
crossroads of Europe, which is not so far from the truth, and while it is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to attempt a broad history of Serbia, I can say that there are a great 
many books on the history of the Yugoslav nations published in the late 1990s and early 
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2000s, of various quality and repute (Djokic 2003), written mostly with a view to 
understanding how the violence that defined the end of the 20th century was made 
possible in a rational and enlightened world. Some of the more academically informed 
and useful for understanding the past century have been Todorova (1997), Lampe 
(2000), and Wilmer (2002). More recently a multinational and multidisciplinary team of 
scholars writing on citizenship from within the Law School of Edinburgh University44 
have begun a ‘comparative and contextualised study’ of citizenship in the states of the 
Former Yugoslavia, in today’s climate of EU enlargement and uncertainty, which have 
been particularly illuminating. The working papers of Rava (2010), Vasiljević (2011) 
and Kacarska (2012) have been of particular interest, and go some way to untangling the 
hugely confusing genealogy of Serbian citizenship. 
As CITSEE is a research unit set up with the explicit aim of studying the legal effects of 
that Europeanisation on citizenship, it should come as no surprise that all three working 
papers deal with the consequences of legislation. What is more surprising however is the 
ways in which these three scholars outline the same themes that become apparent in my 
of my own research. Rava’s (2010) work outlines the problems of citizenship that have 
occurred due to the lack of both well defined consolidation between nation and state, 
noting that current constitutional citizenship regimes in Serbia attempt to reconcile 
European demands for the implementation of a multiethnic state,45 with ideas of civic 
citizenship that also seek to promote the historic creation of a Serb kin-state (ibid). 
Unfortunately, by attempting to please everyone, the regime’s ambiguous stance -  
fails in responding precisely to the question of who are current and 
potential citizens, and what and where is that state with which the 
citizens are supposed to have a relationship. To illustrate this confusing 
situation, theoretically speaking, a large number of people from the 
Balkan region could become citizens of Serbia, but at the same time, 
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44 The Europeanization of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia 
(CITSEE) Team, Funded by the European Research Council. 
45 Kacarska (2012) writes about how anti-discrimination legislation was one of the prerequisites 
for the Visa liberalisation agreement in 2009.
Serbia discriminates against its citizens with residence in Kosovo that, 
in turn, it claims is merely part of Serbia (ibid: 30).
Vasiljević (2011), examines the meanings of Europeanisation in Serbia, looking at the 
ways in which ‘progress’ toward joining the EU has been affected by a lack of consensus 
in the political culture of Serbia, and how this lack of consensus is also mirrored in 
‘substantially incoherent’ public opinions (ibid: 26) Vasiljević finds that there is a 
discrepancy between ‘cognitive support’ (ibid: 26), defined as the rational insight as to 
the need for integration into the EU, and ‘Emotional Distance, provoked by negative 
experiences of UN sanctions and NATO bombing’ (ibid: 26). While European 
integration is generally perceived of an ultimate goal, among the public, the actual 
means of making this will happen are much more hazy, promoting scepticism and 
criticism (ibid). Vasiljević also shows that Europeanisation, in its much broader sense of 
promoting the values and institutional models of the EU, shapes just about every major 
social or political act in the country, whether one thinks of them in term of progress 
made, or never ending forms of conditional hoops that Serbia is forced jump through, for 
the persuasive dangling carrot (Bartlett 2007) of future EU membership (Vasiljević 
2011).
Kacarska (2012), the most recent of the three, writes on the effects that the Visa 
liberalisation scheme, that was implemented in December 2009, just over 4 months after 
I returned from the field. Since that date, all Yugoslav successor states not already 
covered by EU agreements have been admitted into similar visa-less travel agreements 
with the countries covered under the Europeans Schengen agreement. All, that is, barring 
Kosovo. In affect, Kacarska notes, ‘the visa free travel for all of the countries has 
facilitated the isolation of Kosovo citizens, who do not benefit from visa free 
travel’ (ibid: 21). The exclusion of these Serbian citizens, based on their geographic 
residency, has the potential for numerous practical abuses of the system. A major focus 
of Kacarska’s work is on how the relaxing of the EU boarder, is conditional on the 
tightening up of the physical border checks, so that in effect, border officers end up 
conducting informal ethnic and economic profiling on citizens leaving the country, 
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something that I see as connected to fears of too much mobility, and of messy transient 
borders. 
Regarding anthropological tradition from the former Yugoslav region, Bosković (2005) 
notes that scholars from all three [sic] of the dissolved states have come from a tradition 
of anthropology and ethnology ‘at home’; their history, their people, their ethnic 
background (a point also raised by Van de Port in 1998). He writes further that this auto-
ethnological approach to history has had the effect of placing the ‘pure’ and ‘noble’ 
peasant in the heart of Balkan mythology and creating a romanticised view of the distant 
peasant past. This emphasis on the peasant character perhaps influences the dichotomy 
of the ‘Backwards Balkans’ always looking back, compared to the forward looking west. 
For many he writes, across Serbia, the corrupted lifestyles of city dwellers were 
evidenced in the fact that they ‘so readily adopted elements of foreign 
cultures’ (Bosković 2005: 10). From each of the former Yugoslav Countries, academics 
take the stand ‘that “their nation” has been unjustifiably victimised in recent years, and 
have taken it upon themselves, as chosen interpreters of the “national culture”, to set the 
record straight’ (Bosković 2005: 8). History is a contested place, where the tale is always 
told from the winners of battles. The victorious take history for their own, and thus are 
also victorious because of their history and moral character (Wolf 1982). 
One thing appears clear, certainly in the face of such a show of international 
condemnation, it would appear that the right to history was removed from the Serbs in 
much the same way as the right to suffer was taken from the Germans after World War 
Two, the results of which have had far reaching consequences for such health related 
areas as organ and tissue donation and treatment (see Hogle 1999 for a full explanation). 
Additionally, as quickly as the Balkan clashes were thrown into the media circus, 
occupying as they momentarily did, our every dinner time discussion, they seem to have 
disappeared from the global stage, left forgotten again at the periphery of Europe by a 
world community which has moved on to the more pressing worries of suicide bombers 
within their own borders and the pervasive wars of terror; leaving them to wallow in its 
84
misery. This perhaps is the key to understanding how the Serbs, as Bosković notes, have 
also come to see themselves as victims, a position that many outside of the region do not 
understand (2005). Perhaps this is also why Van de Port’s informants so obstinately 
exclaimed that only a Serb could know and understand Serbian history (1998, 1999). 
The collapsing of time, the denial of legitimate history, the blending of myth and 
martyrdom with present reality, and the shifting identities of citizens do not make for 
easy research. 
This collapsing of time is a recurring theme in both histories and ethnographies of the 
Balkans. There is a tension inherent between the contrasting ideas of reviving national 
traditional values post Tito’s Communist Pan Slavic brotherhood, and becoming 
incorporated into the European community. Zivkovic’s ‘twilight zone’ arguably dates 
from when prime minister Đinđić
 paid the ultimate price for the capture of Milosevic and was assassinated outside 
parliament in 2001 (an event that not only martyred him, but also heralded a stagnation 
in economic and socio-political progress), and the Serbia of today remains in many ways 
crippled by war, economic downturn, years of international sanctions, an inability to 
discuss the past and an uncertainty about what the future will bring (Tosic 1992, 2002, 
Roberts 2003, Collin 2004). It is a place where ‘everything is permitted, and nothing is 
permitted. Where anything is possible and everything is impossible’ (Collin 2004 
[2001]: 1). Echoing this sentiment, Milica Bakic-Hayden describes that 
The whole history of these peoples, whether common or individual, 
has become simultaneous and idealised… They have ignored the 
presentness of the present and the pastness of the past, creating a kind 
of ‘primeval present of the volk’ with heroes from remote history 
either identified or appearing side by side with those of more recent 
history (1995: 923).
What to make of the twilight zone, of Zivkovic’s ‘slushy political swamp’ (2007)? Is it 
solely a feature of the post-conflict Balkans? Crapanzano (2003), while discussing the 
nature of hope in his ethnography of white South Africans during the end of the 
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apartheid, suggests that they existed in a state of paralysed waiting, and, moreover 
believes that they found refugee in this ‘sustained and indefinable waiting, [where] they 
were removed: they were not responsible’ (ibid: 18). He notes further that this dual 
world was one of hazy dreams and hopes, far removed from the real and pragmatic ways 
that they went about their daily lives. 
Many of the features of the twilight zone are not of recent construction; for example, the 
idea of an unspeakable past was made real in Tito’s post World War Two communist 
Yugoslavia, where nationalist sentiment was prohibited and nationalist uprisings actively  
purged. As it was again through Milosevic’s political regime from 1981 onwards. 
Writing in 2000, before the fall of Milosevic, Prosic-Dvornic notes how the government 
had been actively exploiting this lack of historicity.
Imagining a “people with no memory,” [it created] a façade that 
includes the pretence that life in Serbia has always been peaceful and 
normal. The regime acts as if the front lines in Bosnia not more than 
100 kilometres away never existed. As if the flows of refugees - 
homeless, displaced people with only memories of the past life and 
no feasible future - never existed. As if the handicapped young men, 
survivors of the war in Croatia, missing limbs, in wheelchairs and on 
crutches, trying to live with their nightmares, desperately wanting to 
pick up the pieces of their shattered lives, did not exist (Prosic-
Dvornic 2000: 334). 
Theorists such as Niethammer (1992) and Brantlinger (1998) have speculated that this 
process signifies the entering of a type of ‘post-history’ where hopelessness is bound up 
in tragedy, presumption and a decline of individualism during political warfare 
(Brantlinger 1998). As history is associated with progress, the post-historical nation 
becomes the stagnation of progress. Although much of what the Serbs are doing seems 
to be attempting to reclaim history from post-history, I am wary of such an 
oversimplification of this claiming of historicity. For two reasons: the first is the 
prevalence of collapsing historical fact into categories of epic storytelling in Serbia in 
much the same way that my four interviewees did for me. Čolović (1994) has 
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documented this particular trait amongst politicians, noting that the use of epic 
storytelling structure, (where the narrator assumes an omnipotent position) gives an air 
of all seeing legitimacy to political speech, and dispenses with the need for concrete 
facts. Šuber (2006) notices among his informants a tendency to not distinguish between 
actual and mythical history, so that recent events (like my interview in the women’s 
bedroom) assume mythologising qualities. 
Mostly though, I feel that that in much the same manner as Crapanzano’s South 
Africans, many of my Serbian acquaintances were simply unable to envision a solution 
to the situation that they found themselves in, and that, as he terms it, ‘they had a hope 
so indefinite as not to have an identifiable object. As such they could not turn it into 
effect desire’ (Crapanzano 2003). For me, this appears to hit the proverbial nail on the 
head. In Serbia this state of fogginess absolves the need for real discussion and thus 
enables the nation to ignore the call for Serbia to take responsibility for many of the 
actions carried out in its name during the 1990s. At the same time, this period of being 
‘out’ of time and ‘waiting’ means that a plurality of European futures can be imagined, 
bought forth through the haze, while the specifics of actual policy are allowed to fade 
into the background.
Rather than contested histories of ‘balkanised’ clean homogeneous territories, Green 
(2007) maintains that within the Balkans the issues are those of too much hybridity, of 
messy areas and ambiguities that exist in the marginal spaces between clear boundaries.
This crossing of boundaries, or more specifically, the right of both people and goods to 
cross borders is the other event that I referred to above, that has significantly altered the 
Serbian State in the time since I began my fieldwork. A couple of months after I had 
returned from fieldwork, the EU both unfroze its trade agreements with Serbia and 
admitted Serbia to the visa-free ‘Schengen’ travel scheme, on the 7th and 19th of 
December 2009 respectively. This, as my friends all pointed out to me, and as Greenberg 
has published (2011) was seen by many as an important step to Serbia becoming a 
‘normal’ country. In fact, the positive effect on Serbia’s desirability as a country of 
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residence, (as perceived by residents of the other former Yugoslavian countries) that the 
abolition of visas (under heavily prescribed circumstances) has had, show us just how 
complicated Serbian State citizenship has become (Rava 2010). 
Health at the crossroads of Europe
How a desire for membership within the European community affects both the desire 
for, and the provision of health and welfare services in Serbia is a question that 
underpins the process of this investigation, not least for its impact on the provision of 
both prosthetic components, and practices of rehabilitation. Dunn (2005) has shown how 
the effects of EU standardisation of food production have mapped new hierarchies of 
power onto older existing networks of trade in Eastern Europe. She has shown how 
those bodies and objects that fall outside of these new networks create a type of non-
network. Citing Istven Rev she writes that phantomised farmers create a type of 
shadowy ‘non-economy, food that cannot be found, grain that is never harvested, land 
that is non-existent. This resistance is the non-event, the means is the non-object, and the 
actors are anonymous’ (2005: 187).
I feel that in a similar manner, a type of non-health system exists in countries such as 
Serbia, where a decade of international sanctions, misrule, corruption and the 11-week 
NATO bombardment of 1999 damaged the health infrastructure and the economy 
(Redmond 1999, Kunitz 2004). Before I left for Serbia, I had read that although patients 
in Serbia are required to make official co-payments to health bodies, better health care is 
primarily achieved through additional ‘payments’ that guarantee the services of health 
workers and pharmacists (Stevenson 2003). 
I will readily admit that I was both eager and a little apprehensive to see how this system 
might work, and so (in the interests of ethnographic research) I decided to have a 
wisdom tooth pulled at the state dentist. Janko’s household was galvanised into a flurry 
of action by this request, as first we had to find a dentist with whom we had some family 
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connection, which happened to be the one at the university. We went to visit, without an 
appointment, stopping at a kiosk to pick up ‘gifts’, coffee, juice, and some chocolates 
(total cost 600 Din). I asked Janko what these were for, and he informed me that far 
from being bribes, they were signs of appreciation. The state pays the workers in the 
health system very little, and so the gifts are a way of making their lives better. In fact, 
the giving of gifts for just about any service rendered was to be a regular occurrence 
during my time in Serbia, and the lines between bribery and gifting are ambiguous. In 
any case our dentist referred my case to his colleague, a dental surgeon, and she agreed 
to take out the offending tooth the next day for the cost of 2000 Din, though first I would 
need to visit a private radiographer (also a friend of hers) and have a photo of my tooth 
taken. Everything was paid in cash, no patient names recorded. The surgery and follow-
up recovery went excellently. I joined the informal health sector.
The WHO estimates that additional ‘payments’ such as those I made may account for up 
to 49% of total health expenditure (Stevenson 2003). In the same document, the World 
Bank estimates that 10.6% of Serbs living within Serbia live beneath the poverty line 
and that one-third of the population live on the poverty margin. With a GNP of 
approximately US $1400 per capita (in 2007) this means effectively that Serbia has gone 
from a moderately well developed country in the late twentieth century to a lower 
income one by the beginning of the twenty-first. Kunitz describes Serbia as a 
pharmaceutical vacuum (2004). 
Stevenson’s research for the WHO makes the claim that restrictions to pharmaceutical 
and hospital supplies have left the already struggling health service infrastructure 
woefully inadequate for an internal population of 7.5 million, some 330,000 of whom 
are refugees from neighbouring lands and a further 240,000 of whom are internally 
displaced (Stevenson 2003, although the WHO acknowledges that these figures are 
likely to have been overestimated) Furthermore, the effects of almost a decade of 
conflict not withstanding, the adverse effect of economic transition alone on health 
services in Central, South and Eastern Europe has been well documented, not least by 
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Adeyi et al (1997) who cite four main contributing factors to this deterioration. First, a 
reduction in real income, and second, stress and stress related behaviour as a result. 
Third, a reduction in real public spending on health leading to a breakdown in basic 
health services, and lastly lax regulation over what infrastructure remains. Coupling 
these factors with the increased flow of injured and traumatised bodies from the conflicts 
in the last decade of the twentieth century paints a bleak picture of the health services in 
Serbia. Additionally, in its health profile of the country, the WHO singles out three 
particularly ‘risky’ areas of health to target in Serbia: tobacco, HIV/AIDS, and 
tuberculosis (Stevenson 2003, Rhodes and Simic 2005). 
Serbia began what was essentially a series of social democratic reforms at the beginning 
of 2001, based on two basic principles, the first that the insider privatisation of state 
assets that had been occurring throughout the 1990s should be stopped and that 
privatisation of the remaining assets should become open to pubic tender. The goal of 
the government was essentially the creation of a fully fledged market economy based on 
liberalisation and private property. The second was the creation of a strong social policy 
that would soften the blow for average citizens and win the population over to what 
would surely be a drastically unpopular series of reforms. Unfortunately with the 
assassination of the driving force of these reforms, the then Prime minister Zoran 
Đinđić, the process of transitioning slowed, and newly privatised companies slid into 
positions of monopoly, as weak ideas of market competition were beginning to take root 
(Crnobrnja 2007). Remaining state institutions, many of them health and education 
related, continue to struggle from large yearly deficits, requiring large subsidies from the 
government, which then impinges on their ability to push much needed money into the 
social sectors. This has in effect allowed large private companies to capture the state, as 
it were (Bartlett 2007). Ottobock Healthcare is one of these companies.
Ottobock Healthcare was, ironically enough, founded in the same year as The 
Prosthetics Company of the Kingdom of Serbia, and for the same reasons. Though it was 
a young German Prosthetist by the name of Otto Bock, rather than a French organisation 
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who proved to be the catalyst. Ottobock, along with being one of the largest prosthesis 
and orthosis manufacturers in the world, remained for much of its history, a family 
driven firm. The company began unofficially in Serbia in 1976, originally as an outpost 
of the Slovenian branch, and unofficial the office remained, until 2005, when it was 
formally opened. During my fieldwork I traveled to the brand new Ottobock office in 
Niš, Serbia46.
Having seen Ottobock products throughout my research, I was surprised to find that 
there were only 12 people employed in Niš, most of whom were doing research on 
prostheses. Their biggest selling products in Serbia remain feet, as well as both 
mechanic and hydraulic knees, as the director tells me that there are no competitors with 
the same quality components. Regarding the cost of prostheses, I learned that regular 
civilian amputees could apply for a ‘scholarship’ to get a limb, but that most of the 
company’s hands on work was with the military amputees. Their monopoly over the 
public market was not quite complete however, and from Rudo I learned that private 
prosthetists occasionally made use of components from a variety of other companies, 
when they were available47. 
Like many countries in transition from socialist regimes to market based economies, a 
new standardisation of international health practices has been implemented, allowing 
new classes of risky citizens and risky practices to emerge in much the same way as the 
creation of Dunn’s risky food production practices (Mastilica and Kusec 2005, Dunn 
2005). The alleviation of this risk (whether health or economic) is often a concern for 
countries entering into the European Union, where supranational neo-liberal political 
economies create forms of risk that are mapped onto and indeed often supersede 
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46 So new that it was ‘bez broja’, meaning without a street number, like so many companies that 
had sprung up too quickly for local government to provide addresses for them, or were semi-
legally occupying premises. 
47 Occasionally shipments from suppliers such as Such as Bauerfind, Sigma Medic, and 
Philadelphia would be available
capitalist economies. These in turn are implicated in the power relations between nations 
(Beck 1992, 2005). 
Dunn’s analysis of risky categories applied to the capability of Poland’s national 
infrastructure to deal with such ecological and pathological outbreaks as Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease) and ‘foot and mouth’ disease shows us 
the practical effects of this. Additionally, Petryna’s (2002) research into what she 
describes is a biological48 citizenship enacted by Chernobyl survivors in the newly 
formed Ukrainian State takes this same analysis to another level in which pathological 
risk becomes a factor for defining the character of the state. In both cases, actual risk 
factors are not altered, rather it is the capacity to contain and control citizens relative to 
these risks that changes.
 Despite the continued and arguably escalating presence of infectious disease, the main 
causes of death in Serbia are chronic, those commonly associated with lifestyle. There is 
a high incidence of cardiovascular disease and cancer, especially lung cancer. The WHO 
estimates that 60 percent of adults in Serbia smoke, and notes that that tobacco 
advertising is pervasive and noxious, targeted at children, 23% of whom are estimated to 
be regular smokers (Stevenson 2003). The lax regulation concerning the sale of tobacco 
to under 18s, and a significant black market in tobacco are seen as undermining the 
rigorous antismoking measures needed to halt what the WHO terms a ‘tobacco 
epidemic’. All these lifestyle behaviours are themselves predictors for illnesses that have 
the potential to result in the amputation of a limb, usually a leg, should they remain 
untreated over long periods of time. 
Hjelm et al. (1999, 2005) have repeatedly studied the beliefs about health that are 
essential to diabetes self care amongst different ethnic migrant groups in Sweden, among 
them former Yugoslavs. They found that their ex-Yugoslav patients often had a more 
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48 though I see it more in terms of a shared understanding of pathological threat - and biological 
citizenship brings to mind practices of eugenics.
‘fatalistic view of the disease in terms of factors lying beyond one’s own control...often 
related to supernatural explanations’ (1999: 1157). They also note that their female 
patients emphasised the importance in health: of living for enjoyment, or taking one day 
at a time, and that retaining traditions (such as food) help to give strength and security. 
The women that they studied also expressed beliefs about health that emphasised the 
freedom to enjoy food, and to deviate from diets (ibid). The men were more likely to 
link health to financial stability (or wealth even) or simply as ‘the most important thing 
in life’ (Hjelm et al. 2005: 53). Hjelm et al. refer to these perspectives as salutogenic,49 
which they then propose might go some way to explaining patient behaviours after 
diagnosis. Finally, they suggest that among (former Yugoslav) immigrants in Sweden, 
health was described from an action-theory point of view, where 
good health is defined as having the ability to act in accordance 
with one’s plan in life, and being able to behave in the best 
possible way under the prevailing environmental restrictions 
(2005: 53).
Health statistics for Serbia available from the WHO and from DFID appear to show this 
same categorisation of risky states. It is health infrastructure (or the lack thereof) that 
primarily creates risk in the Balkans. For example, HIV/AIDS antiretroviral drugs were 
‘virtually unavailable’ in 2003 and the availability of diagnostic tests varied in quality 
and quantity (Stevenson 2003). Regarding tuberculosis, Serbia only implemented the 
WHO DOTS (Directly Observed Treatment Short-course) program in Belgrade in 2002, 
and a nation wide coverage programme was begun in 2004. The continued presence of 
refugees is a further source of TB risk. There are still large numbers of ‘internally 
displaced’ citizens in Serbia. Ho’s (2003) work on migration and TB risk shows that the 
conditions of forced, illegal and refugee migration can prime the body for TB infection, 
as can the conditions of poverty in refugee centres. As most refugees and displaced 
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49 Salutogenesis: this term coined by the sociologist Aaron Antonovsky (1979) is a stress 
resource orientated concept, which focuses on action and interaction, and tries to find out why 
some people maintain their good physical and mental health despite stress and hardship. 
Antonovsky proposed it as an alternative to the pathological model of health, which focuses on 
the absence of disease.
persons have no option to return to their homes, they are left only with the option to 
remain, becoming sick and diseased. This systematic oppression is what Farmer refers to 
as (2003) structural violence, meaning those bureaucratic and socio-political barriers that 
stop the already poor and disadvantaged from accessing health care and welfare support. 
At an even more basic level, the way that the doctors in the Bela clinic actively 
discouraged older amputees from walking on prostheses with a mobile knee joint can be 
attributed to this same perception of structural ‘risk’. To be able to use a mobile joint 
safely means that the patient must have a feeling of trust in their relationship with the 
prosthesis, as during ambulation, there are periods (after heel-strike) where the knee 
collapses and swings forward. The patient must be able to support themselves with their 
other leg, if there is an unplanned collapse of the knee. Now, a patient’s risks of falling 
in Serbia are neither greater, nor less than in any other country. The capacity however to 
deliver follow-up care, the long distances that many patients had travelled, the general 
poor physical and mental status of the patients, and the long stays required in the Bela 
Clinic meant that questions of physical safety trumped the prosthetists and the patients 
desires for biomechanically normal mobility in many cases.
The very ‘Balkan’ nature of the illnesses of consumption and excess creates a power 
differential in the slow transitioning of the health system. The Serbs, it would seem, do 
not make good citizens when it comes to self-regulation and government of the self 
(Foucault 1979). This seeming deficiency of moral character then appears to be 
projected upwards to a state level, delegitimising the governing capabilities of the 
Serbian nation state, and meaning that Serbia itself becomes a potential risky member 
for the European community. In light of this, I wondered how all these people went 






Inside the twilight Zone
While in Serbia, I met a great number of people working in positions (both informal and 
formal), who were sometimes not paid for months at a time. They were stuck, unable to 
quit, for in so-doing they knew that they would never get paid. So they worked on, in 
the hope that everything would right itself eventually. I wondered in all of these cases, 
where the breaking point came, how one might decide that one cannot devote more of 
one’s life to this. When do people realise that they might never get paid, or that a court 
case could never be won? 
Once, toward the end of my fieldwork, I found myself on the Novi Sad to Bar (in 
Montenegro) overnight train. A friend and I were observing that despite the many things 
that locals complained about the trains, we had never actually had an unhappy 
experience on board, and that the only thing that was really missing was the possibility 
to buy a cup of coffee. Despite having spoken too soon, and having managed to enrage 
immigration officials at the border, to our delight, early the next day as the train slowly 
lurched through the Montenegrin mountain ranges, the conductor cautiously asked if we 
would like ‘domaci’.50 
Over steaming cups of black gold, he explained to us that he hadn’t been paid for 6 
months, but that he loved his job and didn’t want to quit. Instead he had come up with a 
little unofficial business to make some cash on the side, hoping that no one would report 
him, and after all, why would they? He was offering a service that many were grateful 
for. As for many people, the ‘twilight zone’ had created abnormal life conditions in 
which good people were forced to behave unethically (Greenberg 2011). What would he 
do if he never got paid? We asked, while ordering refills and tipping generously. The 
conductor simply shrugged his shoulders, telling us that he preferred not to think about 
it. It was a delicate balance, he told us, if one worked for the state, there was at least the 
possibility that at some stage in the future there might be back pay, which was better 
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50 Home made (domestic) Serbian coffee. 
than quitting and missing out completely. Working for a private company was much 
more risky, the pay might never come, the company might fire you, or simply all go up 
in smoke before anyone ever got paid.
Janko
 ‘Serbia is in a twilight zone...we are waiting for something like normal life...’
Janko was in a melancholy mood, it was 2am in the morning and we were walking home 
from a birthday party, where much of the talk had been on the state of affairs in the 
university departments, in local government, and in Janko’s household. There had been 
domestic wine and rakija, a ‘Swedish table’ of cold meats and salads, and a troubadour 
in the lounge. We had danced and sang and clapped until dead on our feet. The birthday 
had been for an 8 year old friend of Janko’s son, and present were an assorted mix of 
their friends and relatives, old and young, academics, farmers, professional athletes. 
Serbia certainly seemed like a twilight zone that night, where, by and largely 
intoxicated, I’d been talking in my almost non-existent German, as well as English and 
Serbian. Like everyone else, I’d eaten and drank more meat, mayonnaise and 
medovača51 than could possibly be good for me... 
Now, in the middle of the night, in the middle of the road, in a village out in the slow 
backwaters of the long drained Pannonian sea, I felt hopelessly lost. I trailed Janko’s 
dreary monologue on the ongoing ‘bad situation’ of Serbia as he led the way home; the 
flat black landscape, the deeply shadowed buildings and the quantity of alcohol 
consumed doubtless contributing considerably to my confusion. As we walked into the 
wind, the cavernous sky seemed to grow even more oppressive. Snowflakes swirled 
around our heads, illuminated by watery street lamps. Fallen, they drifted along the road 
in eerie shifting formations. The Korševa52 tore into our jackets. Two thoughts jostled 
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52 A particularly vicious northerly wind that blows across the Pannonian flats from central Russia. 
for importance in my mind. The first, I wished I had gloves with me, and hunched my 
hands as deeply into my pockets as I could. The second: what did it really mean, to be 
waiting for a normal life? Time and time again during my stay with them, Janko would 
repeat words to the same effect, that he was waiting for something like normal life. The 
more I thought about it, the more I wondered what he really meant. What is a ‘normal’ 
life?
Janko was a fourth generation Serb, and was in his early forties when I stayed with him. 
His mother is a Bosnian Serb and his father’s family origins were originally from 
abroad. Janko had left Serbia at the beginning of the 1990s to study abroad and, having 
missed the worst of the breakup of Yugoslavia and completed a PhD at a well respected 
university, he returned home in 2000 with his wife and young daughter to work as a 
lecturer at the local university. By the time that I was in Serbia, Janko had however been 
out of work for six years after discovering that the university faculty where he worked 
was accepting bribes for marks. While I lived with his family, Janko spent most nights 
trawling the internet that I had had installed, trying to find work outside Serbia, because, 
as he liked to repeat, ‘there is no future here’. 
Janko had taken his faculty to court, and was certain he would win his court case. He 
had been fighting to get his pay ever since it had become apparent that the university 
would not let him work out his tenure, as the department had broken contract when they  
expelled him. The case revolved around an unfair dismissal, where Janko had refused to 
become embroiled in a scheme where students were paying for degrees, which he called 
corruption. When he refused to take part in the scheme, the department had closed rank 
on him, barring him even from entering the building to retrieve his radna kartica.53 
Without his card, he could not show that he still had a contract, and without the 
evidence that he had a job, he was unable to apply for visas to visit many of the 
colleagues overseas who he had previously been working with, nor was he able to 
attend many of the conferences that had accepted abstracts for his articles. He described 
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the department like a mafia, and in terms of veze, which he equated as something akin to 
nepotism or cronyism.
What saddened me most about Janko’s history was the fact that, jobless, almost destitute 
and effectively blacklisted from working for other educational institutions, he had 
become the very thing that he had fought against. To drum up a bit of income, he would 
occasionally write masters theses for cash payment, with the understanding that he and 
the student involved would then be able to publish the results jointly. This moral 
compromise seemed unproblematic to him, and he felt it was the only option available; 
to be honest I think that he was simply glad to be researching and writing with a 
purpose, and he used the students as a way to access the university library and 
databases. Throughout the process however, I was constantly astonished by his 
conviction that he would prevail against the university as an institution, which he also 
described as a ‘mafia’. He felt that he had been dealt an unfair and unjust blow. He was 
also certain that if he tried hard enough, if he pushed and scraped and presented enough 
evidence, then justice, which was clearly on his side, would prevail. 
Herein lay the problem, because officially he had already won his court-case, only to 
have it overturned by the education minister later. It came down to a question of 
legitimate evidence. One could keep adding increasing evidence to the stack of files, but 
he was fighting in the wrong court. Universities in Serbia remain autonomous legal 
institutions, with laws that guarantee freedom of speech and action. On the surface, this 
legislature provides the students with a right to dissent and to protest, as both politicians 
and police must apply for permission to enter campus. The flip side to this is that the 
universities are subject to their own governance outside of the law. For Janko, this had 
the consequence that it did not matter if he won his court case outside of the university, 
as the department was only ever going to be morally obliged to pay him his salary and 
reinstate him. Given the reasons for his dismissal, I, like his wife and friends, felt this 
was extremely unlikely to happen.
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It was an uphill battle of such magnitude that I felt he was never going to win. I was not 
alone in this opinion, and among friends and family, he was often the topic of 
conversation. Yet he persisted, in spite of (or perhaps simply to spite)54 the mounting 
stack of paperwork, court costs, veiled threats, and injustices heaped upon him. When I 
first arrived, I had understood this as a natural desire to fight for justice, even though he 
was clearly the underdog. This was six years on from his dismissal however, the original 
contract had run out, despite his not getting paid his due. He had been forced from his 
apartment in the city into his mother’s home in the village where we now found 
ourselves. His children had school costs and there were groceries to be bought and 
utilities to be paid. His wife routinely faced discrimination in her profession, due both to 
her own nationality and her relationship to him. 
I eventually asked Janko what he meant by a twilight zone one afternoon. He looked at 
me as though I was mad. ‘This!’ He cried, waving his arms as if to indicate everything. 
We were walking home from a bus stop. He singled out a neighbouring house for 
particular derision: ‘they have pigs in the back yard, it’s not allowed! Not allowed by 
the government! This is a built up area, but no one does anything!’. ‘The court! The 
university! Hah! It’s a Mafia’. 
Recent Serbian debates about the state of the nation that appear throughout the media, 
appear to be focussed around the loss and production of a state of ‘normalcy’, that is, a 
history of the desire for what one considers a ‘normal’ life and the feeling that this is 
precisely what one will never have in Serbia. This is very much life in the twilight zone, 
and many people talked to me about feeling as though they were ‘outside’ of time, 
conjuring up twilights, dream states, fog, and moments between waking. Many of my 
students had difficulties in distinguishing the differences between dreams and goals for 
the future, and in planning for how to make these happen. In my field notes at the time I 
wrote that it seemed that they had lost the ability to conceptualise the efficacy of their 
own actions. Many held seemingly conflicting ideologies as to the nature of 
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54 Inat - spite, is often said to be a defining Serbian characteristic. 
‘transitioning’ and their relationship to it. What was in transition? Transition from what 
to what? How would they know when they had arrived? Older people with whom I 
spoke, talked of normal life as something that they had had, in Yugoslavia, or as they put 
it, in the days of the ‘red passport’, tying the concept of ‘normal’ to both interstate 
mobility and to European inclusion (Jansen 2009). 
The red passport days had indeed been a high point in recent Serbian history; as Josip 
Tito turned away from Russia and courted the West, there was a period of massive 
foreign investment inside of Yugoslavia, and citizens were, as members of a non-allied 
state, able to travel and work both throughout Europe and ‘behind’ the so called Iron 
Curtain. Many foreign tourists spent time holidaying throughout the country, and under 
Tito’s particular brand of liberal socialism, the welfare services of the socialist Republic 
of Yugoslavia blossomed. Behind the scenes though, it was a different story, as Tito 
borrowed increasingly heavily, shifting money from prosperous regions to prop up those 
in need, ruthlessly quashing ethnic affiliations and national uprisings. Still, perhaps due 
to recognition of a multitude of political affiliations, Jansen (2009) suggests that these 
Yugo-nostalgic historic discourses of ‘normal life’ (as opposed to talking about ‘the 
good old days’) allow space for people with conflicting political views to articulate both 
a shared period ‘before’ the current situation (regardless of when and what the actual fall 
from grace might be attributed to), in addition to alluding to a contemporaneous 
situation existing outside of Serbia at the present. Just recently, and leading on from this, 
Greenberg’s (2011) examination of the various ways in which young Serbians 
experience state power through their articulation of ‘normalcy’ is perhaps the newest 
publication to draw attention to the seemingly contradictory nature of being both ‘for’ 
and ‘against’ the state, hell bent on transition toward a future within the European 
Union, but with one foot stuck firmly in the Yugoslav socialist past. 
So what, if anything, was not ‘normal’ about Serbia? When did this state of affairs 
begin? What did people mean by it? What was ‘crazy’ about it? If nothing in Serbia was 
‘normal’ then where was? Despite clear differences in people’s opinions over exactly 
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when a state of normalcy had been in place, or even what defined it, it seemed to be 
common knowledge that ‘normal’ was a quality that had been lost along the way. 
Examples given to me of ‘normal’ things not possible in Serbia often (though not at all 
exclusively) seemed to involve accumulating material goods, the ability to travel 
(legitimately), or the possibility of a stable job; all of which were imagined as being 
possible only outside of the country. Additionally, as Greenberg (2011) mentions, and as 
I heard constantly amongst the students, the phrase ‘nisi normalan/you’re not normal’ 
means to be crazy. Referring basically to the behaviour of an individual, it could be 
summed up, if you’re not normal, you are by default, crazy. Was Serbia a crazy land?
However, let’s turn back to the twilight zone for the time being. The quality of being 
‘out of time’ both sustains and entraps Serbia. I hope that what I mean by this will 
become apparent. Let us start with sustaining. Both Greenberg (2011) and Zivkovic 
(2007) are ultimately interested in this. They ask (albeit in different ways) how it is that 
during and after decades of ‘abnormal’ (which I take to mean in this instance - 
inconsistent, conflict riven, violent) conditions of Serbian State functioning - what we 
might call a dys-appearance of the state (to appropriate Leder’s term from 1990), people 
go about retaining, or regaining, the capacity for moral agency and effective action. 
While I have suggested above that the twilight zone is connected with moral decay, 
Greenberg notes another quality that arises within it, the loss of historicity, and 
perspective. As she writes:
Intimate moments are bound up with massive political and 
economic shifts, as the banal and the historical, sacred and 
profane all merge to form one backdrop against which it 
becomes impossible to judge good from bad (2011: 94). 
As a consequence, responsibility is displaced, and while I had originally thought of my 
students as having lost their ability to imagine effective action, Greenberg (2011) 
suggests in the wake of this lack of moral perspective, Serbia has actually produced an 
entire generation (those who are now my own age or younger) who have grown up 
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totally unequipped to take any sort of responsibility for their own actions. The twilight 
zone prolongs this (in)ability. Serbian history becomes something outside of sequential 
time, so that historical fact and national memory do not necessarily need to be 
synonymously recalled.
Zivkovic (2000, 2007) refers frequently to mists, hazes, slushy swamps, and mud, all 
articulations I believe, of losing one’s way in a landscape of paralysed and indefinable 
waiting, similar in nature both to that which Crapanzano (2003) refers to in his study of 
white South Africans under apartheid: and of course, to Janko’s Twilight Zone. Zivkovic 
also describes this loss of one’s moral gyroscope in his darkly comic study of ‘Mile 
versus Transition’ (2007), a TV series popular in Serbia even during my fieldwork. The 
short series, which began in 2003, was intended to be ironic, and the fictional 
protagonist Mile, was planned as a projection of a kind of anti-citizen. Zivkovic 
deconstructs Mile, who through his caricature performance as the Homo Serbicus 
Vulgaris, the everyman - exaggerated in every direction and completely over the top, 
becomes the ultimate ethnographic insider;
He is a human kaleidoscope of media fragments that settle in 
different patterns according to the situation. There is hardly a 
cliché you discovered in Serbia that he doesn’t use, hardly a 
conspiracy theory that he doesn’t subscribe to, a form of 
nostalgia that he doesn’t espouse a one moment of other [...]. He 
is obviously intended as tongue-in-cheek, but offers unexpected 
possibilities of ambiguous, indeterminate identifications [...] 
(ibid: 607). 
Zivkovic views Mile as an ambivalent anti-hero, a folk icon, an ‘impossible combination 
of contradictory traits’ (ibid: 607) offering viewers of the show the possibility to 
embrace him satirically, ambiguously, or as a completely un-ironic national hero. This, 
he surmises, must have been a bit of a shock to the writers, who had intended the show 
(and Mile) as a parody; an entertaining warning to citizens not to give in to those traits 
within themselves that they recognised in Mile. The problem, as Zivkovic sees it 
however, is that even many pro-transition citizens suspect that they somehow contain 
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Mile within themselves, recognising a fundamental kinship with him, even as they 
shower him with ‘sarcastic scorn’, opening a space for a kind of indeterminate irony to 
appear. The twilight zone sustains itself through its multiplicity of contradictory and 
often ironic truths. 
As for entrapment, I believe that the qualities of feeling ensnared (Jansen 2009) by 
dream states and twilight-zones, and of being ‘not normal’ were fundamentally about the 
same thing. They are both the consequence and the cause of losing one’s moral 
orientation within what Zivkovic (2007) calls the ‘slushy swamp’ of contemporary 
Serbian politics; a dysfunctional state of affairs in which otherwise well-meaning, moral 
citizens might have to make moral compromises; where one’s hopes for the future are so 
diffuse and disconnected from the pragmatic ways that one goes about daily life so as to 
be virtually inconceivable. Although the writing in the extract below indicates standards 
of living in the 1970s and 80s, not very much seemed to changed in 2008. Zivkovic 
notices that considering the failure of the state to exert transparent and appropriate forms 
of governance and to guarantee a generally acceptable standard of living, citizens turned 
ever more to personal connections (veze):
Everyday life...necessitated a repertoire of tactics for obtaining 
scarce goods and services that would strike a citizen of a more 
rationally organised western democracy as circuitous.55 Having 
friends or friends of friends strategically distributed through 
banks, post offices, various bureaucracies, and, perhaps most 
important, hospitals, was valuable capital that enabled one to cut 
corners, jump long lines, and, in general, make one’s everyday 
life easier (2000: 55).
Ones ability to act in a meaningful and moral way became increasingly embedded in 
these networks of contacts, friends and colleagues. Like any form of citizenship, the 
ability to access resources through veze imposes its own set of moral obligations on 
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insider ethnographer) himself takes on the Serbian mindset in the extract above: as he mentions 
of the irrationality of having to rely on one’s friends and contacts for quality of life, rather than the 
state, he consequently offers this as evidence of the lack of ‘normality’ in Serbia.
citizens. However, throughout recent history these obligations often involved preforming 
actions that undermined the state. Whether one was tricking the system, or embezzling a 
firm; relying on veze under the socialist state was a matter of pride, and led to both a 
sense of honour among thieves as well as ‘a corresponding distain for those who were 
too straight’ (Zivkovic 2000: 56). Despite Serbia’s ongoing transitioning to democratic 
and transparent forms of European governance, these ‘non-networks’ (like Dunn’s from 
2005), are still powerful and difficult to trace, having existed outside of legitimate 
government over multiple generations. Janko’s story illustrates the dangers of falling out 
of them. 
In many ways, citizenship itself continues to be performed through contradictory 
practices of both supporting and undermining state control. Zivkovic imagines these 
facets of political and social life as kaleidoscopes of ideologies, conspiracy theories, and 
media fragments, that constantly produce not beautiful arrangements, but prismatical 
grotesqueries, or ‘poetic statements of the incoherence, and opacity...of the social 
world’ (Zivkovic 2007: 607). By this quirk of logic therefore, one is ‘not normal’ in 
Serbia because this is itself a ‘normal’ consequence of what has come before; 
conditioned by the Twilight zone, and cut off from the rest of the world, it is implied that 
all citizens have in some way a ‘skewed’ moral gyroscope. This, Greenberg maintains, is 
why many of her Serbian student informants felt that only a foreigner could really 
understand all the ways that Serbs were ‘really’ crazy. They (the Serbs) only had each 
other to position themselves against (2011), each one spinning askew in a moral and 
social order composed of seemingly incompatible and incongruous beliefs. As Zivkovic 
points out somewhat sardonically, and as all this suggests, Serbia is not an ideal field for 
those with a weak stomach for contradiction, in fact, he proposes that that ‘all 
combinations of contradictory political bedfellow will eventually be met with in 




What do we mean about when we talk about citizenship? In Serbia, the word ‘narod’, or 
ethnic nation also refers to its population, or volk. Body, territory and ethnicity 
combined. Like so many other aspects of the state, Serbian citizenship is also defined 
and performed though contradictory practices, not only of citizens, but of the state itself; 
which guarantees the rights of some, by excluding / failing to provide safety and security 
for others. An example of this has been Serbia’s recent inclusion in the Schengen visa 
free travel zone dating from December 2009, explicitly without the politically contested 
territory of Kosovo. By consenting to this condition which was a requirement in order 
for citizens of the rest of the country to be guaranteed the possibility of travel, the 
Serbian State has recognised that, despite their claims of sovereignty over the region, 
Kosovo citizen status is not as legitimate as the rest of the country. Inclusion in the 
European community, and freedom of movement for the majority has come at the 
expense of a few. 
This is, amongst other things, a tacit acknowledgement of what Buchowski (2006) refers 
to as the problems of internal societal orientation in a post socialist state. Buchowski 
writes about the transitioning process of Poland into the EU, drawing on ideas of 
stigmatised others within a country’s internal and largely mono-ethnic internal 
population. Drawing on the seminal works of Bakic-Hayden and Todorova (already 
mentioned in previous chapters), he maintains that the postmodern, postindustrial and 
post-socialist forms that orientalist thinking has taken, stretch far beyond Edward Said’s 
original definitions, in the sense that they cover
not only Saidian distinction into orient and occident, but also 
into capitalism and socialism, civility and primitivism, and 
class distinction into elites and plebs (Buchowski 2006: 466).
The same peasant stereotypes that were once viewed in the volk tradition as maintaining 
a deep reservoir of Polish (and Serbian) culture have been a recategorised in the 
language of ‘transition’ as lazy and ignorant plebeian farmers by politicians and business 
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people alike, who see them as unable to conceive of the new free market, unable to 
change their ways, backwards, uncivilised, primitive. Rather than understanding this 
viewpoint as a product of post-socialist general moral decay during a transitory period, 
Buchowski’s informants (businessmen and politicians) tell him that the country’s low 
income ex-state farmers are simply morally unequipped to deal with the new state of 
affairs, having been used to spying, lying and stealing from the state farms on which 
they worked previously, and that as such, they are now deserving of their fate. 
Buchowski acknowledges that this is not a situation restricted to Poland alone. Many 
countries deal with urban/rural, uneducated/educated dichotomies. What he does make 
clear however, is that the presumption that spaces within national borders are mostly 
homogenous enables the this homogeneity of topography to conceal topographies of 
power occurring within national spaces (ibid.). He uses this geopolitics of power to 
illustrate the processes by which new internal hierarchies of modernist subjects are 
created, but also inverted by the subjects onto which these stereotypes are projected. In 
largely the same way as the Polish population that Buchowski describes, many rural 
Serbs view the urban elite as even worse than colonising foreign powers (own notes, as 
well as Zivkovic 2007, Čolović 2002). They are people who have turned away from 
their own culture, who have sold out, internalising their disgust at the vox populi; and at 
the habits of the homos balkanicus. In Serbia, the population becomes more sparse, 
mountainous and rural as one travels to the south. In this topography of political 
positioning then, Kosovo becomes the epicentre of the proletarian masses. 
Citizens are additionally made through their capacity for legitimate mobility, and 
appropriate moral agency, the belief that their actions in some way influence and are 
influenced by state functioning. Recently though, the work of scholars such as Green 
(2007), Cresswell (2009), as well as the working papers of the CITSEE56 research group 
such as the Rava (2010), Vasiljević (2011) how citizenship is also bound up in historical 
fears of too much mobility, of transient, messy or loose categories that allow loopholes 
in the citizen status of both internal citizens, as well as worries about the illegitimate 
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travel trajectories of itinerant (foreign) populations. The Kosovo vs Serbia citizenship 
status of Serbs, and the denial of biometric visas to citizens of Kosovo, (Requested by 
the Schengen member countries) as a condition for Schengen Visa entry status for the 
rest of Serbia), shows how this plays out in reality. In a nod back to Serbia’s socialist 
past however, the strategies that Kosovo Serbs employ to be granted full ‘Serbian’ 
biometric passports through their veze links (personal communication) show again how 
conflicting ideas of ‘normal’ morality serve to constantly destabilise the hierarchies of 
legitimate governmental power, and in fact, it occurs to me that the government was 
quite possibly complicit in its understanding that this would be the case even while it 
was acquiescing to the pressures of the Schengen member countries to create a formal 
split between the territories. It is much easier to give in to a demand if you know that it 
will not likely affect the practical outcome for securing a biometric visa.
In relation to my interests in prosthetic citizenships, it was the disabled and internally 
displaced citizens who had the most obviously uneasy relationship with citizenship 
practices, whether we speak of their rights to work, or vote, or live independently, to 
have relationships and families, or to access health care. This was made very clear 
during my own fieldwork, in the opaque and messy bureaucracy of the Bela clinic, 
which enabled some of these citizens to access citizenry benefits, whilst excluding 
others. As mentioned previously in chapter two, whilst conducting interviews in a 
women’s dormitory one morning, I noticed that one of the women there was a stroke 
patient rather than an amputee. She turned out to be the mother of a previous patient of 
one of the physicians, who had petitioned the centre to take her in even though she 
didn’t qualify for treatment, after she had been passed around from one rehabilitation 
centre to another in Belgrade. The ability to call on favours or to use one’s connections 
to one’s own advantage means that the veze system still trumps the excessively 
bureaucratic and dysfunctional channel of state medical services. The end justifies the 
means, in terms of an ethics of practice. Within the world of disability many of the 
‘givens’ of citizenship must be fought for. Citizenship must be proved through 
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appropriate morality, both at an individual level and at a supranational scale, by states 
seeking membership into a global community.
Being a citizen is also intimately tied to notions of statehood, and in what Ingstad and 
Whyte (1995) feel is connected to the discourse of modernity, nations have increasingly 
delineated their corporeal subjects, to record, survey and classify them vis-a-vis a 
cultural and societal interpretation of a ‘norm’. In fact, the use of ‘normal’ in relation to 
bodily measurements is a reasonably recent arrival to the English language, dating from 
the mid nineteenth century (Hogle 2005), when it was discovered that the measuring of 
individuals could yield a so called ‘distributed range of data points’ on every aspect of 
the human biological state, from physical traits to behaviour or IQ. With the plotting of 
these points thus began the concept of what we now call the ‘bell curve’ of normal 
distribution. This new way of measuring variance in populations initially augmented 
older ideas of balancing individual deficiencies and excess, though Canguilhem (1989) 
shows how with time, the production of categories of norms and pathologies became 
ever more popular. Eventually the standardising of forms of variance (so that it could be 
applied to entire populations), became the primary means by which acceptable and 
unacceptable deviations from an abstraction of a societal ‘normal’ became the prevalent 
mode of classification (Canguilhem).
In his ethnography of personhood and institutional advocacy primarily among physically  
disabled men in modern China, Kohrman (2003a, 2000b, 2005) discusses the various 
ways that injured bodies speak with the force of history, thus making them emblematic 
of the past. As the same time however, he notes that through increasingly complex 
bodily enhancements, assistive devices, and techno-scientific solutions to bodily 
contingency, these bodies are representative of the future, symbolising increasing access 
to resources, technologies and trade, within increasingly global networks. He charts the 
rise of disability organisations with the development of strong systems of national-level 
governance, realising at the same time that categories of disability are often created 
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within highly de-territorialised international frameworks for managing health and illness 
(ibid).
These frameworks may legitimise the claims of some citizens for access to national 
healthcare and welfare resources, however they also have the unintended consequence of 
silencing narratives of suffering that fall outside of these categories (Petryna 2002, 
Kohrman 2005). Ingstad and Whyte elaborate on this process (1995) noting that when 
the framework of the state is weak, disability is defined and delineated according to 
popular recognition of difference. As the state infrastructure strengthens, there is an 
expectation placed on the state to identify and count the bodily distinctions of its 
subjects. Viewed in this light, disability is directly related to the processes of modernity 
and the growth of the nation-state as the predominant unit of mass political organisation 
(Kohrman 2005) and in turn, the growth of biomedical, legal and educational 
institutions. What this means essentially is that as nation-states come to define, 
medicalise, and standardise aspects of human existence, they often do so within a 
relatively new social category - disability (Kohrman 2005). Serbia’s state infrastructure 
remains weak, which I see is both a cause and a consequence of the continuing reliance 
of more practical veze networks, which require different practical and moral compasses 
to negotiate. In these ill defined categories then, 
Disability becomes the space in which the value of normal shines 
forth without ever having to be directly spoken of, and disabled 
people are held to be asserting their individual ability (value) 
when they can be seen as oriented to serving this normal order 
(Michalko 2002: 530).
For Serbia, located in a liminal sphere (both geographically and politically) between east 
and west, positioned now on the ‘immediate outside’ of the European Union, 
membership in the European community appears closer to the realm of possibility than 
ever before. The capture and extradition of Serbia’s last two remaining high profile war 
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criminals,57 the acquisition of a biometric passport scheme, the possibility of visa free 
travel within the Schengen zone; all these moves are taken by euro-progressive citizens, 
and by external Balkan ’watchdog’ organisations, as indicators that Serbia is moving 
toward a state of ‘normal’ (Greenberg 2011). Interestingly however, Jansen has 
elsewhere noted (2009) that ‘normal lives’ are also recalled in Serbia, as in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, through the recollection of living standards, order, and social welfare, but 
that moreover, a normal life is fundamentally concerned with the dignity of knowing that 
one has ‘a place in the world’ (ibid: 827). 
Indeed, Serbia is possibly closer than ever to being ‘normal’ or at least to existing within 
the widely acceptable bracket of tolerable deviation from it, if one takes democratic 
governance, acceptance by this international community, and living standards, to be 
appropriate markers of this state of European normative governance. However, after 18 
months of examining the production of prosthetic ‘norms’, what I feel strongly is that 
aiming toward ‘normalcy’, as Rod Michalko (2002) claims, shows exactly how 
One of the most 'abnormal' things about being 'normal' is attending 
to its production. Once this is done, normalcy loses its self-
proclaimed status of unreflexive naturalness (ibid: 82).
I have already made use of Leder’s theory of ‘dys-appearance’ relating to the body and 
its phantoms and prosthetic additions, but it strikes me that, as I have recently 
mentioned, as the state was originally conceived of as the body of the sovereign 
monarch, we might also expand this theory to encompass all forms of national territory. 
Leder’s position was that we only really experience our bodies as present when they 
give us trouble - aches, pain, and so on. When they are dysfunctional, instead of 
remaining largely absent from our thoughts as they are generally, they dys-appear, in all 
their wrongness. Which, in making us think about them, pushes their limitations into our 
conscious (fore)thoughts (Leder 1990).
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I would argue that the same can be said of the state. Normally, we do not notice its exact 
dimensions, either of policy or in territory (this perhaps even more so within the 
European Union and the Schengen visa free travel zone) at either local or national level. 
Water and gas flow into apartments, salaries are paid, markets and shopping centres 
offer goods that are bought and consumed, waste is disposed of, malaise and illnesses 
are treated by health professionals, democratic processes are observed, laws are upheld, 
trains, planes and buses ferry citizens from place to place...
In times of crisis however, the limitations of the state become startlingly clear, and, 
rather than reminding ourselves of those areas of social and political life that do remain 
in working order, our focus sharpens on those facets of the state that have now ‘dys-
appeared’. Recessions, wars, territorial disputes, political upheavals, all offer a multitude 
of ways for various dys-appearances of the state, and I propose that it is during these 
periods of the dys-appearing state that the forms that prosthetic citizenship take become 
apparent. Not that they are not always in place, but simply that as a meshwork in which 
we exist they generally form an indistinguishable part of individual and collective 
personhood. 
Many of the supporting structures of citizens exist in ways that fall outside of 
meaningful analysis (such as ANT). Instead they constitute a kind of background noise. 
They are the material media in which living things are immersed (Ingold 2008). Ingold 
argues that it makes as much sense to call us hybridised by our technological 
environments, as it does to say that the water in which a fish swims is an active 
participant in the environment of the fish, or that a fish is really a ‘fish-water’ hybrid 
(Ingold 2008). Until the networks of their creation are jeopardised and their edges are 
frayed away, our citizenry prostheses form the unnoticeable vernacular matrix of social 
life. They exist as those structures that support and prop up citizens; that is, the
 
material, structural, institutional and social conditions that need 
to be in place in order to translate aspirations into realities 
(Greenberg 2011: 94).
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In actual Serbian citizenship practices, it is the later part of this statement the ability to 
translate aspirations into realities that has become the manifestation of everything that 
is ‘un-normal’ about Serbian life. Like the fish though, does it make sense to claim that 
these conditions are active participatory agents? They are the water (or the slush - as the 
case may be) in which we wade, negotiating obstacles to effective action. In the muddy 
Serbian matrix, sovereignty is manifested in multiple, often contradictory citizenry 
strategies that meet with diverse claims and contestations, and produce diverse and 
contingent outcomes. Given the aspirations and agendas of individuals for the type of 
action they wish to generate, many end in a stalemate of contradiction (see Janko’s story 
on page 77 for a description of a complex moral stalemate). Some learn to negotiate 
these new complications, and others do not. Those left behind, entangled in the 
structural framework of transition, are re-imagined by those who have kept up (and 
those who have a foot in each camp, so to speak), not as people with problems, but as 
the problem themselves, in a very similar manner to how rural conservative Polish 
citizens are re-imagined by their liberal urban compatriots (Buchowski 2006). 
Utilising one’s veze connections enables practical solutions to daily bureaucratic 
difficulties within a shifting and unstable political playing field, and both strengthens 
and propagates these networks for further gain (and is often the path of least resistance 
where bureaucratic process is concerned), but has the disadvantage of further weakening 
official channels of power play. Veze, then, is as much an example of distributed agency 
as a physical prosthesis, an external structure that props up and augments the body. As 
with any prosthesis, the choice to make use of some networks rather than others 
(apropos Winance (2006) see previous chapters), opens up some opportunities and 
closes down others. Furthermore, veze also supplies both the need for its continued 
usage (in that its continued usage destabilises more official networks) and the fulfilment 
of that void (the avoidance of bureaucracy), one of the many defining qualities of 
prostheses that Jain (1999) chooses to engage with. 
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Deficient Citizenship 
A consequence of leaving normalcy unquestioned is that 
connections between the assumptions, values, and structures 
of normal life and how disability is actually lived...are almost 
obliterated (Michalko 2002: 82).
Health, citizenship and normalcy are perhaps most obviously linked together through the 
ideology of public health, where categorial renderings of normal and pathological states 
(and categories of normal pathologies) and management of the health of entire nation-
states is enacted at all levels of society and nation. These include the natural 
environment, communities, workplaces, family life and perhaps most importantly, the 
individual (Peterson and Lupton 1997). Although individual autonomy in health 
practices is generally alluded to by health professionals, decision making is rarely 
actually autonomous, as, like Ingold’s fish-in-water on the previous pages, the individual 
is always immersed in their prosthetic structure, existing as the individual-in-family / or 
the environment/society/the clinic. We are indeed not as bounded as we like to think. 
Additionally, within the trope of the Western welfare capitalism, it might be argued that 
the historical norm of a white, male, self-governing, able-bodied, heterosexual, wage-
earning subject exists as the universal citizen (Cresswell 2009). He is able to enact and 
claim legal, political and social rights. This citizen is an abstract concept however, as 
around him exist a range of structurally differentiated ‘incomplete’ subjects - marked by 
gender, age, illness, disability and/or ethnicity/nationality (Jain 1999, Clarke 2003). 
These incomplete subjects are actually much more real that the universal citizen. 
Furthermore, the creation of various categories of incompleteness, and the assertion, 
post-creation, that they should not matter (as well as the additional call for the inclusion 
of peoples deemed to be incomplete subjects into society), actually serves to mark 
certain types of people as an otherwise excludible type (Titchkovsky 2003).
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However altruistic policies of inclusion might be, Titchkovsky’s focussing on the 
elimination of exclusion allows the actual exclusionary processes of inclusion to reveal 
an unchallenged assumption of a biological norm. Her focus on the category of disabled 
citizens in Canada, shows just how they are ‘given shape as an excluded [and 
excludible] population, in need of programs enabling inclusion’ (ibid: 518). These 
paradoxical inclusionary practices are thus prosthetic in that they too supply the 
deficiency for which they seek to provide the solution (to use Jain’s original 1999 
definition). 
In fact, when it comes to articulating the concept of prosthetic citizenship, I have an 
anthropological precedent. Despite Kurzman’s justifiable critique of their work (2001), 
Nelson (2001, 2001b) and Wright (2001) have both attempted to pin down a prosthetic 
aspect to cultural identity formation. Where they went wrong, and what so raised the 
hackles on Kurzman’s back, is the lack of distinction that both authors make between 
identity and citizenry. I maintain that identity politics make a difficult ground for the 
metaphors of prosthetic that really seem to be about power relationships, and repeat 
Jain’s parting warning, that as the prosthetic body is the norm rather than the exception 
(1990), prosthetising the body cannot help us narrow our gaze on identity construction. I 
believe however that it can help us understand the creation of citizens, who are defined 
by their capacity to affect moral actions; to both own and be shaped by having ‘a place 
in the world’ as Jansen (2009) puts it. 
To my mind, despite rich ethnographic detail into gendered and culturally codified 
interactions and imaginings, Nelson (2001b) loses track further when she imagines the 
image of the mujer Maya as a ‘semi autonomous prosthesis’ to a kind of metaphoric 
Mayan identity. I, like Kurzman am confused about what she actually means by this, 
because, as he points out, a prosthesis cannot be autonomous, although, as Nelson does 
elude repeatedly, it can be and often is, a difficult pairing; an ungainly or ‘lumpy’ 
incorporated structure. Why can it not be autonomous? Power relations in human/
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prosthesis relationships are directional, flowing out from an individual to their external 
structures. 
A citizen can be only ever be an ‘individual-in-wheelchair’ rather than the inverse. The 
wheelchair alone represents a form of action, rather than an actual augmentation, 
incorporated into a body schema, likewise an ‘individual-with-prosthesis’. Divorced 
from usage, it is fetishised movement, like Zoran’s fancy spring loaded mechanical knee, 
propped up on his wall at home (see his story in The Ghost in The Machine). 
Responding within the same journal volume to Wright (2001) and Nelson’s (2001, 
2001b) articles, Kurzman’s imaginings of his prosthetic limbs marching downstairs to 
confront his subjugation of them, while facetious, do prove the point he is trying to 
make, that the potential of the prosthesis for active agency should not be confused with 
autonomy. They may prop up, support, and augment, open the possibility for some forms 
of action, and close down others, but they cannot self determine, Zoran’s leg cannot 
walk alone, it cannot even make him walk better via osmosis or by its sheer existence, 
without his mastery of a set of learned skills. Likewise, the prosthetic structures or orbits 
of individuals do nothing on their own. They require manipulation, and a mastery of 
skills; how to access benefits, who to talk with to smooth one’s path in a visa queue, 
where to buy goods. 
Even when I have referred to the distributed agency of individuals in various co-
formations of interpersonal and technological pairings, where one element is prosthetic 
to the other, there must necessarily exist a citizen (or core concept) at the centre of each 
grouping. Relationships with all these external elements are not mutually exclusive, an 
individual (or technological/bureaucratic) node existing on the periphery of one 
particular prosthetic network can also be a more pivotal central element of another, and 
in turn will have their own distributed network. What Ingold calls meshwork in the 
above extract, I see more as the radius of potential actions that orbit various citizens and 
citizenry groupings, the spheres in which we all move and which are in turned 
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influenced by us. In this respect these prosthetic citizenships are rather more like the 
circumferences of venn diagrams, where each overlapping area opens the possibility for 
a particular contingent form of action. Perspective is of particular importance in the 
distributed agency of citizens. Who and what is ‘prosthetic’ (i.e. augmenting) to 
someone or something else changes as a different concept is placed within the central 
orbit. 
Despite falling firmly within Kurzman’s camp when it comes to the difficulties that he 
has with the way that both Nelson and Wright retroactively define prostheses as artificial 
limbs, and amputated bodies, I do agree with Nelson’s ultimate conclusions, that
We cannot understand the relations between the imagined and 
lived body of the [wounded] nation, the relation between 
indigenous rights and the project of nation building, the 
simultaneity of modernity and tradition and the theoretical 
problems of the relation between real bodies and social fantasy, 
solidarity and critique, without thinking them all together 
(Nelson 2001b: 342).
Wright’s work, from the same volume (2001) which begins so promisingly by offering 
the prospect of a concept of a distributed social network and the prosthetic nature of the 
power differential between ‘unskilled’ female Mexican factory labourers trained by a 
skilled male supervisor, unfortunately also does exactly what Michalko warns against in 
the extract previously mentioned (2002). It takes this prosthetic relationship to be 
something outside of the ordinary, leaving issues of normalcy in gender and workplace 
relations (indeed in all intersubjective relationships) unquestioned, as Wright imagines a 
hybrid and hermaphrodite abstract body that both parties inhabit. I, like Kurzman, am 
wary of the way that Wright, like so many scholars, never questions the assumption that 
the body in need of prosthetising is a naturally incomplete body, lacking in substance, 
and I therefore worry that as the prosthesis is taken as an extension to a ‘natural’ 
insufficient body, this raises questions as to what kinds of relationships and citizens are 
sufficient. 
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Wright (ibid) misses the point articulated at beginning of the second section of this 
dissertation, lifted from from Steigler’s (1998) ‘Technics and Time’, that a prosthesis, far 
from being an extension, is really the constitution of the body as human. Steigler takes 
the body itself as the original prosthesis that we learn to manipulate, and posits that 
augmentations and replacements to it are therefore part of a continuing process of 
prosthetising. Prosthetic relationships are gendered, aged, classed and raced, mostly 
(though unlike Kurzman I’m unwilling to accept it as a universal fact) according to the 
cultural and personal preferences of an amputee58. To this end I am wary of retroactively 
ascribing prosthetic metaphors to citizenry status as well, though I am heartened in this 
endeavour to remember that whilst I was in Serbia, Kosovo was alluded to as a 
gangrenous foot (as previously mentioned) that needed be amputated for the health of 
the nation, as well as to hear that it would always remain part of the Serbian national 
body, even if no Serbs remained there. Phantom citizens thus appear in the political and 
social landscape. However, if it appears rather difficult to see prosthetic citizenry 
practices in healthcare, I hope to show that this is more a case of the difficult and 
paradoxical properties of prostheses themselves, than a theoretical shoehorning on my 
behalf. 
The ability of nations to maintain the health of their populations is in many cases an 
index of global standing, in an age where despite the increasing salience of international 
health interventions and incentives, the politics of global health is far from de-
territorialised, especially when it comes to the provision of care to the poorest members 
of society, to illegal immigrants and refugees, or in the case of Serbia, to the large 
numbers of ‘internally displaced’ Serbs, with indeterminate citizenry status. 
Writing about the treatment of immigrants in health care centres in the USA, Ong (1996) 
discusses the ways in which class, ethnicity, and cultural difference become reductively 
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58 Kurzman’s reference to the skin colour of a limb being matched to the skin of the amputee is 
of course a ‘best practice’ ideal, though is outside the realm of possibility for many amputees in 
Serbia, and I imagine in many other situations as well. 
racialised, on a sliding scale of blackness and whiteness, based upon popular lay 
perceptions of a group’s potential economic worth. Ong contrasts the treatment of Cuban 
and Mexican immigrants in an era of declining welfarism, noting that this precipitates 
‘the rationing of health care, based on a scale of individuals’ imputed moral worth’ (Ong, 
cited in Horton 2004: 475). Horton’s work itself is interesting in this regard too, as she 
examines both the way that refugee patients’ languages and health attitudes complicate 
health care access, and the way in which hospital staff measure immigrant groups 
against each other, ‘couching issues of risk and responsibility in terms like ethnicity and 
national origin’ (ibid: 476). Differences in health seeking behaviours, class attributes and 
status of immigrants all fall under the catchall phrase of ‘culture’. Remembering the 
citizenry reframing project (as envisaged in Poland, and in Serbia as I have argued), and 
the basing of the universal citizen on an abstract norm, the creation of new forms of risk, 
and the production of Serbia as a state on the ‘immediate outside’ of the EU, we begin to 
form a picture of how the marketing of health (in this case prostheses) through official 
channels of government and international business, is co-opted by occasionally 
contradictory ideas about health, as well as unofficial health seeking models of 
behaviour influenced by divergent factors such as veze, availability of resources, 
citizenry status, even time of year. Patients in the clinic were on the lower economic 
rungs of society. Seasonal black or grey market workers, the internally displaced; many 
fell into the category mentioned by Buchowski (2006), people left behind, and 
recategorised as the problem, those to blame for Serbia’s lack of ‘progress’ toward 
European amalgamation.
It is not only the health of both individuals and collectivities that that is up for debate, as 
we continue to discuss the health of economies, trade networks, industries, and 
territories. The turning of governance toward the self however creates a moral deficit, 
and I would argue that in Serbia’s case this is then inverted and reprojected upwards to a 
state level, as states are, after all, collectivities of people, especially in the case of states 
with large supra-national populations and weak or shifting physical state boundaries. 
Petersen and Lupton (building heavily on Foucault) have shown the health of the nation 
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can be viewed as a resource that must be maintained as an end to itself, perhaps even a 
state of war readiness, and more recently scholars have concurred and also inverted 
these claims as well, describing how the ill health of a nation is sometimes utilised as a 
resource for attracting aid through medical trials, or as a defining characteristic and the 
grounds of citizenship itself (Petryna 2005). This upward projecting however, primarily 
allows the language of the state to become imbued with the language of the self, where 
national stereotypes can then be both created and confirmed as ‘natural’, which in turn 
allows this category to remain unscrutinised. Just as I described the how bodies can 
become the state made corporeal, so I would like to suggest that the inverse also applies. 
The state can be imagined as a corporeal collective body, with appetites that cannot be 
reined in. Further more this state body can then be positioned relative to other states, 
personified as a risky or responsible patient, deemed to be making ‘progress’ (or not, as 
the case may be).
Imagining prosthetic health citizenships, both at an individual and state level, means a 
critical investigation of concepts such as bodies, technologies, individual and collective 
rights and social and aesthetic norms. This by itself is not explicitly prosthetic. It is part 
of a growing body of research in social anthropology and especially within medical 
anthropology that explores different models of ‘medical citizenship’, such as claims 
made for biological (Petryna 2002), pharmaceutical (Ecks 2005), or therapeutic (Nguyen 
2005) citizenship. What is specific about a prosthetic citizenship is the ways in which 
what I have called the orbiting structures (metaphoric, physical or otherwise) of that 
which we call a singular citizen, force us to ‘renegotiate discourses on “the 
human”’ (Smith and Morra 2006: 6). One might argue that these are the themes of 
cyborg anthropology, however rather than embracing the cyborg, the post human, and 
the post-post human, prosthetic citizenships evoke a critique:
Against a more evolutionary understanding of the gradual infiltration of 
the body by prosthesis, there is ... [an understanding] that the point of 
prosthetic contact - and the dialectic of the edges in such contact - is 
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also a part of a process that recognises exactly how the ‘the prosthetic’ 
is an integral or ‘inter-constitutive’ part of the ‘human’ (ibid: 7).
Physical restorative prostheses are still commercially produced objects, whether high or 
low tech. They are bought and sold on global markets, subject to patents, copyright law 
and economic flows of capital. These technologies change and adapt, keeping pace with 
wider industries of cybernetics, and engineering, intimately tied to the relentless quest to 
replicate the human body. As objects however, prostheses are much more than the sum 
of their parts (pun wholeheartedly intended). They are also indicative of social 
processes, class and socio economic status. New technologies do not always replace old, 
but can co-exist. Moreover, in a process known as alignment, an amputee learns to 
‘embody’ their specific prosthetic, to make it part of their lived experience so that it 
ceases to be an object and instead is incorporated into the body. Within the gait clinic 
this relationship is tested out. It is refined and made temporarily solid. It may however 
be revisited as this relationship no longer becomes desirable or appropriate. Like any 
consumable good, certain brands and types of prostheses are considered to be more 
desirable, and as with any rehabilitative measure; cultural, economic, and social 
structures help to shape where the upper limits of functional restoration and the lower 
limits of enhancement lie.
Mass produced and globally consumed objects are thus incorporated into the lives of 
specific patients and these lives are also grounded within lived context. Within a gait 
clinic (or a physical therapy lab) a new relationship to this lived context is tested out, to 
be revisited repeatedly, as one’s priorities and desires for a particular way of being 
change. It is not only the corporeal and technological relationship being reordered. A 
new citizen is created, other prostheses are perhaps incorporated or jettisoned; for 
example, a government benefit, a walking frame, a wheelchair, the presence of a carer at 
home. 
Prostheses are therefore also about the creation and maintenance of social order. A 
‘normal’ gait or body shape might not exist in any real way; however there is a standard 
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degree of deviation from this abstraction of normative ambulation which is tolerable. 
This is the space of prosthetising. Prosthetising is after all about pronunciation, easing 
understanding, and therefore ways of acting and/or being that fall outside of any range of 
understandable deviation are bought under control through the prosthetic aspects of 
citizens, as they are seen to pose a threat to normal and appropriate social relations. 
What indeed is a citizen? As always technologies adapt and mutate. The Europe of 2010 
is an ever more technologically advanced and increasingly global world, where 
advanced liberal systems of creating, maintaining and governing health populations have 
re-conceptualised the primary political citizen (Foucault 2006 [1991], Rose 2006 [1996]) 
as a subject who self-regulates his/her behaviours, and thus, by exercising ‘free-will’ 
governs him/herself in ways that are simultaneously indicative of a freedom to do as one 
pleases, while conforming to the ‘norms’ of society. Who and what is governed in these 
new state apparatuses? The internal borders of the European Union become more 
permeable, even as the peripheral ones strengthen. In a time of economic austerity 
within healthcare there is what may be termed a general shift away from the principles 
of a welfare state, as governments find less funds are available for public spending. Rose 
writes that although  
strategies of welfare [seek] to govern through society, ‘advanced’ liberal 
strategies of rule ask whether it is possible to govern without governing 
society, that is to say, to govern through the regulated and autonomous 
choices of autonomous agents - citizens, consumers, parents, employees, 
managers, investors - and to govern through intensifying and acting upon 
their allegiance to particular ‘communities’ (2006: 160). 
This can be seen as reflecting new global health initiatives, where individual populations 
are governed through citizenship, which affects their access to health services (Beck 
2005, Hindess 2005). However, far from de-territorialising populations, this type of 
governing is enacted by the creation of smaller territories of governments held together 
by the creation of supranational targets (whether they be health, economic, or political). 
Failure of a state to control its population therefore becomes legitimate cause for 
123
intervention (whether desired or not) from foreign states. Like the prosthetic body, the 
prosthetic citizenry structures of the state then imagine a whole (the state) by reducing 
the body of the state to a sum of units (institutions, citizens, families) that may then be 
shaped individually. These supranational ideals are played out in the daily lives of 
citizens, the choices available to them, and the support offered. Recent anthropological 
research has shown how difficult it is to separate ‘the state’ from the politics of local 
level life (Gupta 2006). Indeed the boundaries of the state and the individual appear to 
be more blurred than ever. 
Within the Bela clinic, a premium was placed on inpatient care, and at the expense of the 
provision of higher quality prostheses. More prostheses of a lesser standard could be 
made for with the money that was available, requiring less training of prosthetists and 
less parts that could break. This meant that a higher number of patients could be trained 
by physical therapists, rather than prosthetists, important as therapists were cheaper to 
employ. Many of the younger patients in the clinic actively researched their prosthesis 
options, even though more technological limbs than those offered through the health 
care system were above their economic means. Those who could access funding (by 
friends, colleges, churches or organisations) and who were interested (the majority of 
people were not) could draw on their networks to gain access to the resources that 
allowed them to become the kind of citizens that they wished to be. In an ongoing circle 
of exclusion therefore, only people with supporting structures already around them could 
utilise these further supports themselves. 
The Serbia that I lived in was a country undergoing a massive transition, both from long 
term economic crisis, and conflict. It was aiming for the development of a transparent 
democratic market in a region where many of the problems stem not from Balkanisation, 
but, as Green (2007) has argued, from messy hybridization, from indistinct boundaries 
and borders that are disputed and can be claimed by multiple parties, given differences 
of scale and historicity. Though each of the Balkan countries has fought tooth and nail to 
become independent from each other, now all seek a new type of security and legitimacy 
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under the banner of the EU. At the time I lived in Novi Sad, Serbs still needed visas for 
all European countries (with the exception of Turkey and the newly created Montenegrin 
state), a state of affairs that had existed for over 20 years. The bureaucratic channels that 
one had to go through had the effect of making travel a luxury that few could attain, and 
even then, it was often through paths of dual citizenship. Where and how one could 
travel was less a question of monetary resources and physical than the ability to imagine 
one’s historical citizenship outside of Serbia59. 
Ten years on from the 78 day long NATO air strike that shook Serbia, the occasional 
building in Belgrade remained bombed out, the trains crossing over in Novi Sad were 
still using the ‘temporary’ bridge, and crumbling military structures on regular Sunday 
hiking trips with friends in the Fruška Gora national Park served as a stark reminder of 
just how badly wrong everything had gone. Serbia was and in many ways remains badly 
misunderstood in the international media. It is still often perceived of as an antagonistic, 
stubborn and spiteful country60. In many ways the ‘sustained waiting’ meant that neither 
past events, nor future directions were discussed. Occasionally though, individuals were 
jolted out of this state. such as in April 2009, as I was conducting an interview with one 
of the nurses at the Bela clinic. Suddenly all the air sirens in Belgrade sounded. Startled, 
I started toward the window, and looked over as the nurse, suddenly paralysed, her 
mouth frozen open and her eyes wide and staring, burst into tears. ‘It is the anniversary 
of the start of the bombing’ she sobbed, clutching at her stomach, ‘I’m sorry, I can’t help 
crying, it is a physical memory inside me. You know, I was pregnant with my daughter 
when they started.’
A physical memory - contained (not unlike a phantom limb), within the mind, but 
experienced through the body. A body of memories. The past suddenly breaking through 
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59 Just about all of my friends and colleagues if I asked, would answer that their families were 
from outside of Serbia. After my initial surprise that the inevitable questioning that would follow, it 
typically emerged that they were talking about a great great grandparent.
60 the Behaviour of Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić in the Hague is often jumped upon as 
typifying that of Serb Politicians - unrepentant, belligerent and hoping to lay the blame 
elsewhere. 
the hazy twilight zone. The anniversary of the start of the bombing, not its ending. This 
small vignette is perhaps a tellingly poignant example of the consequences the moving 
forwards out of the twilight zone. The mechanisms by which the twilight zone keeps the 
future positioned outside of reach, also allow even the recent past to remain diffuse, 
recalled as though out of time. It is only when history breaks through its haze that 
horrors are remembered. As we move into the second section of this dissertation, I ask 
that we keep this in mind. 
The second half of this dissertation deals more explicitly with the rehabilitation of 
bodies within the Bela clinic, at the networks involved in the creation of citizens, who I 
find have a distributed agency which sometimes causes, due to the nature of state 
functioning as I have described in in this first half. I wish to now examine how hope is 
imagined in the clinic, and why it is that we design to rehabilitate these bodies in the 
first place. The forms that these rehabilitated bodies take, are caused by and have 
consequences for patients and staff alike. Networks of people, objects, and ideas are 
implicated in the construction of legitimate citizens. 
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II
The prosthesis is not a mere extension of the human body; 
it is the constitution of this body qua ‘human‘ 







To begin, some general knowledge about admissions. I sat in on a couple of hospital 
admission evaluations with Gordana and Nikolina, and later with some of the clinic 
psychologists. The patients were asked many questions - factual, technical and medical, 
for example about their amputations and surgeries, whether they had pre-existing 
medical conditions, and whether they smoked or drank. They were also asked if they 
enjoyed socialising or if they preferred to be alone, if they liked reading, and what sort 
of level of movement they aspired to. It struck me that during these interviews, the 
patients themselves were mostly passive. Dishevelled and with downcast eyes, a number 
of them mumbled monosyllabic answers. The inevitable family member or carer who 
had brought them did the majority of talking. Later I asked some of the staff if the 
patients were often medicated for depression, from which Gordana had previously told 
me many suffered. Bojana told me that unless they were already being medicated for a 
pre-existing condition, the answer was no. Nikolina later told me that depression after 
amputation was a ‘natural’ phenomenon, one that would fade gradually as the amputees 
learned to wield their prostheses and came to accept their new body image.
Jackson once hypothesised that perhaps our uprightness of posture defined a 
psychophysical relationship with the world, and postulated that to lose this position 
could be thought of as both a bodily and intellectual loss of balance (1983). French’s 
(1994) work with Cambodian amputees appears to confirm this from a cross cultural 
perspective. Speaking of crossing cultures, the Bela clinic itself had been had been 
founded on a mid 20th century American psychological model of care, to which Jackson 
was referring, which had additionally been interpreted though the lens of Tito’s 
Yugoslavian model of socialist health care. 
The English language is full of metaphors that take the ability to stand and to walk to be 
‘a measure of rank and moral rectitude’ (Ingold 2004: 324). Examples include ‘to stand 
up for oneself’, ‘to stand tall’, ‘standing on your own two feet’, ‘to walk out’, ‘to be 
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walked over’. Ingold goes as far as to suggest that from the waist down, the human body 
is really simply a ‘stepping machine’ (2004). Standing is about strength, movement, and 
masculinity; it is a prelude to walking, a move outward and as such, it is diametrically 
opposed to sitting and dependence, passivity and femininity (Young 1990 [1980]). Our 
ability to stand has become emblematic of our moral standing (Ott 2002), a sentiment 
shared by Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1984) and more recently by Metzl (2010) who 
note that increasingly in our neoliberal health market, physical impairment is no longer 
the result of bad luck alone, but is emblematic of a perceived failure to live right, eat 
well and so on. The absence of health infers a moral failure. Reclaiming movement is 
thus a prelude to independence, both in a mental capacity and a physical sense of 
regaining a moral perspective. Simply put, the more physically active the patients 
became, the more mentally proactive they also appeared to be. 
I am greatly aided in this chapter by the work of Warren and Manderson (2008), who 
carried out research on rehabilitation, ageing and amputation, although in an Australian 
setting. There are many similarities between the Bela Clinic and their research, though 
some clear differences also exist. Like Warren and Manderson, I am continually 
interested in how patients and staff understand hope and rehabilitation relative to 
prostheses. What do they hope for and why: and how is hope generated within the 
clinic? The answers to these questions appear both clear and riddled with complexity, for 
what is being asked is not as simple as it first appears. 
First, the vast majority of the patients at the Bela clinic were geriatric patients with 
ongoing vascular co-morbidities. Their amputations are in many ways indicative of a 
continuing process of ever decreasing body functioning. In many ways, the loss of these 
vascular pathways constitutes a diminishment of sovereignty over one’s own body which 
is likely to be become worse, reviewed and re-operated on as more areas of the body 
become unviable. Their age and the multitude of these health issues render many 
patients’ futures uncertain and largely foreshortened. Yet without exception, the patients 
with whom I talked during fieldwork wanted to return to a state of ‘normal’, seemingly 
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in all aspects of their lives. The staff are also invested in this push for normalcy, 
although in a far more clearly anatomically delineated capacity. Their ‘normal’ was 
quantified within the gait lab, as ‘the absence of gait deviations’ or as having a ‘normal 
gait pattern’. Appearing ‘normal’ through movement is the practical and aesthetic 
paradox of the prosthesis. It is after all, as Wright notes, ‘the secret of [one’s] self, 
hidden beneath clothing, allowing its user to pass as something other than what they 
‘truly’ are’ (2009: 1).
The amputated body has different physiological limits to the bipedal, four limbed body, 
with all its internal biological organs intact. How a normal prosthetic body might look, 
feel and behave is dependent on different body schema, that is, what has been removed, 
and why. For example, it is quite common for amputee patients to experience high blood 
pressure, raised body temperature and increased sweating, due to changes in physiology 
that accompany the loss of body mass and skin surface area. 
The staff with whom I talked inside the Bela clinic felt that because of this disparity 
between the body before and after surgery, it was not helpful for the amputees to use 
their previous body as a tool for comparison, telling me often that patients needed to 
‘accept’ their prostheses into their selves. In reality however, it was difficult for patients 
and staff to find common ground without alluding to the language of the biological body, 
and therefore the narrative of rehabilitation was an area of uncomfortable boundary 
crossing, where both parties lacked the language of the other (see Kurzman 2002). 
Patients are required to tell their prosthetists and therapists how their prosthesis feels. 
Clearly there are descriptors that are easier to interpret, such as tightness, looseness, 
rubbing, chaffing, or squeezing, but how does one make sense of a prosthesis that 
produces cramps in a phantom calf? That feels like walking into a hole? Or up a hill?
To try to get my head around how difficult it would be to describe walking without 
alluding to the biological body, I thought about how I would go about describing how 
my biological leg feels while walking. Sacks once called the language of movement a 
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kinetic symphony (Sacks 1984), referring to the ability of action to transcend linguistic 
description. Grosz’s body that ‘knows’ (1994) its actions is really nothing out of the 
ordinary, it is the body of an ‘everyman’, engaged in networks of what neurologists and 
prosthetists call kinaesthetic or proprioceptive senses. Fundamentally unconscious, these 
movement senses are none-the-less necessary for all voluntary movements that we 
make, from our ability to balance, to our knowledge of how hard it is to grasp a teacup. 
In daily life, these senses have become automatic, the thousands of actions that the body 
processes simultaneously to accomplish movement exist as literally ‘unremarkable’. 
Especially in the case of ambulation, proprioceptive and kinaesthetic senses matter, 
otherwise we wouldn’t be able to walk without consciously watching our feet. In a very 
literal way, the prosthetic paradox means that to make a prosthetic leg as equally 
unremarkable as a biological one, both the prosthesis and the patient must go through a 
fundamentally ‘remarkable’ process. To make use of Leder’s illness metaphor, in order 
for prosthetic limbs to disappear as attachments and become incorporated into a whole, 
they must first be made to ‘dys-appear’ (1990). The performance (of walking) is broken 
down into a multitude of smaller actions within the body (toe / heel strike, dorsiflexion, 
rollover, energy storage, spring for example), which are then transformed through being 
described, and from this description replicated through technology, before being 
translated back into action and relearned through proprioceptive networks. 
Warren and Manderson (2008) show that within the field of prosthetic rehabilitation 
among the elderly, the high probability of future amputations mean that body 
sovereignty is uncertain and temporary, due to the presence of various co-morbidities 
that foreshorten long term life expectancy. A long and prosperous future with a better 
quality of life was therefore not a motivating factor for these patients. Along with this, 
the physiological knowledge of their own biologies (a kind of body memory as it were) 
was no longer available as a stable resource through which patients could imagine a 
particular type of action, through amputation of the physical body, and the presence of 
phantom limbs. Our ability to anticipate is based in large part on the logic and reason 
that we gain through experience of given situations. Simply said, if you’ve never had a 
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prosthetic limb before, it is difficult to imagine how it will function61. This loss of both 
future and past has the combined effect of rendering both these categories unavailable as 
a source of generating rehabilitative hope. Hoping for recovery in prosthetic 
rehabilitation is connected with predicting and anticipating movement. 
While the rhetoric of hope connects it strongly with the future, and therefore with 
recovery (Delvecchio-Good et al 1990, Crapanzano 2003), the actual ‘work’ of hoping is 
located very much in the present. Without the past as a vehicle for creating a framework 
for anticipation (it is difficult to anticipate how a prosthetic limb will work without 
experience of its usage) and in the presence of a radically foreshortened future 
complicated by increasing ill health for most patients, the staff do their best to locate 
hope in the present. The question becomes not only ‘what’ patients hope for, but ‘how’ 
they go about the business of hoping. 
The staff and the patients are therefore actively engaged in locating hope in actions, and 
hoping becomes something that is ‘performed’ daily in the gait clinic. Dualisms such as 
‘walking movement = movement = autonomy’ and ‘sitting = stagnation = passivity’ are 
manifest in both the actions of the staff and in the advertising materials that span the 
walls of prosthetic components companies such as Ottobock Healthcare. Researching 
online also brought motion and hope together: ‘Life is movement,’ exclaimed Kathy, one 
of the Ottobock amputees who I found featured on their ‘real life’ motivational 
website.62 Does this then imply that a life without movement is no life at all? Or that the 
more we are able to move, the more alive we are? That someone is ‘still moving’ is after 
all often used as shorthand for proof of life. 
I asked one day if the Bela Clinic had any archive photos that I might use, and though 
there were none of the buildings which had been my original goal there were a series of 
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61 Ironically enough, this is remarkably similar to what Van der Port’s (1998) Serbs had to say 
about being Serbian!
62 www.ottobock.com$ $ $
‘before and after’ pictures that I was shown which were very striking. What I noticed 
most about these pictures of upper limb amputees (where the patients had been 
photographed first without their prosthesis and then with it in position) was that in the 
former, they had been pictured standing straight or side on, clinically, gazing straight 
ahead, whereas in the later they were pictured smiling, picking up blocks, drinking, 
jumping: ‘using’ their prosthesis (see figure 11 in the next chapter as an example). In 
other words, in action.
While I discuss the various readings of these images in the next chapter, what interests 
me here is the way in which motion is conceptualised in rehabilitation, and, leading on 
from this, the way in which function is understood in the realm of prosthetics. The idea 
that amputees had been rehabilitated when they could wield their prosthesis was very 
strong, and as previously mentioned, one of the social workers on the staff even 
suggested to me that if the patients turned up at the benefit offices wearing their 
prostheses then they would not receive a benefit, and therefore he suggested to patients 
that when they were claiming their benefits, turning up in a wheelchair, or on crutches 
could be beneficial. The patients were thus encouraged to utilise those elements of their 
body aesthetic that were conducive to getting their disability allowance, just as Staples 
(2003) describes people with leprosy in India revealing and concealing disfigured body-
parts in order to beg. The differences in being able and disabled are thus tied both to 
ideas surrounding what exactly the accepted level of deviation from normative body 
aesthetics should be, which, according to the anecdotal evidence from the clinic social 
worker, would seem to be based on the capacity of citizens to labour, in a very Marxist 
sense.
Often, as I watched patients begin to stand and to learn the art of walking with a 
prosthesis, it seemed to me that they were struggling with a ‘hopeless’ endeavour. If the 
gold standard of walking is to be bipedal, unaided, and wholly without a gait deviation, 
then these patients were so far off track as to render this possibility unattainable. 
However, it seemed that their sessions in the gait clinic provided them more with a 
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chance to measure themselves against each other, and against progress for progress’ 
sake. In the broader sense of the rehabilitative ethic, it would appear that getting a 
patient to stand is preferable to having them wheelchair bound, and being able to 
undertake some form of ambulation (no matter how strange) was further preferable to 
having them static. 
Over and above the examples listed on page 104, at various stages, Mauss (1950), 
Bourdieu (1977,1990), and Ingold (2004) have all shown that simply standing carries 
with it meaning (we can say ‘to be a person of high standing’, ‘to stand on one’s feet’, 
‘to stand up for oneself’), walking perhaps even more so (‘to be walked over’, ‘to stage 
a walk out’) and legs can become a metaphor that also yield a fruitful result (‘to leg it 
across town’, ‘having a leg to stand on’, ‘to be on one’s last legs’, ‘to have a leg up on 
your competition’) for our ability to generate independent action. 
In the Bela Clinic the ability 
to generate action was so 
integral to locating and 
performing hope in the ‘here 
and now’ that simply to be 
capable of walking in some 
form seemed to be more 
important than what exactly 
that form took. In the gait 
clinic, strange ambling gaits 
that left walkers exhausted 
and unbalanced appeared to be preferable to lives bound to wheelchairs. Patients and 
staff egged each other on in the gait clinic, coaxing and cajoling each other from across 
the room. Fights broke out occasionally over who had the right of way on an apparatus. 
Elderly gentlemen in shirts and bathing shorts were hoisted into their leather harnesses 
and tottered back and forth between parallel bars. Exhausted by their morning training, a 
Fig 8: Prostheses in their storage shelves.
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fair number of the patients would retire outside to smoke in the courtyard, or play chess 
in front of the bakery, or (if it was too cold), in the large hallways outside their rooms. 
Those who came late, or who finished long gait sessions, ended with the smell of lunch 
wafting through the hallways. Limbs were dutifully doffed, and duly returned to the 
storage racks.
An overwhelming majority of patients left their limbs in the gait clinic, and indeed for 
most of the day they went without them; the rules of performance being that the 
prosthesis was worn for neither too short a period (meaning that rehabilitation was 
prolonged), nor too long (which increases the chance of a friction sore developing, 
which in turn results in not being able to wear a prosthesis ergo, longer rehabilitation 
time). The gait clinic was therefore delineated both in terms of time and function as the 
primary space in which prosthetic rehabilitation occurred. The tools of this work: the 
prostheses, were left on site for the next shift. This ‘work’ was thus confined to regulated 
hours and was always undertaken under the watchful eye of a staff member. 
Due to the need for regulation and supervision, it was in the gait clinic (or the amputee 
gym in Warren and Manderson’s case) that the main performance of hope ‘in motion’ 
occurred. Within the industry of prosthetic production, and especially the field of lower 
limb prosthetics, both amputees and their rehabilitation teams (called ‘prosthetic teams’ 
in the Bela Clinic) engaged with the rhetoric and discourse that surrounds ideas of the 
‘normal’. This quality of normalcy was quantified through gait deviations, or rather the 
absence of them. The more qualities of an aesthetically ‘natural’ gait one mastered, the 
closer one moved to normal. The closer one moved toward normal, the more fully one 
had embodied or internalised the qualities of the prosthetic. Of course, the prosthetic 
paradox is that to imagine being aesthetically ‘normal’ at all, one must embrace fully the 
reality of living with an unconventional body, as well as internalising the inclusion of 
mechanical and/or electronic parts of a body scheme. Amputees are far from the only 
group of people to whom this applies, though this is a discussion that I shall shelve for 
now.
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That hope and rehabilitation are bound tightly together does not perhaps come as a 
surprise to many of us. However anthropological enquiry into hope is somewhat thin on 
the ground. Some of the notable exceptions being Crapanzano (2003), whose work on 
the paralysing hope that he found among white South Africans during apartheid I have 
found particularly illuminating. Also useful has been Webb (2007) who mines the scope 
of social science literature available to distinguish 5 forms of hope that we move 
between (Patient, Critical, Estimative, Resolute and Utopian), concluding rather 
miserably that perhaps, what it is to hope will always elude us. I read Miyazaki (2004, 
2006), whose difficult texts delve into the methods of hoping, contrasting desires for 
technological superseding, with our on anthropological hope in critiques of capitalism. I 
have also referred to Delvecchio Good et al. 1990, in addition Warren and Manderson 
2008 (both for a more medical take on hope). It is still difficult to flesh out a theory of 
action where hope is concerned however, even though we see the hard work of hoping 
going on all around us on a daily basis. Surrounded by what many might call ‘hopeless’ 
circumstances and stories, through the course of my fieldwork in the clinic I came to 
wonder, not simply what people hoped for (which was a difficult enough category to 
unpack), but perhaps more interestingly, how they actually went about the business of 
hoping. 
Space and Recovery
If the gait clinic set the court for the performance of hope, then the therapists were the 
team members who set the rules. Rehabilitation in the Bela clinic was broken into two 
phases, pre and post prosthesis. Many of the patients had serious long term co-
morbidities alongside their amputation, and required a lengthy period of physiotherapy 
simply to be considered as candidates for a prosthesis. Others had difficult residual 
stumps to mould and perhaps ongoing oedema, and still others had simply been 
burdened with slow working prosthetists. All these patients were confined to the pre-
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prosthetic clinic. The 
immobility of the patients 
was evident even in the 
layout of the pre-prosthetic 
clinic, where evenly placed 
benches lined the walls, 
with space for wheelchairs 
and therapists to manoeuvre 
between them. Here patients 
made use of hand-held 
dumbbells and sand 
weights, as well as engaging (often less than wholeheartedly) in a programme of 
modified calisthenics to build up their upper body strength, both in preparation for long 
days holding themselves aloft, and simply to be able to self propel wheelchairs and/or 
utilise crutches whilst waiting for their prostheses to be produced. 
Very few of the patients could actually make use of crutches during their initial pre-
prosthetic period due to lack of muscle tone. There was a split in opinion in the clinic as 
to whether using crutches early on in rehabilitation was even particularly good for the 
patients. Some of the therapists that I discussed it with thought that anything that got the 
patients up and moving about exercising was a good move, whilst others told me that 
being proficient at getting around with crutches too early meant that patients were more 
likely develop problems with their remaining knee (or to be affected by muscle strains in 
their upper body), and were less likely to become fully invested in the process of 
prosthetic rehabilitation. While motion is the goal of prosthetic rehabilitation, it is 
prescribed movement, concerned with ambulation, or at least assisted walking: what’s 
more, too little, or too much of the wrong type of motion could jeopardise this goal. In 
preparation for walking, patients also had an exercise regime to strengthen their sound 
leg, as well as their gluteals and their residual limb, as wielding a trans-femoral 
prosthesis requires significant muscle tone especially through the buttocks. In fact, I 
 Fig 9: the pre-prosthetic clinic.
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noticed increasingly that many of the patients in the gait clinic had a gait pattern63 which 
showed that they were still substantially lacking strength. 
The gait clinic was connected to the pre-prosthetic clinic by a large double doorway, 
though both had an additional separate entrance. This allowed the therapists to move 
back and forth, between the pre-prosthetic patients, who exercised largely independently, 
and the gait clinic, where 
patients required more 
supervision. Three sets of 
parallel bars were laid out 
with mirrors located at 
one end, and two of the 
walls were lined with a 
shelving system for 
storing the limbs of the 
different patients, a small 
ramp with railing 
occupied the central space 
and there was a small set of stairs for practicing on in the corner. There were two 
additional benches for weight exercises, for when space was tight in the pre-prosthetic 
clinic. Additionally the parallel bars closest to the window had a long low bench, which 
was used during the alignment assessments by the prosthetic team. 
While there were a couple of chairs placed in various spots, there were no seating 
arrangements like those described by Warren and Manderson in their Australian setting, 
who mention that family members often come to watch and support from these seats 
lining the walls (2008). The lack of these seats then corresponds accordingly with the 
Fig 10: the gait clinic
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63 This gait pattern was reasonably easy to spot. The patients would be slightly leant forwards, 
the weight of their upper body resting heavily on their walker/crutches/parallel bars, their 
backside pressed back, and their biological leg (if they had one) locked tense with each step. 
Each step required a hasty shuffle forward of their prosthetic limb. 
lack of this type of activity. When family did come to visit, they often spent their time 
sitting at the bakery, or took the patients with them out into the city, or simply sat outside 
chatting. Family time was seen as something different to therapy work which was 
clearly marked as being the space within the two adjacent clinics. While the gait clinic 
might appear spacious, it was often used by dozens of patients at once. These patients 
left wheelchairs lined up in the wall spaces not already taken up, or simply left them in 
the centre of the room, creating an impromptu obstacle course. It was also a common 
occurrence to have two or more patients on the same set of parallel bars, which had a 
tendency to lead to a commotion if the patient in the fore wished to turn before the one 
bringing up the rear.
While Warren and Manderson (2008) also found that their physical and occupational 
therapists divided time between many different types of rehabilitative inpatients and 
therefore had low levels of direct contact hours with amputee patients; within the Bela 
Clinic it is the therapists to whom the patients become most attached (from my personal 
observations and from interviews with both patients, physicians and therapists). Nikolina 
suggested to me that this might be because they go through a ‘personal journey’ together, 
and that in terms of real contact hours, they spent a great deal of time together. It is the 
therapists who noticed when small adjustments to the prostheses were needed, who 
noted where friction points irritated the skin of residual limbs, and who coaxed reticent 
patients into their harnesses, occasionally downright frogmarching them along the 
parallel bars. A memorable session that I attended, included one therapist trailing her 
patient (a small frazzled looking woman who by this stage had graduated to walking 
with a support frame) constantly reminding her of the order in which she should co-
ordinate her movements. As the patient walked, the therapist would bark out ‘Nogu, 
Glupa, Protese...odlicno64! 
In many ways the therapists of the Bela clinic became the translators of Kurzman’s 
‘unknowable’ language of alignment (2002). In his excellent chapter in Ott, Serlin and 
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64 leg, bottom, prosthesis...perfect!
Mihms’ edited volume, Kurzman explains first hand the experience of using and 
learning how to perform able-bodiedness through the process of being fitted for a 
prosthesis, which is known in the prosthetics industry as alignment. In describing this 
performance of alignment, he shows that the language gulf between the amputee and the 
prosthetist is often so great that there are literally no words to explain the experience of 
learning to perform the process of alignment. The language becomes one of ritual 
performance; actions here speak louder than words. Kurzman posits that prosthetists 
become expert at interpreting the subjective experience of amputees. In the Bela clinic, 
one of the many functions of the therapists appeared to be bridging this prosthetist/
patient relationship. In the clinic one morning I observed Maria, one of the physical 
therapists, teaching one of her patients through mimicry. ‘Don’t walk like this’, she cried 
out in frustration, at the same time copying the woman’s walk. ‘Put your hips forward, 
trust in the prosthesis, push with it.’ 
Hoping through walking is taken as an unproblematic signifier of the desire for a move 
(back) toward engagement in the social sphere. This symbolic and literal move outwards 
is also evident in the way that patients used the space of the gait clinic. The first steps of 
a patient learning to walk are taken in the enclosed space between the parallel bars, 
which offer both the safety of handrails, and the security of a wheelchair placed at one 
end. The patients graduate to walking an outer loop of the parallel bars, completing a 
‘round’ with one hand for guidance before turning and supporting themselves on the 
opposite side. Free from a static structure, they then graduate to using a walking frame, 
full and then elbow crutches, before moving on to one crutch, and finally being able to 
walk unaided. Throughout this period, they began to expand their walking area outward 
from the bars, to the perimeter of the gait clinic itself, to walking in the corridors, and 
(weather permitting) out into the grounds. 
The final two categories were rarely mastered completely in the gait clinic. These 
capabilities were in many cases above what many of the patients wished to achieve. 
Many aimed to get to the stage of being able to support themselves within their homes 
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with the walker. These patients were classified as indoor users. Many also never learned 
to adequately don and doff their prostheses. Instead, their rehabilitation programme was 
extended to include teaching family members how to help hoist them into position, and 
how to tighten the harnesses, look for signs of sores and ulcers and how to clean the 
sockets and liners. These patients and their families also went through a period of 
learning wheelchair skills. 
Kurzman (2001) notes an important difference in the epistemology of the largely bio-
mechanical American prosthetics clinic when compared to the biomedical hospital or 
health clinic. He posits that the alignment room of the prosthetics clinic can be seen as a 
place of performance, in which the transformative qualities of a ritual are played out 
both on and through the bodies of amputees, who are socialised in the process of 
alignment. During these ritual performances, both the societal perception of the person 
and the personal perception of one’s self is changed (ibid). this is the creation of a new 
habitus (in both Mauss’ and Bourdieu’s senses). The structure and staging of this 
performance of Kurzman’s description still ring true in my research setting, although 
what he calls the language gulf is mitigated by the presence of the gait clinic therapists 
within the Bela Clinic, something that he alludes to being an increasingly common 
feature of prosthetic alignment. 
The therapists form a pool of knowledge which is easily accessible to the patients (as 
they spend all their ‘rehabilitation hours’ together) through a shared language. Through 
the use of jokes, and the telling of stories, by translating action to speech, they provide a 
source of feedback from which the patients can generate hope. Like the therapists in the 
Australian clinics with whom Warren and Manderson researched, at the Bela clinic, 
when patients were ‘progressing’ it was through their individual hard work, while 
setbacks were always located externally in a wider matrix of objects and events. This is 
vital to understanding how hope is generated by the staff through the reinforcing of good 
behaviours (taking part in exercise regimes), and the externalising of ‘bad’ behaviours, 
because many of the staff were complicit in the same alternative ideas of health that the 
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patients had (often partaking of the same ‘vices’ as their patients). Through creation of 
motivation in the moment from one day to the next patients could always be deemed to 
be making progress.
Within the gait clinic, the physical therapists bridge the linguistic gap between 
prosthetist and patient. It is they, rather than the prosthetists, who spend the most time 
with patients and are therefore better equipped to notice the slight changes in posture 
that signal an ill fitting or badly aligned prosthesis during usage. It was often (though not 
exclusively) the therapists who I saw placing height adjusting spacers underneath the 
prosthetic feet of patients, working out if the shaft of the limb needed lengthening or 
shortening. If something was wrong, or needed adjusting, then the patient’s assigned 
prosthetist and/or physician would be called and the necessary alterations made. It was 
the therapists to whom the patients complained and confessed on a daily basis. Patients 
were not always compliant with their rehabilitation trajectories. They might refuse long 
sessions, or complain incessantly about pain levels, rubbing prostheses, they might 
sneak foods into the clinic, continue to smoke, drink, sometimes not even turn up for 
their sessions. In contrast, Jadranka was a good example of what the centre saw as a 
committed and compliant patient. 
Jadrenka
I had noticed her in the Gait clinic, where amongst the leather and epoxy limbs, her 
transparent (and therefore temporary) suction socket, and mechanical knee had seemed 
starkly different. Having watched her progress, some weeks later I organised an 
interview with Jadrenka, together with her physician Bovan. It was he who informed me 
that Jadrenka had been admitted to the clinic at the same time that an Ottobock 
representative turned up and asked if any of the patients would be suitable candidates for 
a trial. While she had recently retired, Jadrenka was still a good decade younger than 
many of the patients and was in relatively good physical form. Her residual limb was 
well healed as she had been at home for four months, during which time she had refused 
the offer of a wheelchair, and had learned to use crutches whilst looking after her 
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granddaughter, while her daughter (who was a lawyer) and son-in-law were at work. 
Unlike many of the patients who seemed unsure of what type of benefits they were 
entitled to, or who were unwilling to kick up a fuss to get them, Jadrenka received a 
monthly benefit, which her husband had helped her apply for in Belgrade, and she 
couldn’t understand why the others did not apply as she felt it was not a complicated 
matter. Her husband had also recently retired, but had spent his life working in one of 
the more famous firearms factories, the staff of which had been scaled back to about 
50% in recent years. He had been very supportive throughout her recovery. 
Like many inpatients, Jadrenka had made trips home to visit, though hers had been 
confined to the weekends and had not been often, only twice. Instead one of her 
daughters in Belgrade had been to visit ‘several’ times. Bovan told me that her 
amputation had been due to vascular problems, and Jadrenka told me proudly that she 
had not smoked since her operation. She had been one of the more dedicated patients, 
spending two to three hours exercising in the clinics before lunch, as well as another 
hour-long session in the afternoons. This dedication had meant that she had mastered the 
art of the vacuum socket, which in turn meant that Ottobock had paid for it, and would 
continue to pay for its maintenance, in return for Jadrenka’s time in the future. It also 
meant that Bovan had written her a prescription for a mechanical working knee, rather 
than a safety lock. Jadrenka told me that she feels there will be few barriers with this leg. 
She could confidently walk with elbow crutches, and had mastered the steps, which she 
felt was important as there are stairs in her home. Driving is not an issue for her, as she 
stopped when she married and her husband has always driven her. In fact, she was 
planning to leave in a couple of days as her training was finished. Bovan told me that 
there were three other patients chosen to trial the suction sockets, but that all of them had 
been unable to master their use. 
Jadrenka was looking forward to leaving behind what she called the ‘bad’ aspects of the 
Bela clinic, namely the hygiene and the cramped living quarters, and to moving back to 
her family home. She had been focused on this outcome and remained optimistic 
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throughout, said Bovan, despite having had some setbacks with her health. This ‘playing 
by the rules’ had served her well. In return for receiving her socket and follow up care 
free of charge, Jadrenka had agreed to be a ‘testimonial’ patient for the Ottobock, a role 
which would involve being present during workshops and presentations, for which she 
would be unpaid. Jadrenka was therefore a model patient, literally singled out as an 
example to which others should aspire. 
To walk then, is to hope. But interestingly, within the trope of prosthetic rehabilitation, 
the opposite also holds sway, namely that to hope, is to walk. What walking is, is further 
defined as bipedal ambulation, un(or at least minimally) assisted, and additionally, to be 
independently capable of the actions that necessarily accompany prosthetic ambulation 
(mastering the art of donning and doffing a prosthesis), as well as to self-regulate one’s 
behaviour in relation to the prosthesis - through stump and socket liner maintenance and 
good prosthetic hygiene.
Imagining Action in Rehabilitation 
This process of (re)learning through action, is perhaps best examined through Actor 
Network Theory. If success within the realm of amputation means having an anatomical 
aesthetic that allows one to pass as normal, then the prosthesis is arguably the primary 
agent through which this passing becomes possible. However agency, as ANT theorists 
(Latour 1987, 1988, 1993, Callon 1991, and Law and Hassard 1999, among the most 
prominent), argue, does not automatically imply intention. Prostheses may have a type 
of agency, a potential one, although we cannot ascribe them with intention, no matter 
how many cybernetic or high technology components they contain. Success is only 
relative to the capability of the wearer to wield their prosthetic with expertise. This is not 
a light undertaking either. The process of fitting and wearing a prosthetic limb is often 
painful (Gallagher and Maclachlan 1999, Kurzman 2002). Leg stumps are not able to 
bear the weight of people, and the very possibility of being able to use a prosthetic is 
contingent on a surgeon’s proficiency to leave the stump with a cushion of flesh to shield 
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the bone (Ott et al 2002). Standing and walking, much less running, with a prosthesis is 
a process of relearning the techniques of the body that we consider normal (Kurzman 
2001, 2002, Gutfleisch 2003). The performance of prosthetics is enacted differently by 
different parties involved in the design, the creation, fitting, wearing and repairing of a 
limb (Mol 2002). Prosthetics therefore invoke the practice of daily life. They imply a 
move outward, a social ‘standing’ and a life beyond the wheelchair (Srinivasan 2002) 
although for many of the patients in the Bela clinic this life beyond the wheelchair was 
only enacted in specific environments. Nonetheless, in order to create the aesthetic of a 
whole or ‘complete’ body, they also reduce the physical body to a sum of it parts, where 
a seemingly endless range of possibilities exist for picking and choosing body part 
replacements and additions. 
Different types of amputations and prostheses require the user to relearn body 
techniques in different ways, older style limbs, strapped on with a harness are wielded 
differently from those with a suction cup to fit the wearer’s body. These different 
attachments pose different problems for the stump as well. Additionally, though, they 
have not arrived in Serbia, Osseo-implanted prostheses, first developed for dental 
prostheses, are now being investigated for limb attachment. Here the implant is literally 
screwed into the length of the bone that remains, which is allowed to scarify and 
integrate the titanium fixture. This protrudes from the skin, so that further prosthetic 
devices may be screwed on, according to the wearer’s need. This is yet another future/
present representation of body parts perhaps that more clearly begins to show the 
ambiguity between what is enhancement and what is disability. In addition to the still 
prohibitively high cost of such implants and the continuing infection problems of the 
physical interface between the end of the stump and the protruding metallic screw, part 
of the reason for the limited use of Osseo-implanted limbs is that the titanium ‘limb’ is 
so much stronger than the original bone to which it is attached. Therefore, should the 
biological limb suffer stress shock such as when competitive running, or in the event of 
an accident, it is likely that the body’s own organic bone will be compromised before the 
prosthetic, leading to further injury. Here again we can see the potential for the body to 
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become prosthetic to the machine in much the same way that Perry (2002) described in 
World War One Germany almost a century ago.
Interestingly, Winance (2006) has published on how action (in an ANT sense) is made 
possible for people with neuromuscular disabilities through wheelchair choice, and 
focuses on the ways in which the testing of a new wheelchair forces both wheelchair 
users, personal assistants and wheelchair salespeople to examine, deconstruct and 
reassemble what we generally think of as ‘ways of being in the world’. Winance argues 
that 
Action is the result not only of distribution but of a long process of 
negotiation between a person, the devices he or she uses, and the 
collective in which he or she is included. ‘To act’ implies hard 
work from a patient, those surrounding him or her, and the aid 
itself... and this work transforms them (53-54).
She refers to this testing of wheelchairs as ‘adjustment’. This adjustment is 
fundamentally synonymous with alignment within the gait clinic, a period which the 
relationship of a person to their prosthetic add ons becomes evident and uneasy. These 
relationships are tested out, made and unmade in different ways, culminating in the 
incorporation of the wheelchair (or prosthesis) into the body’s schema, and the 
cementing of the temporary relationship between the patient and this prosthetic aid 
(Winance 2006). Each subsequent ‘adjustment’ (for my purposes, an alignment) thus 
represents a new negotiation of the networks that make up a way of being in the world: 
which of them are rigid and cannot be altered, which are malleable and which can be 
dropped altogether. This dialogue is ongoing and ambivalent, as some possibilities for 
action emerge, others become impossible (ibid).
The ways in which hopes, dreams, desires, and plans appeared to be blurred together in 
Serbia made me wonder how it is that we delineate between these categories, each of 
which resonates with wider ideas of anticipation, the future, the present and the past. 
Ideas of the everyday, and of ‘normal life’, of grief, loss and recovery are played out in 
149
specific ways within the prosthetics clinic. With this in mind, along with being about 
understanding how hope is generated in the clinic, this chapter is also an attempt to 
understand how two central and contradictory tenets of amputation surgery can 
simultaneously be true. These are that amputation is the embodiment of lost hope 
(Warren and Manderson 2008), and that amputation is a reconstructive surgery (Sherman 
and Jones 1995, Sherman 1997). 
How might this be possible? Let us first engage with the more straightforward of the 
two, that amputation might embody lost hope. Amputation is not usually a decision that 
is undertaken as a primary health care measure. In many cases, either due to traumatic 
injury or because of failing cardiovascular circulation, multiple interventions and 
surgeries will have been attempted in the hope of retaining bodily contingency. In 
vascular cases for example, surgeons often attempt the re-mapping of major arteries and 
blood vessels in an effort to increase circulation. These attempts are often clutched at by 
both medical staff and patients. In traumatic injuries, attempts are often made to save as 
much of the limb as possible. During an interview that is mentioned more fully in the 
next chapter, Radka recounted to me the story of her journey to the specialised military 
hospital after her traumatic injury where after many attempts to save her leg, a sepsis 
infection had set in. Her impassioned cry at the end that they had ALMOST saved her 
leg and subsequent breakdown in tears led me to believe that she felt it was so much 
worse that the possibility for recovery had been there for almost a month, only to be 
snatched away at the last moment. 
Amputation in the vascular cases lends itself to a slightly different analysis, although 
here as well the loss of hope is evident. Here the body’s own vascular system has turned 
against itself in an ongoing process of disruption and death. The choice to amputate is 
often a question of whether an ageing or extremely ill patient will survive anaesthesia 
(Warren and Manderson 2008). Patients often struggle with failing sensory awareness 
and motion in their limb preceding their amputation. This ‘death’ of a limb might be 
signalled by gangrene, sepsis, sores, failing sensation, stiffness, and/or immobility and is 
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often considered to foreshadow the death of the patient unless there is medical 
intervention. The choice of whether to amputate then might be framed as a choice about 
when to die and how? As Warren and Manderson explain 
Professionals promote the notion that by delaying immediate 
death, eventual death (usually explained as from cardiac, 
cerebrovascular, or renal complications) will be less awful than a 
death from gangrene and associated septicaemia (2008: 191).
In the Bela Clinic, these cardio-vascular patients were somewhat more ambiguous in the 
eyes of the staff, as their amputations, often caused by diabetes or cardiovascular 
problems, have their origin in bodies with appetites that are framed as excessive, or in a 
very Foucaultian sense, unable to govern themselves. That is to say, patients ended up in 
the clinic in their current states due to their habits of eating fatty, sugary food, their 
smoking, and their lack of exercise: all indicative of their weakness of will or moral 
rectitude. They were in need of external monitoring, and those who continued to eat 
fatty foods, smoke and do the minimum physical exercise to get by were seen as 
ultimately sabotaging their own recoveries. 
Amputees at the Bela Clinic had all been at home, or in a previous hospital, recuperating 
from their limb surgeries before undertaking rehabilitation. Some were at the clinic for 
their second or third stay, receiving a new socket or prosthesis. Seen as a sequence of 
events, the gait clinic was the penultimate period in prosthetic rehabilitation, a 
postoperative period following a timeframe where even people who had been at least 
reasonably physically active before amputation had undergone a surgical procedure, 
something which had rendered them immobile or at least incapacitated to some degree 
over several months. In the gait clinic, all the patients were in the process of regaining 
their mobility. I will readily admit that this is vastly simplified, framed as what Frank 
(1995) might term the ‘restitution’ narrative, where the hospital is a stepping stone back 
into the realm of health. Interestingly though, in some ways the clinic itself contributed 
to the ill health of the patients. I was told by many of the therapists that a majority of the 
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patients actually put on weight during their time in the clinic, due to their general 
inactivity and the fact that the daily routine of the Bela Clinic revolved around 
mealtimes. 
During prosthetic rehabilitation, the process of a return to ‘normal’ is negotiated by 
people whose anatomies have been fundamentally changed, and while we might well 
argue that the normative body has been shown by many theorists of the body to be an 
abstraction, the fact remains that practices of rehabilitation (in the case of lower limb 
amputation) still take standing independently, and the lack of discernible gait deviations 
as fundamental and unproblematic signifiers of ‘normalcy’. There are some degrees of 
deviation from an ‘average’ or ‘normal’ anatomy that can be tolerated, and some that 
cannot. In upper limb amputation, as with ambulation, these signifiers are aesthetic as 
well as functional, but mostly a moot point to my research anyway - the Bela Clinic had 
no money with which to provide amputees with myo-electric prostheses.
The push for normalcy in prosthetic rehabilitation is driven in many ways by larger 
networks of international manufacturing companies. The discourses of rehabilitation that 
accompany the products and services that Ottobock health offer, in their self proclaimed 
role as the ‘only truly global partner in rehabilitation’ offered and indeed continue to 
supply were a truly dazzling array of jargon and gendering. I recommend even a quick 
perusal of the prosthetic ‘patient and user’ section of www.ottobock.com, should one 
wish to personally experience the sparkling selection of possibilities available to a 
potential ‘customer’.
In the ‘real life inspirational story’ internet clip mentioned above, ‘Kathy’ is on a trip to 
Berlin, and is seen having her makeup done, on a fashion shoot, shopping, skipping with 
friends. She exclaims brightly ‘I just love life and I live it with two legs and not one’ 
before twisting her c-leg knee so that it rotates a full 360 degrees in its socket. Like all 
prosthetics advertising models, she is shown as ‘enhanced’ rather than disabled, her 
lifestyle clearly something to be desired. In other life stories, men undertake activities 
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like riding horses, driving sports cars, and sailing. One states ‘I’ve noticed that we do 
most things standing up’ while yet another shares his relief that his leg is ‘always there’, 
whilst he holds his grandson aloft. 
A trip to visit a private prosthetist showed me the disparity between life on the ground in 
Serbia, and the imagination of futures that the prosthetics industry promised. Marko’s 
tiny shop was located deep in the back alleys of the Novi Sad old quarter. Raised up 
from street level it was an unassuming little place. Two posters covered the window and 
the glass door. One was of an ice hockey player with a prosthetic leg. The other was of a 
man in shorts, with a clearly visible Ottobock ‘c-leg’ bent down on one knee, lifting a 
child. From this little premises, Marko made a modest trade in prosthetics, orthopaedic 
aids and insoles. Business had been tough. Specialised orthopaedic foams are a niche 
industry in any situation, but here in Serbia a German company had a monopoly over the 
market. Now a cheaper French firm was attempting to break into the market, this had 
resulted in an import war, where due to complaints over legal issues to do with 
importing, both companies had been stopped at the border and their shipments 
impounded. Now in house stocks of materials were running out for everyone and the 
situation showed no signs of being resolved soon. 
I had come to Marko’s together with Janko. Without any source of income Janko had 
turned to orthopaedic insole consulting and freelancing. It was a tricky business 
however, as the way that Serbian business culture operates meant that he often had 
invested time and equipment before finding out that his clients could not or would not 
pay the prices that he was asking. Marko was one of the contacts from whom Janko 
bought materials from, and with whom he worked from time to time. We were here to 
find out about a pair of insoles that they were working on together, and Janko was to 
introduce Marko to me, in the hope that he would be able to help me out with my 
research. 
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The shop was divided into two areas, the front, which functioned as the shop area, was 
marginally cleaner than the back, which functioned as a workspace/storeroom. There 
was a strong smell of epoxy glue, and components were jammed onto every conceivable 
shelf. Marko bid us sit down, and lit a cigarette. He had a new apprentice who made 
‘passable’ coffee. I pondered the health hazards of smoking in such a dusty environment 
and felt vaguely uneasy about the effects of the glue and smoke on my lungs. I was still 
in the early stages of my research then, and had not yet given up on the idea of 
interviewing military amputees. As a private prosthetist Marko told me that yes he dealt 
with them, but he was unwilling to grant me access to them. 
As we left I looked at the posters again. They showed such ingrained ideas of normative 
masculinity. Both the men in the posters were in their thirties and attractive. Although 
the posters were now both dog-eared and sun-bleached, I could still imagine the 
supersaturated colour scheme as it must first have appeared. The implications that I took 
from those posters were that the prosthetic body was safe, masculine, that wearers of 
prostheses had happy satisfying home lives, and could take part in dangerous and manly 
sports: that they could be, or regain a life as ‘one of the lads’. Later in my research I 
searched the Ottobock websites, and found the same, men on horseback, driving 
powerboats, swinging children, carbon fibre legs, with tattoo effects. A focus on the 
super-macho, or in the case of female amputees, on the hyper-feminine: legs with 
stocking effect, with high heel adaptors, toenails that could be painted. The way that 
prostheses are marketed is as much about the reproduction of normative, and idealised 
aesthetics as it is about restoration of normative functional movement. 
While increasing numbers of academics, philosophers and scientists discuss the ways in 
which they want to embody their prostheses and incorporate them into a body schema so 
that they disappear from thought (see the works of Sobchack 1995, Kurzman 2001, and 
Wright 2009), what strikes me is that the very act of talking about them brings them 
hurtling back into appearance, pushing them out of an incorporated scheme. 
Paradoxically, even as prostheses offer up the possibility to make us imagine a whole 
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and integrated fusion of flesh and technology; they also compartmentalise the body, and 
the process of talking about prostheses as integrated, shows simultaneously exactly how 
they are different to biological limbs. 
Zoran
Zoran is a 25 year old refugee from Knin in Croatia, and this is his third stay at the Bela 
Clinic. His leg was amputated due to a tumour when he was 17. Zoran is actually 
entitled to a new prosthesis, but likes his initial one so much that he has just been having 
it repaired since 2003. His amputation and recovery took a long time, both from when 
his tumour was discovered to the point of surgery, and from that point to a stage where 
his limb was sound, as during his ‘recovery’ period he had to undergo chemotherapy and 
an additional operation on his lungs. He took a year to recover before his initial stay at 
the Bela Clinic. 
He walks into the room unaided, though with a noticeable limp, apologises for the time 
it has taken him to get to the room and mentions that he has been having hip problems 
recently. Zoran arrived with his parents and two brothers in Belgrade in 1995. He lives 
in a collective home for refugees in Belgrade together with his father and younger 
brother. There are 17 families in the collective, and they each live in a small house, and 
although there is no running water inside, there are 4 taps to share between the families 
in a central courtyard. They receive three meals a day, or have the option to cook their 
own. Zoran works from home on his computer, and his father works for a state company 
so gets a small monthly income. He used to work in security (as a nightclub bouncer) but 
was never paid and made the decision to give it up. By working at home, he maintains 
contact through phone and email with the people he met here the first time he came to 
the Bela Clinic. He does not go to the refugee centre (a support centre for refugees from 
the former Republic of Yugoslavia) because he feels its not really ‘for’ him. Zoran has 
been here this time round for three weeks, and has already adjusted to being back. He 
goes to gait school and watches TV most of the time. His amputation is at mid thigh, and 
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he has a prosthesis with a vacuum socket and a mobile knee. His ongoing hip problems 
have meant that this prosthesis has had to be shorter than recommended due to his 
method of walking. His current method of walking works for him and comes easiest to 
him, but exacerbates his hip problem further. The doctors have been pressuring him to 
change, because, while his limb has been paid for by the fund, there were not many 
options to choose from back in 2003 when he first got the prosthesis and they feel a 
newer model would help him to achieve more normal ambulation. 
Many things in the interview stand out, such as when Zoran tells me that he would like 
to get permanent work with telephones or computers and to claim an unemployment 
benefit in the meantime, but that he cannot register at the unemployment office, as he 
would lose his status as a refugee and thus a place in the refugee collective. He tells me 
that he does not want to ask for help, and as such receives no benefit, though he accepted 
a one off payment for a toilet. He does not want to change his prosthesis, as he says it 
suits him and he is used to it. It means that he can get out and socialise with his friends. 
He has no choice but to stay in the collective, as his father is ill. He fears that the shock 
of his amputation caused his father’s diabetes. Zoran also tells me though, that he has a 
‘normal’ social life, and that he goes out with friends when he can. Perhaps most 
importantly, he tells me that he is dependent on the Bela Clinic, which he can access 
although he is a refugee, and it is his biggest reason for staying. While not a citizen, his 
insurance status covers the clinic, which binds him to Belgrade - although he longs to 
travel. 
Zoran’s choice to wear a particular prosthesis, shows that for him, this network has 
become defined, it is no longer malleable. In opening up the possibility for social action 
(going out with his friends, walking unassisted) it has closed other possibilities (the 
possibility of travel) and rendered other actions uncertain (his ongoing hip problems). 
His ambivalent citizenship too, closes and opens the possibilities for his rehabilitation 
(the covering of his medical costs, the exclusion from unemployment benefits). The 
possibility of action for Zoran is embedded in a network of both human (prosthetists, 
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therapists, government workers etc) and non-human (his prosthesis, the computer, his 
citizenship) actors. The ability of these networks to withstand or embrace change might 
be considered the resilience of a technological matrix. To be resilient, a technology must 
be transformative and mutable whist remaining appropriate (De Laet and Mol 2000). 
Zoran’s changing circumstances lead to constant renegotiations of the possibilities 
afforded to him each time he needs to have his ageing prosthesis repaired. These 
negotiations are really about the testing out of which links in the network are still 
appropriate. The realisation of his dream to travel for example, would force a 
renegotiation of his relationship with the Bela Clinic, and it was very likely that his 
deteriorating hip would at some stage do the same with his ambulation. 
Prosthetic hope then exists and is performed through the possibility for action. This is 
quantified as a return to bipedal ambulation (in lower limb amputations), or the 
possibility for normal ‘reach’ radius and to act out social cues such as shaking hands, 
driving, dancing (in amputations of the arm) which in turn are taken as signifying that 
one is embedded and active in a social environment. These hopes are unmade and 
remade in the process of alignment, through the hard work of all the actors (human or 
not) involved. As Winance concludes ‘the person is made up as normal and different by 
the specific links making him or her‘ (2006: 67). 
We are all in some ways made simultaneously able and disabled through the collection 
of body, technology and their corresponding relationships. Through alignment, a 
paradoxically transformative and yet concrete body emerges, which must be 
renegotiated over time. The networks that form an ‘extended body’ (family members 
who help to don and doff prostheses, components that wear and tear) are mutable, as are 
the more abstract networks that facilitate access to these resources. While the physical 
and quantifiable markers of alignment are negotiated within the gait clinic during a 
given period, hope for normalcy exists in a precarious state of possible unmaking and 
reassembling, and as specific possibilities open, others close. Amputation in itself is a 
transformative act, where potentialities emerge that appear to be conflicting, that is, the 
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loss of hope, and the restoration of it. It is through their capacity for labouring action 
that citizens are defined, and through action that patients are remade into citizens, that 
their hopes are realised, that the networks or ‘collectives’ in which they are embedded 
are unmade, scrutinised or tested and then renegotiated. Patients are thus transformed 
into specific types of people, who are simultaneously disabled and normal. 
 
158




In a therapy room in the lower floor of the Bela Clinic, I am chatting with Nikolina, the 
head physical therapist. Bojana, my occasional translator and often research accomplice, 
is also here. It is February. It is cold, and outside, a veritable mountain of coal for the 
boiler appears to have been belched forth from the bowels of the centre overnight, 
sprawling over the car park and covering everything outside with a fine veneer of grime. 
We three are squeezed into a two meter square treatment space partitioned off by a 
grubby curtain, the watery Belgrade morning light slipping in over the draped partitions. 
Space is tight in the cramped workspace. Nikolina seats herself in the only chair whilst 
Bojana and I clamber onto the treatment bench. We are taking a break from ostensibly 
touring the facilities, discussing therapies, pragmatics, and prostheses, on what is my 
first official day down in the therapy level. Currently she is discussing issues 
surrounding stump pain, phantom limb sensations, and phantom limb pain, three 
different issues ‘of the flesh’, that are both compounded and mediated by the use of 
prostheses. 
In the course of our conversation, I ask Nikolina what she thinks a prosthesis can, and 
cannot, do. She pauses for thought and uses an interesting turn of phrase for the 
prosthesis, calling it the ‘compensation’. Pressing her on what she means by this, I get 
her to elaborate: 
For many people seeing an amputee for the first time can be 
disturbing. The prosthesis creates a compensation for this 
negative image. Whether this compensation is successful 
depends on the skill of the prosthetist to create a prosthesis that 
is the most appropriate for the amputee and the skills of the 
therapists to give the amputee the best training possible. 
She continues:
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It isn’t enough to have a great prosthesis. Even if you have the 
newest, the most expensive... if you don’t complete your training 
it’s going to be of no use. All the therapy in the world will not 
help if you have a badly fitted and poor quality device. It is a 
combination of the two that leads to success. 
For Nikolina, as for the prosthetics industry as a whole, this success is measured 
primarily in what is referred to as the absence of gait deviations. This is the prosthetic 
paradox in praxis. The body, as Grosz (1994) has argued, is not simply the addition of 
various mechanical parts, but a unified whole. Building on the works of Merleau-Ponty 
(1962), she posits that ‘the body “knows” what its muscular and skeletal actions and 
posture are in any movement or action, quite independently of any knowledge of 
physiology or how the body functions’ (1994: 91). A prosthesis works by utilising the 
body’s knowledge of its complete normative self, whilst simultaneously assuming that 
pieces of this whole can be replaced by machinery. Passing, or appearing as normal as 
possible, is the motivation behind much of the rehabilitation taking place in the Bela 
clinic, as it is internationally. The patient and their prosthesis are embedded in a network 
here: of machines, actions and technologies, of meanings about normality, of the 
reproduction of these meanings, and the pathologising of the absence of ‘normalness’. 
Far from being a straightforward process however, an interview I conducted with a 
physical therapist showed me the most obvious, and variable component of this network 
- veze. Miljan was one of the therapists with whom I spent most time: after hours 
observing the gait clinic I would sit with him and discuss the questions that had arisen in 
my notes. He in turn would ask me about other gait labs that I had been in, particularly 
in ‘Anglo-Saxon65’ settings, motion sensor capture and new alignment possibilities. 
There were a large variety of prosthetic limbs on display in the storage racks in the gait 
clinic on any given day and the long hours I spent in the clinic meant that I had ample 
opportunity to inspect them. I noticed eventually that the assignment of either ‘safety’ or 
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65 Like many Serbs who I talked with, Miljan separated the ‘western’ regions of the world into 
American, European and Anglo-Saxon countries. 
mobile kneed prostheses seemed almost arbitrary among trans-femoral patients66. One 
morning, I noticed that a man who appeared fit and healthy was practicing walking with 
just one elbow crutch and a very basic safety knee limb, whilst a heavily overweight 
gentleman was attempting the parallel bars with a swung knee and what appeared to be a 
rough hewn wooden socket67. What on earth was going on? Discussing them later, I 
discovered that the first patient was one of Miljan’s. I wanted to know if there were 
some doctors at the centre who prescribed mobile knees more often. What was the 
criteria for choosing who can have one? ‘Safety, primarily’ he answered and explained to 
me that the doctors must judge whether the patient will have the adequate muscle 
strength to control a knee, otherwise there is the possibility of collapse. No one wants a 
patient to fall and injure themselves or their leg.
I wondered how on earth the overweight gentleman, who had managed about 20 minutes 
of labour intensive movement, had got the prosthesis he had. Miljan told me that it was 
probably though veze, and that the leg came from Rudo68. He was certain that it would 
not have been prescribed to the patient by one of the Clinic’s doctors. He shouted to one 
of the other therapists, ‘Hey Maja, how did Zoran end up with that Rudo leg?’ and she 
shouted back from the next room. ‘Veze, His brother works there69’. I was confused. 
Even if he could access one, why would he want a leg that he could not use properly or 
that increased his likelihood of falling? I felt like I was missing something. Miljan 
shrugged:
I don’t know. Maybe he feels like it makes him more physical or 
something, you know, you’ve gotta be in form to use one, and if 
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66 A safety leg has a knee that must be manually collapsed in order to bend or for the purposes 
of sitting, usually by pulling a release lock at hip level. A mobile or active knee locks and 
collapses as the user walks, but requires a greater degree of physical control. 
67 It was a wooden socket. I discuss the manufacture of wooden sockets in chapter 1.
68 The private prosthetics and orthotics company located on the same property as the Bela 
Clinic.
69 Brat - Lit. brother but could in reality refer to any related male cousin.
he’s got one, maybe he thinks like he’s still young... don’t worry 
though, he’ll probably never use it, he likes his wheel chair...
Miljan mentioned that some of the doctors over prescribed safety knees. They are a 
‘safer’ option, and negate the need to ask the patient about their activity levels and 
desires for fitness. A locked knee gives more security to the patient, but less motion. The 
first patient I had seen in the above example was strong and proficient and rehabilitating 
quickly, so I asked Miljan if it would be possible for him to ask for a swing leg later. 
However, once the original prescription was written, this then becomes the basis for all 
later replacements and alterations. He tells me that ‘it’s a shame that some of the doctors 
aren’t interested in going into all the details’. What a prosthesis means, and what a 
prosthesis does, are clearly two different things. Zoran’s fancy prosthesis propped up on 
the wall at home makes a very different statement about his masculinity than when it is 
wielded badly in praxis. 
 
Prosthetic Networks: ANT in focus
I feel that some basic understanding of Actor Network Theory (ANT) is important to 
understanding the relationship between technology and the potential for movement. A 
limb on the wall at home has the necessary potential for agency to make a claim about 
Zoran’s masculinity, and this potential for movement is far greater whilst the limb is not 
actually attached to him. This is because once he puts it on, his shortcomings of physical 
prowess curtail the possible movement. It will likely sit, as Miljan said, propped up 
against the wall while he uses a wheelchair to get about.
Looking at prosthetic relationships necessarily entails engaging with a range of theories 
from across the social sciences. As artefacts of material culture, prostheses engage the 
practice of daily life, they are culture made material. As objects, they are embedded in 
complex networks of human and non-human agents. Thus they bridge the gaps between 
material culture, science and technology studies, and phenomenological understandings 
of the body. As citizenship is enacted through both policy and practice, ANT is useful 
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for understanding how these relations are cemented through performance, and is most 
easily described as a type of material semiotic theory in which the relationships between 
people, objects, technologies and organisations are mapped by material (i.e. solid 
objects) and conceptual (semiotic) links. 
First developed by Latour (1987, 1988, 1993), and more recently expanded by Callon 
(1991), Mol (2002), De Laet and Mol (2000), Law and Hassard (1999), and Law and 
Mol’s (2002) works, an ANT description deals with ‘how’ a network takes the form it 
does. The theory is that through a full and thorough description of these networks and 
the actors that make them up, a clearer picture of ‘why’ the network takes that form will 
emerge. Furthermore, the above authors all show that a network itself is always 
precarious and has the potential to break down. These breakdowns expose the inner 
actors of a network, usually obscured though a process described as punctulisation, an 
easy example of which is the way in which a driver interacts with a car as a single solid 
object. It is not until a breakdown occurs that all the small working parts, computer 
technologies, networks of trade and necessary theoretical concepts that make up the car 
become apparent and each actor becomes visible. Agency within these networks is not 
located within actors (or objects) themselves, but in the inter-subjective relationships 
between them. These relationships are cemented through practice. By framing 
technologies as responsive, adaptive and mutable, and showing how networks can be 
stopped or cut by actors within them, ANT theorists show that flexibility is often a 
crucial factor in the resiliency of these networks of ideas, objects and flows of capital. 
As the actors in a given network are necessarily composed of relationships between 
other actors and objects, it could be argued then that a seemingly endless network might 
be created. However the work of Strathern (1996) has shown us the capacity that 
networks have to be cut by human intervention in the form of patents and intellectual 
property rights. In a similar way, the networks that make up objects such as prostheses 
may be broken down by warfare, international sanctions, changes in the structure of the 
health system or changing laws regarding the status of citizens. Additionally, if we look 
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at prostheses through the lens of the works of Haraway (2000) and Haiken (2002) it 
appears that (as in the case of Zoran’s leg) agency is not located within the prosthesis 
itself, rather it is its potential ‘humanness’ or agency that is harnessed by the wearer who 
incorporates it into a seamless whole. The amputee, like the automobile above, or 
indeed, like one of Haraway’s many cyborgs (2000) is therefore punctualised in this 
process, interacted with as a singular solid object embedded within a network, yet 
composed of a myriad of smaller objects and networks which may be revealed though 
the picking apart of these relationships. 
If success within the realm of amputation means being able to pass as normal, then the 
prosthetic is the agent through which this passing becomes possible. Often accused of 
ascribing agency to inanimate objects, prostheses are an excellent counterpoint to 
critiques levelled at ANT, showing, as ANT theorists argue, that agency does not 
automatically imply intention. Prostheses have an obvious potential agency, in that they 
are a catalyst for action, and, it is also clear that we cannot ascribe them with intention, 
no matter how many cybernetic or high technology components they contain. They are 
always ‘added on’ requiring, by default, something to be attached to. Furthermore 
success, as Nikolina was keen to remind me, is only relative to the capability of the 
wearer to wield their prosthetic with expertise. This is not a light undertaking either. The 
process of fitting and wearing a prosthetic limb is painful (Gallagher and Maclachlan 
1999, Kurzman 2002). Akin to the breaking and remaking of a Habitus of body 
movement (in the Maussian sense - 1979). Even when an optimal match of surgical skill, 
rehabilitative care and prosthesis design occurs, a range of other biological effects can 
occur; retraction and cramping of muscles in the residual limb can lead to a permanently 
flexed stump, the skeletal face of the amputation can sprout a proliferation of boney 
growths: the stump can be too long or too short for a particular prosthesis type. 
Should one be considered to be a good candidate for prosthetic rehabilitation, it does not 
take long to discover that walking, much less running with a prosthesis is a process of 
re-learning the techniques of the body that we can consider ‘normal’ (Kurzman 2001, 
166
2002, Gutfleisch 2003). This performance of prosthetics is enacted differently by 
different parties involved in the design, creation, fitting, wearing and repairing of a limb. 
Prosthetics therefore invoke the practices of daily life that we take for granted. They 
imply a move outward, a social ‘standing’ and a life beyond the wheelchair (Srinivasan 
2002). In order to do this, however, they also reduce the body to a sum of parts, where a 
seemingly endless range of possibilities exist for picking and choosing body bits. 
Prostheses are, after all, things, objects, they have physical dimensions and attributes, 
but by investigating them as a site of production of social ‘norms’, we can see that while 
the field of prosthetics has its own history, it also maintains an uneasy relationship with 
the fields of anthropology, disability studies, sociology, science and technology studies, 
medical history, and rehabilitation. Most recently, amputees have been analysed as 
bionic beings, cyborgs if you will (Haraway 2000). They have stood in as metaphors for 
modernist anatomy, for institutional power structures, for nationhood or even empire 
(Nelson 2001, Wright 2001). Prostheses and bodies have been studied as ways of 
disrupting the body order, by those influenced by the works of Foucault (1989, 2006) 
and Bourdieu (1977, 1984). However it is rarely that prosthetic devices, ‘as social 
objects with a complex set of meanings in the daily lives of people’ have ever been 
‘understood as part of vernacular material life’ (Ott 2002: 2). 
I wish to suggest that there is a difference between the historically constituted prosthetic 
body, and the cyborg. The mapping out of already ascribed notions of class, nationality, 
gender, socio-economics, culture and history onto and through the body through its 
articulation with prostheses should at least make us think long and hard before utilising 
metaphoric prosthetic devices as a source of novel allegory. It is particularly tempting in 
current medical anthropology to declare the body as absent, as obsolete, its primacy 
diminished in a technological future that renders humans ancillary to their technological 
components - replaceable organs, bionic body parts, the internet, mobile phones - here 
bodies have been framed in terms of a natural progression toward a hyper-technological 
global future (Cerqui 2002, Cleland 2010). For these bodies, questions of historicity and 
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loss do not feature. The very scarcity of practical ethnographic prosthesis based 
research, and the lack of research that takes prostheses as fact-of-life, when contrasted 
with theoretical prostheses (such as Wills 1995), or phantom powers and amputated 
identities (such as Wright 2001 and Nelsons 2001, 2001b works) points to how little we 
understand how bodies and technologies mesh together in the ‘real’ world. 
There is always a difficult learning curve when technology is brought into contact with 
the body. New amputees have a tendency to compare their prosthesis to their organic leg, 
whereas prosthetic veterans compare new legs to older ones (Sherman and Jones 1995, 
Kurzman 2001). Despite advice that this is possibly detrimental to their mental health 
and that it discourages them from making progress in their rehabilitation, if our ability to 
anticipate action is based on previous experience, then how else might one go about 
learning to walk than by using a framework that already exists in our mind? An entire 
habitus of bodily movement is broken, more or less abruptly, and a new one must be 
learned, created in the environs of the gait clinic (as discussed in the previous chapter). 
Here more than ever we see the potential agency, not only of the prosthesis itself, but of 
its shadowy spectre. It is here that we enter the realm of the phantom limb as agent. Like 
symbiotic twins, each plays a part in bringing the other to life. 
 
Nikolina recognised this as well. Far from simply replacing an absent limb with a 
present mechanical device, she told me that the presence of the phantom limb is helpful. 
‘It helps the patient to wield the prosthesis’ she said, and is there inside the prosthesis. 
‘For below knee amputees’ she said, ‘the prosthesis becomes like a boot, like a shoe that 
they wear’. I thought of Davor70, who told me that his prosthesis was something to fill 
the ‘empty space’ in his shirtsleeve, and wondered if, in the same manner, a phantom 
limb fills the empty space within the prosthesis. 
Prostheses show us just how the techniques of the body are re-membered (literally!) 
through amputation, from walking, sitting and standing, to cleaning, donning and 
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70 First mentioned in chapter 1.
doffing prosthetics. Sherman and Jones actually describe amputation as a reconstructive 
surgery (1995). While they frame this in terms of the ‘usefulness’ of mechanical limbs, 
versus damaged or ‘useless’ biological ones; to understand how this might be possible 
anthropologically, an understanding of pain, sensation, appearance, and dys-appearance 
as applied to stumps, prostheses and limbs (both biological and phantomised) can be 
drawn upon. 
Back in the Bela Clinic, we continue our tour, coming to the currently empty gait clinic, 
located across the hall from the previous treatment room. Legs line two of the walls of 
the clinic, in various stages of completion. Most are of the above knee variety, with a 
leather harness. Each has a shoe, and corresponds to a particular patient who arrives in 
the gait clinic wearing the matching one - most often a sneaker. Most of the patients do 
not take their limbs to their rooms. Bojana explains, ’There isn’t the space, and there is 
always the possibility that they will fall over and get damaged’. ‘Although, there are 
always exceptions’, grins Nikolina, ‘we once had a patient who wore his all the time, he 
even slept in it!’ 
Pondering this lack of room in the patients’ dorms, Bojana and I went to find a young 
patient Lazar in his room. The patients in the Bela clinic were divided into 3 wards, A, 
B, and C, and these were divided by gender, with two for men and one for women. I 
needed Bojana’s help in many of my endeavours to track down patients as due to 
numerous extensions to the buildings, the space that had been B ward was now C, and B 
was now A, and following directions on the walls was a hopeless undertaking, 
everything was located elsewhere. It was therefore difficult to track down patients in the 
maze of corridors. 
We eventually found him that afternoon in one of the men’s wards. Whilst I knew from 
conversations with Bojana and other staff that patients shared ‘close living spaces’, this 
turn of phrase did not adequately describe these shared rooms. The room was painted a 
dull blueish, greenish grey - a dank dirty patina which may have at one time been any 
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one of those colours. Four beds were packed foot to foot along the opposing sides of the 
room, and one stuck out perpendicular from the window opposite the door. The room 
was bustling with elderly men, and, due to the lack of chairs, people sat on the beds 
carrying on conversations with their wheelchairs parked outside the room. The wall 
space not occupied by beds was filled with lockers and sets of drawers. Extra blankets 
and pillows were piled to make cushions. A table was set up in the centre of the room 
and patients on wheelchairs were sharing a plastic container full of cvarci71 whilst 
playing chess. A jar of whole pickled chilli and a flask of what appeared to be rakija also 
took up the remaining space on the table. Lazar lay on a bed in the right hand corner, 
quietly holding a handkerchief to his nose. The room smelled of unwashed bodies, 
wound dressings, chilli, grease and stale smoke. My immediate thought was that the 
handkerchief was not going to help in the long term, but Lazar just had a nosebleed. 
We made our way to the quiet upstairs therapy room that we had taken over as an 
interview room, and Ana, Lazar’s doctor, joined us. She told us that nosebleeds were 
quite common among the amputees due to their increased blood pressure. Lazar arrived 
shortly after. Softly spoken, he asked to be interviewed in English, which he had been 
learning in college. 
Lazar 
Lazar was 17. His right arm up to the shoulder had been amputated in an agricultural 
incident in October. His arm had been caught in a thresher whilst he was helping out on 
his parents’ land. After spending time recuperating at home in his village in southern 
Serbia he arrived in the centre in mid December. At the time we spoke he had a sore on 
his shoulder which meant he was unable to wear his prosthesis. We spoke of his time in 
the centre. Lazar said he felt very out of place when he first arrived, like he was a rat in a 
laboratory with everyone looking at him. 
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71 Small pieces of salted fried pig fat.
He was the only patient under the age of 20 and it was often difficult and boring in the 
centre. As an upper extremity amputee he had a different course of treatment to the gait 
clinic. He had two sets of therapy, a total of three hours a day, one session concerned 
with donning and doffing the prosthesis, and another concerned with life skills, for 
example learning to write with his left hand, and shaving one handed. In reality these 
two categories were not so clearly defined, as the sessions were informal, the therapists 
allowing for flexibility in training dependent on factors such as his current sore. When 
we discussed his family, Lazar said that he felt his parents were doing their best to 
support him, but that they did not want to show how upset they really were. His brother 
lived in Belgrade and visited him daily, and he spent his time outside of therapy reading 
or walking around Belgrade. He smiled and said that this was the only good part, the 
chance to live in a big city where things happened, ’you know how it is in villages,’ he 
shrugged, ‘nothing ever happens’. 
None the less, Lazar wanted to go home, back to school and get on with life. He missed 
his friends and said that he talked to them on the phone, and that he had learned to send 
text messages with his left hand. He wanted to study agricultural science at university in 
Novi Sad and was excited when I told him that some of my friends taught in that 
department. Lazar’s prosthesis was a non-functional cosmetic limb and he told me that 
he had a ‘strange72’ feeling when seeing it for the first time. He could not describe this 
strange feeling for me when I asked him, either in English or in Serbian, and later I 
thought of how disconcerted I had felt when I saw all the cosmetic glove prostheses in 
Nikolina’s office.
Reading bodies
Lazar’s admission that he felt as though he was in a laboratory with everyone looking at 
him, is perhaps not so far from the truth. The staff often took photos of the patients, 
before and after receiving their limbs. Looking at them, it appears to me that there is a 
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72 čudno - strange, weird.
clear stylistic divide between clinical photos of amputees prior to their rehabilitation, 
and those taken after they have received their new limbs. In the former, patients stare 
straight into the camera or stare off into the distance in profile. They appear without 
expression, less person and more an object of scientific interest. In post rehabilitation 
shots, they are caught ‘in action’, moving, lifting, and playing with objects. They smile 
into the lens, apparently aesthetically completed and appearing content. Archival 
photographs reveal amputees with prosthetic limbs, at work, in motion, standing and 
walking. Those without prostheses are shown sitting square on, or baring their 
unfinished limbs. There are of course multiple ways of interpreting these images: but 
almost universally they depict a move from passive to active, from dependence to 
independence, from patient to functioning social citizen. 
There are of course various groups of people who are routinely photographed for 
medical research, among them the inter-sexed. Dreger’s (2007) work on people with 
visibly unusual anatomies shows how the effect of photographing these individuals, in 
clinical settings, with a measurement grid behind them has the effect of pathologising 
them. The obscuring of their eyes with a black rectangular box, whilst for the purposes 
of protecting their privacy, actively dehumanises them, while those who know these 
Fig 11: Staff rehabilitation photos - Bela Clinic archives. 
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people will still likely recognise them. In exposing themselves for photographs without 
their limbs, amputees, in much the same way that the inter-sexed reveal their anatomies, 
shed light on a twist of both prosthetic and gender rehabilitation. In order to alleviate 
feelings of difference, or of having an unusual, or abnormal anatomy, these differences 
are displayed, examined and represented in ways that make people feel these distinctions 
even more keenly. 
The paradox of the prosthesis is that it imagines a whole complete body, but does so by 
dividing the body into parts that can be replicated and then replaced. It also imagines an 
‘over-complete’ residual body, where a phantom limb can inhabit a prosthesis, flowing 
into it and ‘bringing it to life’ if you will. In the clinic pictures it is clear that the 
prosthesis is viewed as the catalyst for this transformation. It masks the endings of a 
body and imagines a whole. This whole or complete body is accomplished aesthetically, 
as well as biomechanically. Without it, patients are rendered immobile, incapable of 
action, and dependent. It is this aesthetic that I wish to examine here. That of the 
amputated body, and of the prosthetic body. These two body schema often, though not 
always, overlap, and are interesting when juxtaposed with notions of citizenship; of what 
it means to be a good citizen, and how the prosthetics industry is bound up in these 
modernist citizenship aesthetics. 
The amputated body, and the prosthetic body can be read in many ways, given location 
and context. The pinned-up sleeve or trouser leg of the veteran on ANZAC73 or V day, 
serves to remind us of sacrifice and citizenship, of personal cost and the personal and 
national price of war. Military amputees are often ambiguous figures. Depending on the 
outcome of the conflict, they may be considered heroes, champions of a cause, willing to 
give all for king and country, or they may be scorned; becoming objects of pity and 
pariahs of society, living reminders of bad decision making, or of what was fought and 
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73 Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. Celebrated nationally in New Zealand and Australia, 
and by antipodean diaspora making a pilgrimage to Gallipoli, Turkey. 
lost. They may also be recast as belligerent state welfare abusers, draining resources in 
an already war weakened economy. 
Until relatively recently the amputated body was more visible than it is today, partly due 
to the very nature of prosthetic rehabilitation. Prostheses impose their own set of 
demands on the amputated body. They require certain lengths of residual limb, muscle 
padding, blood supply, limb strength, stump shape, and a course of physical 
rehabilitation. These prerequisites are easier to achieve when the amputation is due to an 
illness, where surgeons can take their time to achieve symmetry and perfection; luxuries 
that were until recently unavailable to many military surgeons. Without the possibility 
(or the desire) to attach a prosthesis, the amputated body was more prevalent. In many 
places, pinned-up sleeves or trouser legs are still a hallmark of many a veterans’ parade, 
though less so as the years progress. As military and paramedic triaging has become 
more advanced patients have more options available to them. In addition to military 
amputation, throughout the ages, punishment by amputation has been a recurring theme; 
hands have been amputated; ears lopped off as punishment, eyes have been taken for 
eyes, fingers, toes, hands and feet hacked as warnings, either for individual 
transgressions or as a practice of spreading political terror in the population, as in the 
case of Sierra Leone, where ‘Long sleeves or short?’ was the chilling choice of having 
one’s arm taken below or above the elbow by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels 
in Sierra Leone's 10-year civil war. Over the course of the war, these rebels mutilated 
some 20,000 people, taking hands, arms, legs, lips, noses and ears with knives, machetes 
and axes. The campaign was a macabrely ironic response to Sierra Leone President 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah's plea for citizens to ‘join hands for peace’ in 1996. These victims 
were a living symbol used to spread terror among the population and to deter people 
from supporting the government, and remain a powerful visual reminder of the horror 
that spread throughout the land (Bergs 2007). 
French (1994) is one of few anthropologists to have delved into the experiential world of 
the amputee. Her work on the Cambodian amputees injured by land-mines is some of the 
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only work that examines how amputee bodies are ‘read’ in situ within the societies and 
contexts that create them. Far from inciting compassion amongst fellow refugee camp 
members, French finds that amputees are objects of fear and derision, their amputations 
physically indicative of a karmic failure. Many of these amputees had previously been 
soldiers, and had entered the resistance army through a moral obligation, to secure the 
patronage and protection of their commanders. Once injured however, even in the course 
of ‘duty’, they lost their usefulness and were often abandoned back into their villages, 
where their value as civil citizens was also diminished. 
Layers of Buddhist teaching were also mapped onto the amputees’ bodies. While being 
born human is good fortune in itself, ranks of status and virtue among humans also exist 
and an incomplete or crippled body is, as French ascertains, benighted indeed. To have 
been healthy and suddenly have lost a limb is then a fall in karmic status, and a rapid one 
at that. Amputation thus becomes a sign of ‘bad fortune’ both in terms of destiny and in 
the practicalities of daily life. As now diminished beings, the amputees are no longer 
capable, or even expected to behave like able bodied ‘civilised’ people. Although in an 
ideal Buddhist worldview, French states, the proper response to this from able-bodied 
citizens would be compassion, in the resource scarce refugee camps on the Cambodian-
Thai border, it is reconstituted as wariness, through the now dangerously volatile nature 
of the embittered amputees. Much of French’s research makes the claim that although it 
is undoubtedly a personal experience, amputation is also constructed through social 
interaction. 
Within the aesthetics of amputation itself, a type of political display of body parts can be 
found similar to that Staples (2003) found among lepers. Just as he found, there is 
politics involved in the display or concealment of stumps, many amputees at the Bela 
Clinic felt the desire for what Nikolina referred to as ‘compensation’. Some of the 
patients I met were occasionally even distressed by their own fleshy limits. One of them, 
Predrag, who had a partial hand amputation, told me that he wore his prosthesis (called a 
cosmetic glove) all the time. He didn’t like looking at his hand without it on. Since it 
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was wearing out and he was at the centre to have a new one fitted, he kept his hand in 
his pocket when he could not have it on. 
Another of the patients, Jovan, told me that he had to leave the centre the first time he 
attempted to go through gait school, as he felt ‘nervous’ being surrounded by amputees; 
he felt that they were all ‘freaks’. He has found his new life increasingly difficult at 
home, where he lives upstairs at his son’s house. Despite attempting to teach himself to 
walk again, Jovan had eventually suffered a bad fall whilst using crutches, and so he has 
returned to the clinic after a 2 year period. Now he feels safe within the clinic’s fences. 
He only returns home at the weekends, and spends his free time playing cards with the 
other patients.
Amputation has the power to disrupt the sense of the physical end of the body, for both 
the self and the observer, through the absence of organic limbs, the presence of phantom 
limbs, and through the presence (or absence) of prostheses. The concealment or 
displaying of class and citizenship is negotiated and decided upon here, mapped onto the 
body’s territory. Not only class but also gender is reproduced in this attaching of body to 
machine. First, amputation remains for the most part a man’s world, both in terms of 
patient numbers and in the gender of the prosthetists. Whilst not the case in the Bela 
clinic, I often felt distinctly uncomfortable in the manufacturing workshops of Rudo, 
where amateur glamour-girl calendars adorned the walls, a heavy smell of industrial glue 
hung in the air and the prevailing aesthetic was a stoic relationship between man and 
machine. It felt at times like an old army boys’ barracks. In their field guide ‘The 
Amputee’s Guide to the Amputation and Recovery Process’, Sherman and Jones (both 
military surgeons) encourage men to choose a functional limb, noting that it is 
unfortunate that women 
tend to stick with cosmetic [arms] largely because they don’t like 
the look of a pair of hooks sticking out the end of their sleeves... 
it’s true that [functional prostheses] don’t yet look and act like a 
living hand but they are coming closer (1995: 26).
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For these two military surgeons, it couldn’t be more ‘normal’ that women were 
seemingly concerned with style over substance. More men than women are amputees in 
Serbia, as in many parts of Europe and the United States. The mainstream prosthetics 
industry is bound up in military institutions in Serbia as elsewhere. In light of this, 
Radka’s74 desire for a more feminine appearance was viewed by some staff as frivolous. 
Which, while interesting in itself, is made doubly so by the presence and opinions of 
other women on the ward. Miljana, for example was not concerned with a feminine 
appearance. She wanted to go home as fast as possible to her family and get back to 
work. They were depending on her to bring in a wage, as both her and her husband were 
involved in the ‘informal’ work sector. 
Miljana
Miljana came to Serbia fourteen years ago as part of a mass migration of refugees from 
the Dalmatian coast in Croatia together with her husband and (then) 9 month old son. It 
was very difficult in the beginning as neither of them were registered as refugees, but 
eventually they both found work and built a house in Ruma. Miljana’s husband is a 
carpenter and she is a cook, but they are still not registered to work. Back in the year 
2000, Miljana noticed pain in her right leg, which persisted despite treatment she 
received during a wrong diagnosis of ‘inflammation of the ligaments’. Because of this, 
she was told to have an MRI which cost her €200, and as she had no insurance to cover 
the costs took some time to save up for. Six months later she went to the military 
academy orthodontics hospital for a biopsy and a course of physiotherapy. They 
discovered she had a cancer of the bone. After having chemotherapy to reduce the size 
of the tumour, Miljana’s leg was amputated in October 2008. Now in early 2009 this was 
her first visit to the centre as she has had to wait for another round of chemo and for her 
leg to heal. She is new in the clinic and has only been here for two weeks. 
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74 One of the younger female patients.
Miljana is a regular visitor to the Bojana’s little library and gets around on crutches. 
Yesterday, she was measured for her prosthesis (below knee right) and will have her first 
fitting tomorrow. Miljana tells me that she really likes her doctor Ana and the young 
student intern who is sitting in with us agrees. Ana is well liked among both staff and 
patients for her lack of formal hierarchy and her willingness to pursue new solutions. 
Miljana does not know anything about what type of prosthesis she will have, or about 
the fitting process, but she knows that she will be at the centre for approximately 2 or 3 
months. She has heard from the nurses a little of what is involved. I mentioned 
previously that (as is the case in many hospitals) the nurses play a huge role in providing 
information to the patients and are generally overstretched and under appreciated. 
Miljana tells me that she was scared at first when doctors told her about the amputation, 
but says that it is good to be able to talk about it. She was more scared about coming to 
the Bela Clinic than she was about the prosthesis and was definitely more scared about 
the cancer than the amputation because she is still afraid that it might come back. Ana, 
who arrived during the telling of this tale, looks at me hard from across the room, and 
says that in her opinion, the stress of being a refugee and the 1999 bombings contributed 
significantly to the formation of the cancer. 
Miljana’s husband is supportive and her children as well; the younger daughter (9) 
accepted her amputation very quickly. She would like to go back to her job as a cook if 
possible, and has been doing exercises to build up her strength as well as using crutches 
instead of the wheelchair. Occupational therapy is not an option for her as the centre can 
only fund a couple of patients at a time - Ana thinks this is a shame as Miljana would be 
an excellent candidate; however, there are limited resources and space and Miljana is a 
refugee on a ‘grey’ wage. So she watches television and reads. She tells me that she 
would like to have an active life without a cane or crutch. Actually, she says, she does 
not mind, she just wants to have any life. A positive and optimistic view of life is very 
important to her, and only one thing annoys her here at the clinic. She would like to use 
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the computer to learn how to use the internet in the Telenor75 sponsored-club room but it 
does not work on their dated computers (and has not worked for months). Due to her 
chemotherapy, Miljana sometimes wears a wig, but mostly has either a hat or just a scarf 
on, as today. She agrees to me following her story as she is fitted for the prosthesis. The 
reality is that I never see her again however, apart from a terse greeting in the hallway 
the next day. I learn that her cancer came back and is spreading aggressively, she has 
gone home to be with her family. 
The majority of the patients in the Bela Clinic had co-morbidities of some description: 
diabetes, heart disease, and/or cancers. Additionally they were often from low socio-
economic families. Most often they were geriatric patients. The majority of women 
patients fell into this category. A great number of them were widows, who currently 
lived with the family of one of their children, most often a son. These women often 
received a small pension from their husband’s previous employers, and through their 
stories one could see the history of the Serbian economy. Some had husbands who had 
worked in ammunitions factories, some had themselves been gjestarbietere76 working in 
factories and on farms in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. Without exception, all the 
women either were, or had been homemakers and mothers, some working in offices and 
libraries but far greater numbers of them had simply been farmers wives, working the 
land, pickling paprika and cabbages. These were the same babas who sent food packages 
of tightly wrapped smoky salty sarma, and boxes of proja to their grandchildren, my 
friends in Novi Sad. They were almost exclusively short, pudgy women with slightly 
smudged edges, who smelt of talcum and age. They chatted or smoked outside in their 
hallways in wheelchairs pushed tightly together and swapped the latest photos of their 
grandchildren. The question of whether they would like a more cosmetically appealing 
prosthetic limb was never raised either by staff, or among their ranks.
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75 Telenor is a Norwegian owned, mobile network operator. Their Serbian branch ranks 2nd of 
3rd domestic providers. They are the largest foreign in Serbia, and engage ‘in the development 




I don’t feel pain when I’m in the gait lab no, only when I’m 
sitting. But yes, I feel [my leg] it’s there, I know of course.
Radka, aged 22, was one of the many agricultural patients who had arrived at the Bela 
clinic in the autumn. She arrived for the interview in sneakers, tight grey track pants, full 
make up, and a slouchy pink ‘puma’ brand sweater. Radka had left school and married at 
sixteen, and now had two children, aged two and six years. Her leg had been caught in a 
hay-baling machine in July 2008. She was rushed to the Belgrade Military Academy 
hospital where her leg was almost saved. During recovery however she contracted a 
sepsis infection and the leg was amputated at the femur in September 2008. Radka 
arrived at the Bela Clinic at the beginning of November, and now in a few days time, at 
the end of February, she was going to be returning to the home she shared with her 
husband, children and parents-in-law. Her husband is a police officer in their small 
village in southern Serbia and she told me that he was very sympathetic, as he had also 
recently had a thumb amputated in an agricultural incident. Radka, like many other of 
the young agricultural amputees had never worked in the agricultural sector before. She 
had been helping her in-laws when she got caught by the machine. 
Radka had gone to an economics high school. She wanted to go and work in a business 
company. Suddenly she burst out crying and reiterated that they ALMOST saved her leg. 
She told me that she was motivated and accepts her injury but then cried out that ‘of 
course I’m emotional, I used to be healthy and normal’. ‘Everyone’ comes to visits her, 
and her parents were with her constantly at the military hospital. As it is a long and 
difficult drive to Belgrade her husband visits only 2 or 3 times a month but in between 
her therapy and gait training, she reads, and has made friends with some of the older 
women. All the friends that she has made are from the women’s rooms, despite there 
being a relatively large group of young men of similar age and background.
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Radka was very interested in the specifics of her prosthesis. She told me that she had an 
I.C. socket77 with a mobile foot. Her first foot (a SACH78) had problems so now she has 
a dynamic foot. This was not completely covered by the state welfare beneficiary. She 
also has a slimline neoprene harness but had to find the money for this and the foot 
herself... And the neoprene sock that goes with the harness... And an additional €300 
adapter so that she can wear whatever shoes she wants and cross her legs. Nikolina, who 
was in the therapy room at the time, reminded Radka that every prosthesis is just an aid, 
and depends on the motivation of the user (After Radka left, Nikolina further explained 
that with so much information available on the internet sometimes patients place all their 
faith in technology and this gives them unrealistic expectations). Radka looked sullen at 
this and said that she practices at least two hours a day. She is glad to be finished with 
the gait clinic finally as she had many adjustments. Nikolina says that she thinks a 
standard issue limb would have had more possibilities. Radka doesn’t look impressed. 
She tells me that she doesn’t have any problems with donning and doffing her limb as 
‘It’s like pulling on a pair of tights’. The temperature of her stump remains stable. She 
will get a foam cover for the leg this week for cosmetic reasons. 
I feel that there is a bit of a showdown going on between Nikolina and Radka by now. 
Again Radka notes that they almost saved her leg. I ask her if this was a good or a bad 
thing, considering the loss of function that she would likely have had, if they had 
managed to save it. She does not know, and says that it’s not worth thinking about. Her 
plan is now to find a good job without too much walking involved and to get an 
automatic car so that she can pick up her children from school. She does not feel 
phantom pain when walking, only when sitting down. She can endure this pain. Like 
many of the amputees, Radka has not looked into the government sickness benefit, and 
181
77 The Ischial Containment socket was developed through a number of revisions to prosthetics 
design in the 1940’s and 1950’s but became widely used in Serbia by the 1980’s. Without 
becoming overly technical, it remains a popular socket design due it its ability to control lateral tilt 
on the femur. 
78 SACH is an acronym for a foot type. It refers to ‘Solid Ankle, Cushioned Heel’. 
tells me that while she will try to apply she is not confident of receiving anything. 
Finally she tells me that she is just trying to live as normally as possible. 
After she is gone, Nikolina stays to talk, she tells me that she thinks Radka is afraid of 
losing her husband. That is why she is spending so much money for cosmetic 
adjustments, like the harness that allows her to wear tight jeans or track-pants, and of 
course the knee adaptor so that she can cross her legs. In fact, throughout the interview 
Radka had been questioning Nikolina on other limb models that were more cosmetically 
appealing than her current one. If she could afford all these adaptions, what was she 
doing at the centre, I asked. It transpired that the extra components were all paid for by 
her local church. They had had a radio appeal for her. This did not happen so often these 
days Nikolina told me, but had been quite common after the war79. 
In fact when I asked around in the private sector who it was that bought limbs and how 
they paid, when even a basic mechanical below knee model could set an amputee back 
€1200 (the average monthly income rested around €300) a particular picture of 
pragmatism and veze emerged. Down at a large private clinic in the south of Serbia, 
when I met with the director, his press team gave me the example of two local police 
officers, who had been injured in the call of duty. Their colleagues had had a collection 
to raise the money required. This altruistic giving can be considered a citizen led 
charitable beneficiary, able to provide what the state cannot. There was however, 
obviously a moral component to it. Police officers, honest hardworking homemakers, 
those embedded in their communities as model citizens, injured in the service of the 
country, whether it be harvesting or patrolling could draw on public support. It is 
doubtful that Davor (chapter 1) could have drawn on such a network. 
‘What if I want a better knee than the one I am allocated?’ I asked a number of 
physicians, and prosthetists, including Dragotin, at Ottobock Healthcare in Serbia. I was 
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79 A prosthetist that I interviewed at Rudo also mentioned that during the war this had been a 
common occurrence. 
thinking of the doctors at the clinic who 
prescribed safety knee components as a 
matter of course. ‘then I’ll sell you one!’ he 
laughed, ‘you get your prescribed leg, and 
then you come down here to the clinic and 
we replace the knee with the new one! It’s 
easy.’ ‘Couldn’t I get it made with that knee 
to start with and pay the difference?’ I 
asked. Wasn’t it a waste that the 
components were then used up. He grinned, 
‘that would make sense wouldn’t it, but 
welcome to Serbia!’
Whether or not Radka was really worried 
about still being desirable, there is a market in specially designed women's prostheses 
that captures a specific type of prosthetic femininity. One of the more prominent women 
in this regard is Amiee Mullins, bilateral amputee, athlete and muse to filmmakers and 
fashion designers, owner of many pairs of limbs, ‘barbie doll’ cosmetic legs, Cheetah® 
running limbs, hand carved solid ash wooden limbs, created specially for her by British 
fashion designer Alexander McQueen, as well as a pair of transparent resin ‘Cinderella’ 
legs, made specially for her role in Matthew Barney’s Cremaster Cycle III film from 
2002. In fact Mullins lays claim to more than 10 pairs of legs, allowing her to vary her 
height from 5’8’’ to 6’1’’. She has stated in various media80 that being a double amputee 
makes her the ultimate canvas, as she is not constrained by needing to have one limb 
match a biological leg. What then should we make of the fact that Mullins, who appears 
in fashion shows, magazines and film, will not be photographed without limbs on, and 
famously refused to comply with Matthew Barney’s direction in the Cremaster 3 films, 
stating that to capture her without her prostheses would strip her too bare, and leave her 
Fig 12: Amiee Mullins on the cover of Dazed 
and Confused, September 1998.
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80 via a number of TED talks (www.ted.com) and during her period as guest editor on the 
www.gizmodo.com online technology portal. 
feeling too vulnerable81? Residual limbs, stump surfaces, unnatural endings of the 
amputated body, interfaces between machine and flesh. These are, if we are to believe 
Mullins, something private, something that would, if seen, leave her exposed. E. Wright 
(2009) calls her prosthetic limb ‘the secret of [her] self’ and writes: 
It hides, tucked beneath clothing, allowing me to pass as 
something that I am not, that I can never be. It is precious to me, 
it enables me, gives me mobility and an aesthetic that would 
cease if it was removed from me. Within my body schema, my 
prosthetic [sic] is as much a part of my body as my skin, blood, 
and organs (2009: 1).
What do we make of James Gillingham’s photos of female Victorian amputees, skirts 
discreetly lifted, or prosthetics advertising from the mid century, of Vargas-style pinup 
girls with subtle plywood limbs, or of the prevalence of female amputee videos in file-
share sites such as youtube.com? There is an 
undercurrent of voyeurism which is gendered fully 
toward women. The female body, attached to an 
artificial limb, is read in a different way to the male 
one. Here, the amputated body is something to be 
hidden, encased in the prosthesis (Smith and Morra 
2006). A number of Mullin’s limbs, whilst giving 
her a doll-like appearance, are not designed for 
stability. This means that she must either remain 
moving or be held up. To this end, she is often 
photographed in motion or sitting/lying. These 
limbs are costly, high technology, made from 
desirable materials by designer companies far out of 
reach of many women. They are also vulnerable and 
precarious, and require Mullins to have just the right height of shoe to match the arch 
and a supporting prop in the vicinity should she wish to rest. Even more strangely, while 
Fig 13: Amputee with a hip 
dislocation - James Gillingham
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81 Barney filmed her with transparent gelatinous octopus tentacles instead...
Mullins can’t bear to reveal her amputation, something so private that it exposes her in 
some intimate way, she has made a name for herself as a model, appearing nearly naked 
in many instances. 
Within the walls of the gait clinic, amputees of both sexes wore shorts (slashed to the 
waistband) so that their harnesses could be easily adjusted. None were afforded the 
possibility of hiding their injury, even if they personally wished to. Many told me that 
here, they felt that it was here they could truly relax because everyone understood what 
they were going through. The primary gender difference I found in dealing with the 
patients, was that of self care. Female patients would arrive to the gait clinic, made up, 
with their hair done, and clean clothing, whilst the men had, often as not, not shaved, nor 
brushed their hair, and one memorably turned up in a pair of bright orange pyjamas one 
morning, having also forgotten the correct shoe82. 
The amputated body has the power to disrupt, or at least challenge the normative 
boundaries of the body, and thus social relationships surrounding it. The prosthetic body 
takes this power, and channels it into the rehabilitation of social order. By doing so, the 
prosthetic body becomes concerned with control and discipline, and the art of governing 
the body and technologies of the self; both over aspects of body contingency and over 
aspects of social life (Foucault 2006 [1991], Frank 1995). Within the Bela Clinic, issues 
of contingency and predictability were of paramount concern to the amputees. How will 
the new limb work? Will it hurt? How will they sit? Stand? Will they be able to put it on 
themselves? Will they be able to balance? The implicit trust that a wearer must have in 
their prosthesis’ ability to hold them upright is mediated by their experience in the 
prosthetic clinic and their previous life experience, akin to the creating of a new 
‘habitus’ of movement (Bourdieu 1977, 1984). Interviews that I conducted with patients 
who had yet to receive their prosthesis revealed that fear was paramount in their minds: 
185
82 The majority of the patients were unilateral amputees, and their prosthetic limb had its shoe 
already attached. A matching one was a necessity for the process of alignment.
fear of falling and injuring themselves83, fear of not being able to wield their prosthesis, 
fear of not being able to go home, fear of going home, fear of losing independence, fear 
of becoming a financial and social burden on their families, about getting a benefit, 
returning to work, whether their partner would find them desirable, how they would go 
to the toilet, whether they could drive a car, where they would live, how they would live, 
or if they would be a burden on their families, to name but a few.
The history of prostheses is irrevocably bound to the history of conflict, and the 
wounding of bodies through injury. The prosthetic body to this end is also gendered, and 
has at its core the re-imagination of the injured veteran body, where other types of body 
require deviations from this norm as well. Large scale prosthetic rehabilitation as 
originally imagined post World War One, is very much about the aesthetic of the 
masculine body. Within the industries that have grown up surrounding amputation, 
doctors, patients, therapists, manufacturers, and prostheses themselves are all engaged in 
a network of creation and meaning. By this I mean that they are inscribing meaning both 
onto the body and through the body, through its relationship with the prosthesis. It is 
interesting to me that the term Nikolina used earlier, ‘compensation,’ seems to refer 
primarily to a viewer outside of the body. That being said, I would argue that this 
‘viewer’ is simultaneously both the self and the observers with whom social interactions 
take place. Julie Livingston’s recent work into disgust, body aesthetics and human ethics 
(2008) has been useful as a comparative study in this regard. Writing about physical 
disability in Botswana, Livingston looks at how people simultaneously experience 
disgust and love, or compassion and revulsion, in their interactions with the physically 
disabled, and how positive qualities of people are brought forward through ‘the taming 
of unruly bodily sensations’ (ibid: 288). 
Amputees form relationships with both people (surgeons, prosthetists, therapists, their 
church, their communities and the like) and technical agents (prostheses, orthoses, and 
aids). They also form relationships with parts of their bodies that no longer physically 
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83 Kurzman (2002) also finds this among elderly patients at his prosthetics clinic
exist: phantom limbs. A phantom limb is simply and perhaps most easily described as 
the continued sensation of a body part, after it has been amputated. Most people have 
heard of this phenomenon through its association with the presence of pain in the 
previously amputated area. Phantoms are, to that end, routinely quantified and 
pathologised through measurements of Phantom Limb Pain (PLP). However, many 
amputees, including those I interviewed, experience their phantom limbs as more or less 
ever present, and describe that their ‘phantoms’ are only an issue when painful 
(Kurzman 2002). In fact many of the amputees that I worked with described that these 
painful problematic ‘phantoms’ were only a problem when the body was at rest. When 
put to work through the prosthesis, phantom limbs were in fact useful through their 
presence as a memory of the flesh. 
For many amputees, phantoms are managed 
through body techniques that make the phantom 
work through the prosthesis (Sobchack 1995). 
There is neurological evidence to suggest that 
without the use of a prosthesis, the physical 
presence of a phantom limb becomes less clearly 
defined (Doidge 2010, Sacks 2010). Without the 
prosthesis to give it form, it becomes increasingly 
abstract until it actually seems to be within the 
residual limb. The presence of pain in this limb 
however, brings the boundaries sharply back into 
focus, allowing the limb to ‘dys-appear’ (Leder 
1990) in all its wrongness. This shortening and 
lengthening of the limb relative to pain is called 
telescoping. The dimensions and functioning of 
the physical and neurological body therefore 
change through the body’s articulation with a prosthetic device, which is incorporated by 
the body that relies on it (Grosz 1994). Leder (1990) argues that our bodies only really 
fig 14: ‘telescoping of a prosthetic limb 
over time’ from pain after amputation - a 
lifelong problem? (Sherman 1997) 
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appear to us in times of illness or injury, so that in essence they ‘dys-appear’. The rest of 
the time we simply take them for granted, not noticing their literal or figurative 
limitations. Prostheses then allow phantom limbs to appear, rather than dys-appear, and 
furthermore allow these limbs to be re-incorporated into the user’s body. 
The prosthesis re-members the body again, literally and figuratively. It conceals the 
interface of flesh and machine, and imagines a whole. When fitted properly and 
perfectly aligned to the body, it disappears as a prosthetic add-on, and in its place, the 
phantom limb is allowed to reappear. Much is at stake however, and a number of 
different types of phantom limb pain have actually been attributed to badly fitted or 
designed prostheses (Sherman 1997). None the less, if pain and suffering destroy 
language, and unmake the embodied world (Scarry 1985, Frank 1995, 1999), then 
prostheses surely allow the creation of a dialogue, the opening up of language, and a 
remaking of the world, a rehabilitation of not only the biological but also the 
experiential, allowing for constant renegotiation of borders and boundaries, as the 
interface of machine and body changes with time and technology. 
Simply put, the prosthesis disguises where the organic ends and the mechanical begins. 
It is, as Davor put it, something to fill the empty sleeve. However, it is more than just 
this. More interesting is the way in which the prosthesis becomes a space where the 
psychological and the biological body can be negotiated. If this is confusing, then think 
of the prosthesis as the empty sleeve, and the ‘phantom’ as the limb that fills it. The 
mechanical brings the ghost of the biological back to life. Experiences of phantom body 
parts show us that we are all caught up in the need to create a coherent belief system 
surrounding the body and that what we call our ‘self’ is not necessarily located within 
the flesh. Phantoms ask questions of how it is that we come to perceive the world, and of 
whether we can root ideas of seeing and knowing in the corporeal body. 
The space of the prosthetic is where biomechanical, phenomenological, and 
technological world views are played out vis a vis the human body. Where a habitus of 
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movement is reconstituted and the body is reassembled. This is where a generic and 
marketable prosthesis (consumable fetishised movement), which was (and in some ways 
remains) identical to hundreds of other limbs, becomes thoroughly customised to the 
needs of the wearer. It becomes a specific prosthesis for a specific patient, and the 
aesthetics of this relationship are coded and ‘read’ in ways that are unable to be 
separated from their socio-political and historic contexts. Technology, that great blurrer 
of boundaries, is in reality never quite as infinite as it appears. Thus it is that I turn to 







A cyborg is cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
organism. A creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction (Haraway 1985: p149)
Cyborg /ˈsīˌbôrg/
a fictional or hypothetical person (sic) whose physical abilities are extended 
beyond normal limitations by mechanical elements built into the body
It is more than two decades since Donna Haraway published ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’, a 
text in which she drew from Marxist feminism to develop a form of postmodern 
feminist critique of person/object relationship. This sought to collapse dualist notions 
of nature, culture, gender, objects and subjects, which Haraway perceived as artificial 
in nature. While I have no issue with the latter of these statements, as I hope to show in 
this last section, the increasing use of cyborgs, to stand in for all human and technology 
relationships, runs a risk of becoming a victim of its own success. Across the social 
sciences, cyborgs, much like the terms prosthesis and prosthetic, have become a 
catchall phrase. They are however, not synonymous with each other, though neither are 
they mutually exclusive. 
The concepts that Haraway was rallying against had all been touched upon previously, 
but in naming them, Haraway acknowledged their strangeness, and gave them a fertile 
academic space in which to grow. Since 1985 these cyborgs have replicated, so to 
speak. Permeated throughout the fields of Science and Technology Studies, and Gender 
Studies, a field of cyborg anthropology has evolved, dedicated ever more myopically 
to this study of the boundaries between naturalised categories we so often take for 
granted - animal/human, flesh/machine - these fleshy endings of the body shaken out 
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until they give up their secrets, most potent of which are perhaps that (as Haraway was 
hammering home) we are not as finite as we imagine ourselves to be. 
Contemporary and complementary to the cybernetic turn in anthropology, came the 
focus on ‘the body’ as a theoretical tool for understanding the world. In 1987, Scheper-
Hughes and Lock put forth The Mindful Body: a Prolegemon to Future Work in medical 
anthropology within which they note three theoretical bodies that we all inhabit. At the 
first and most fundamental level is the phenomenological experiential sense of the 
individual lived body. The second comprises the social body, referring perhaps most 
strongly to Mary Douglas’ ideas of the body as a symbol of culture, society and nature 
that can be read, during both health and illness (1966). At the third level, drawing 
heavily on the works of Michel Foucault (1973, 1978, 1979), they posit a body politic, 
referring to the ways that bodies are controlled, regulated and surveyed at all levels of 
governance. Though they note that there are many areas of social life where these three 
coalesce, Scheper-Hughes and Lock conclude that 
the individual body should be seen as the most immediate, the 
proximate terrain where social truths and social contradictions are 
played out, as well as a locus of personal and social resistance, 
creativity, and struggle’ (ibid: 221). 
Cementing the domain of the individual body as a tool for anthropology even further, 
Thomas Csordas’ 198884 essay on embodiment as a paradigm for anthropology heralded 
a new era in phenomenological approaches to the body. Csordas rooted the body as the 
‘existential ground of culture’ placing the body at the centre of all experience. Departing 
from Mauss (who he noted reproduces the very Cartesian dualism he sought to collapse, 
by producing the concepts of la notion du personne and les techniques du corps 
separately (Csordas 1990: 7)) and building on again on Merleau-Ponty and the works of 
Bourdieu, he put forth an argument for using the body as the starting tool for analysing 
culture and the self through perception and practice. Such an approach, he surmised, 
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84 Published in volume 18 of the journal ‘Ethos’
would collapse distinction not only between mind and body, but between subject and 
object ‘allowing for an investigation of how cultural objects (including selves) are 
constituted or objectified … in the ongoing indeterminacy and flux of adult cultural 
life’ (Csordas 1990: 40).
What was groundbreaking to many in 1985 has grown out of its skin in 2012. Cyborgs 
after all, are the ultimate rule breakers, they are always located in the present/future. As 
technologies that were once avant garde and unsettling become a part of the vernacular 
meshwork of life, so new ones arise to take their place. We are always looking for new 
ways to describe our relationships to new technologies, and thus to each other. The 
cyborg is always associated with a move toward the future, which masks rather than 
engages with history, while the prosthesis and thus the prosthetic citizen are located 
more firmly in the present, rooted through action to a particular time and place. That is 
not to say that there is no overlap between the two, but I would argue, just as Kurzman 
(2001, 2002) does, that not only do cyborgs obscure relationships and networks, but that 
due to the location of the cyborg within the future/present, cyborgs also obscure notions 
of historicity and time; concepts vital to understanding how a particular type of ‘normal 
life’ is produced and replicated through the production of particular types of citizens.
Cyborgs and embodiment, or technology and bodies to be slightly less opaque about it. 
These are also the realms of the prosthetic. The larger macro processes of international 
and national level politics played out on the field of the body, inscribing and marking it 
in the process. Little wonder that ‘the prosthetic’ has been fruitful ground for metaphor 
for those anthropologists who wish to articulate the techno-dazzle of the future/present. 
However, given the central position of ethnographic description to anthropological 
thought, it is perhaps more surprising though, that there has been only a spattering of 
recent research dedicated even in part to grounded ethnographic studies of ‘prosthetic’ 
ways of being. 
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I was very interested in cyborgs when I started writing up my field notes on prosthesis 
advertising, as it seemed to me that the marketing of limbs encouraged people to 
imagine themselves as cyborgs, a literal fusion of machine and flesh. However I rapidly 
discovered that cyborg studies were not the territory in which my research belonged. 
They bore strikingly little resemblance to my experience in Serbia, and the experiences 
of the people with whom I worked. In the cyborg future present it sometimes appears as 
though people are imagined as totally unconstrained, insofar as they are not people at all, 
they alter their bodies in sterile labs, they replicate asexually, they extend their ears and 
mouths through cell phones, their new limbs are computer designed and aligned. In the 
clean, civilised, technical laboratory, there is no need for human error. There are no non-
compliant patients, sneaking into one another’s rooms to smoke, eat cvarci and drink 
rakija; there are no harangued therapists with 15 simultaneous patients each, no 
prosthetists with gambling debts toppling into black holes of despair, no directors who 
fall down stairs and break limbs, no lack of funding in the state health systems, no 
triaging of who will receive better healthcare from an already overstretched pool of 
works. No distinctions in forms of life; human and non human and non-non human are 
all equal. The really real, the messy, leaky, morally ambiguous, slovenly, hopeful matters 
of daily life, and the meshwork in which we all exist are conspicuously absent. In the 
hunt for the near future, the cyborg lifts us from contextually embedded matters of the 
flesh, to a plane where everything is possible. In fact, in her flagship cyborg manifesto, 
Haraway has strikingly little to say on the subject of disability - or of anything that I 
have come to recognise as prosthetising. She notes only that 
perhaps paraplegics and other severely handicapped people can (and 
sometimes do) have the most intense complex hybridisation with other 
communication devices (Haraway 1985: 178).
It seems such a contrite and patronising sentence, in what otherwise appears as a 
convincing and complex argument, that we are all in some way cyborgs. Many of the 
patients of the Bela clinic would I feel, be as hard pressed to consider themselves 
severely handicapped, just as they would be hard pressed to ‘perhaps’ consider 
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themselves enhanced beyond nature. Haraway’s cyborgs are the stuff of fantasy, her’s is 
a future of clean, glittering technology, of postmodern eclecticism, devoid of the need 
for choice, because one can be everything at once, both human, and non human, and non 
non-human. It is a future of desire. Disability does not figure here. In this future, the 
disabled are worthy only of a side note, a grudging acknowledgement that ‘perhaps’ they 
are capable of the a ‘more intense’ form of machine/human communication. What, if 
anything, is more intense about it? Are not all our interactions with prosthetic structures, 
be they communicative, ambulatory, or bureaucratic in nature, complex and intense? 
Haraway too then, despite all appearances of boundary collapse, regresses too, via an 
excludable category, to a kind of naturally incomplete disabled form in need of 
hybridisation. 
   Cyborgs and Prostheses: revealing relationships
Cyborg anthropology is therefore a fair weather friend to amputees, exclusively the 
domain of those involved in the latest research, in nerve cell transfer programs, in 
learning to move limbs with their minds. I get as excited by these breakthroughs as 
anyone. These breakthroughs however, happen primarily within the bubble of ‘cyberia’, 
a middle-class, western, technological future/present. The amputees involved are mainly 
young, healthy, often military veterans, and each time I read about a new limb 
technology connected to cybernetics, I hear the grouchy voice of Kurzman (2001) in my 
head. Kurzman too takes issue with the over ubiquitous nature of the term cyborg, which 
masks underlying networks and relations. Far from being a cyborg simply because of his 
prosthetic leg, if he is to occupy such a position than it is, as he states, because 
my leg cost $11,000 and my HMO paid for it; because I had to get a job 
to get the health insurance; because I stand and walk with the irony that 
the materials and design of my leg are based on the same military 
technology that has blown the limbs off so many other young men; 
because the shock absorber in my foot was manufactured by a company 
which makes shock absorbers for bicycles and motorcycles, and can be 
read as a product of increasingly engineered sports equipment and 
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prostheses; and because the man who built my leg struggles to hold onto 
his small business in a field rapidly becoming vertically integrated and 
corporatized (Kurzman 2001: 382).
One becomes a cyborg though the networking of these diverse technologies that are 
incorporated in the prosthetic structures that support us, rather than by way of these 
technologies alone. Thus while one might initially think that the cyborg is the most 
appropriate way of thinking about human-prosthesis relationships, the weakness of the 
cyborg is its focus on the cyberdazzle of the new technologies. When one removes the 
new and unfamiliar from the technological relationship that exists, what happens?
The patients who I interviewed did 
not see themselves as sexed up 
cyborgs. Far from it, through their 
sessions in gait and manual therapy 
they hoped for something 
approaching normal, something 
within the range of tolerable 
difference, and many knew already 
that they were doomed to fall short. 
These were patients with a paucity 
of resources and choices available. 
Even at the opposite end of the 
economic scale, and despite many 
claims of unsportsmanlike 
enhancement off the field, I have yet to hear of anyone taking up Pistorius on his offer to 
‘meet at the track85’. 
The Cheetah® running prostheses that both Pistorius and Amiee Mullins (among many 
hundreds of other amputee runners) use, question the normative form of the human 
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85 see page 9
body. The Cheetah® leg looks beyond the human body for its inspiration, and is 
composed of a moulded carbon fibre blade, earning Pistorius his now famous ‘blade-
runner’ eponym86. As its name suggests, the limb both looks like and replicates the 
tensile strength of the tendon in the hind leg of a cheetah. It looks nothing like a 
biological human leg, has no external moulding and is not worn with a shoe (Kurzman 
2002, Gutfleisch 2003) although many athletes actually glue the spiked soles of track 
shoes to the impact points of their limbs. Marketed by Icelandic prosthetics company 
Össur, the cheetah® is publicly declared not to be a ‘bionic limb’ capable of delivering 
proprioceptory feedback and assisted movement, like the Ottobock C-leg©, but is rather 
described as ‘a non-mechanised prosthetic running foot, which returns a portion of the 
energy stored during the loading phase of running87 ’. 
Furthermore, its shortcomings are detailed
Studies have shown that the Flex-Foot Cheetah can return 
around 90% of the energy stored in it. This is far less than a 
normal able-bodied foot and leg, which has been shown to 
return 249% of the stored energy88. 
The disruptive quality of prostheses is clear here. Össur is interested in outlining the 
limits of the limb’s capabilities. I would like to suggest that because Cheetahs® push the 
range of tolerable difference aesthetically, and yet not athletically, they rub 
uncomfortably with unquestioned ideas of normalcy, of the ‘naturality’ of the biological 
body, and of debates into enhancement versus disability. When does a limb stop being an 
assistive device and start being a cosmetic one? How are extreme limbs different from 
cosmetic prostheses? Who decides what ‘natural’ levels of performance are? Has such a 
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86 This is also a nod to science fiction, like so many descriptions of cyborgs in the media, in this 
case to the 1982 film of the same name, in which rogue and morally ambiguous androids are 
revealed to be hiding among biological weapons, a work itself based upon the 1968 Phillip K. 
Dick science fiction classic ‘Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?’.
87 www.ossur.com/?PageID=13462.
88 accessed February 17, 2012
category ever existed? How is a prosthesis different to a pair of high tech running shoes? 
Debates continue to rage across the internet about the whether ‘disabled’ athletics are 
really ‘enhanced’, and Pistorius seems to herald a new generation of so called ‘super-
crips’ (Howe 2011). Despite being deemed finally to not have a ‘net’ advantage over his 
naturally bipedal competitors, and despite having run with the same pair of limbs for the 
last 10 years (his are not the latest models), and even though his speed has continually 
and incrementally increased, suggesting that no small amount of learned skill is 
involved, Pistorius still seems to divide opinion. Let’s not forget as well that Cheetahs® 
are debilitatingly expensive: by all accounts, they cost between US $15000 and $28000 
each.89 They are therefore not available to everyone, only the financial elite of a small 
group of athletes previously believed to be at a disadvantage, excludable by way of 
physical anomaly. The furore around their usage on the athletics field begs yet again the 
question of when it is that restoration becomes enhancement. 
In her typical insightful style, Lock (1993, 2000) writes that arguments about deficiency 
are really moral disputes about the boundaries of abnormality. I would also argue that 
they show how proclamations of the seamless articulations among humans and 
machines, a concept required for the construction of the post-human autonomous subject  
(Hayles 1999), do not stand up to rigorous appraisal. It is precisely along these seams 
that subjects are made and unmade: Individuals within supporting structures that have 
the capacity to validate their claims for citizenship or to negate them, based on the 
oppositional claims of others. This is no more clearly portrayed to the general public 
during the televised sporting arena of the paralympics. Athletes in the paralympics 
compete against each other inside an official sports class, which is based on the 
classificatory status of their disability for each particular event. 
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89 Paralympic does not include the price on their website, so this is gleaned solely from a broad 
web search across resources for athletes, where limb prices vary considerably. Moore and Rieg 
(2005) ADD TO BIBLIOGRAPHY state figures that are considerably higher.
There is no exact science here however, and each individual is assessed according to a 
number of disparate formulae (Howe 2011)90. Most of what is consumed via media 
coverage are distinctive bodily differences, and much of the politics of physical 
classification in the paralympics is ultimately not far removed from Titchkovsky’s 
excludable categories of inclusion mentioned previously91 I would like to suggest 
however that it is not classificatory slippages from within the Paralympic populations 
that trouble the vox populi, it is the leaking of this previously excludable ‘normal’ 
disabled body into the realm of the aesthetically ‘normal’. We might be okay with the 
knowledge that no two disabilities are completely alike, but then why are we so 
concerned with able bodies being identical? That like should compete against like, in the 
interests of ‘fair and equal competition’ (IPC 2007) is one of the founding principles of 
the paralympics, and indeed could be considered a primary ground of all sportsmanship. 
Ambiguity is frowned upon, primarily because it means that this guiding principle 
cannot be established92. Furthermore it is again at the boundaries of the limits of 
‘normalcy’ that this is most apparent. Note that there is no discussion whether 
wheelchair athletes should be allowed to compete against their able bodied 
counterparts.93 
Perhaps then, more than anything, athletics shows us most clearly that prosthetising 
citizens is about taming; whether it is taming the unruly aesthetic or kinaesthetic of an 
unusual body shape; constraining infinite cyborgian epistemological possibilities into 
something real, practical and culturally embedded; or bounding messy national 
201
90 See the IPC classification code published in 2007 and available on www.paralympic.org for 
further information.
91 see page 92
92 Consider, in addition to Pistorius, the case his fellow South African runner, Mokgadi ‘Caster’ 
Semenya, who was subjected to a intrusive public investigation by the International Association 
of Athtetics Federations (the IAAF) into her ‘true’ gender, based upon ‘abnormal’ competition 
results in the upper limits of what a female might be assumed to achieve.
93 Currently the paralympic 800m wheelchair record outclasses the able-bodied one, at 1:32.17 
to 1:41.117(Howe 2011). Rules for wheelchair racing however allow athletes to ‘draft’ air 
turbulence from one another, making the event much more akin to a cycle race. 
hybridities and contested spaces within geographic borders. Prosthetising takes the 
abstract cyborg, and reforms it into the concrete and defined.
Once one accepts that the cyborg is (like the universal norm) unattainable, the 
theoretical stance of it becomes in principle only useful for establishing an ideal of 
prosthetic citizenship, and, as Haraway wrote originally, to express the conflict between 
mass production and personal experience:
the production of universal, totalising theory is a major mistake that 
misses most of reality, probably always, but certainly now; and second, 
taking responsibility for the social relations of science and technology 
means refusing an anti-science metaphysics, a demonology of 
technology, and so means embracing the skilful task of reconstructing 
the boundaries of daily life, in partial connection with others, in 
communication with all of our parts (Haraway 1985: 181).
This original insightful tenet of Haraway’s seems to have fallen much to the wayside 
where cyborg anthropology is concerned. How though might we go about talking about 
human-prosthetic relationships without the rubric of the cyborg to anchor us? Having 
scrutinised cyborgs, and found them wanting, where do they fit in the scheme of things, 
and what is their relationship to the prosthetic citizen? For the amputees of the Bela 
Clinic, the universal near future always meets the individual physically present at the 
interface of flesh and machine. The universal is consumed, marketed, desired, and 
bought ó  by way of generic components, but it is the latter that is produced; a cyborg 
in-situ, the prosthetic citizen ó  the specific cobbling together of these components. 
During the conflicts that marked the end of the century, Serbia, like many of its 
neighbouring countries, received many used prostheses as aid. Well-intentioned gifts 
nonetheless went on to cause unforeseen problems as parts broke down, pieces needed 
replacing, and orders had to be placed. Many of these parts could not be sourced from 
within Serbia, and while the country remained under economic sanctions many 
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prosthetists learned to make do and mend what were originally high quality, though 
dated prostheses, with local components. Conversely, with the opening of the borders 
and the flooding of the market with Ottobock products, many of these prosthetists were 
now limited to working solely with branded components that they encountered in the 
course of their sponsored training seminars. 
I wrote previously that in much the same way Perry’s historical research into post World 
War Two Germany described men becoming prosthetic to the machines that they were 
attached to94, the Ottobock marketing videos described in on page 41 made me feel as 
though some of the prosthetists were afraid of becoming a supplementary support: 
human prostheses to a self serving machine of progress, and that Ottobock’s C-legs were 
advertised as almost able to ‘walk by themselves’. In both these cases there appears at 
first to be a renegotiation of a power flow, the biological giving way to the 
biotechnological - however, ultimately, neither L.A.S.A.R95. alignment systems from 
Ottobock, nor prosthetic legs are of value without a body to attach them to. New ways of 
talking about things do not necessarily mean the destruction of older forms. Machines 
might take the ‘guesswork’ out of alignment, but what is construed as ‘guesswork’ is 
actually the skilled labour of the prosthetist, and the work of the patient. Much as we can 
theorise the post-human, its very existence presupposes that there is (or was) a ‘natural’ 
category which the ‘post’ can fall outside of. The prosthetic in many ways reinforces 
this, as one cannot augment something that no longer exists. 
The amputees who I interviewed often had many other worries in their lives, which 
vastly trumped their concern over body aesthetics: health, financial, social, 
psychological, emotional, relationship type worries. For many, thinking about their 
prosthesis as something more than an everyday tool that allowed them to stand and 
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94 see page 34
95 Laser Assisted Static Alignment Reference
move about, or stopped people from staring at them, seemed a ridiculous endeavour, one 
that they often turned their noses up at, making me wonder to what extent the cyborg 
might speak to a particular western notion of the future and fears of body contingency. 
The prosthetic body after all, predates our late twentieth century notions of the cyborg. 
People have always existed with unusual anatomies, just as technologies have always 
supplemented and augmented bodies in different ways, across a range of culturally 
defined ranges of acceptable bodily difference.
Perhaps if one considers that the emerging ‘cyborg’ imagination of endless desirable 
body transformations is really about a particular mode of capitalist consumption, then 
we can begin to distinguish prosthetic citizens from cyborgs. Hybridity, cyborgs, and 
bionic people might all in some way be prosthetic citizens, but the inverse is not 
necessarily the case, at least not for the reasons that might first appear explicit. The 
marketing of assistive devices is already morally ambiguous, relative to questions 
relating to restoration or enhancement. What an appropriate level of restoration and 
rehabilitation is, varies from country to country, from class to class, from generation to 
generation. Take for example the silicon breast. It is the site of much contention, whether 
it be the restoration of breast tissue following a mastectomy, or the silicone implants of 
woman who chooses to augment her biological breasts, how one comes to wear a 
prosthetic breast has implications for the financial support one receives from the 
government, relating to the number as nature of prostheses, how often they can be 
renewed, of specially designed underwear, even of emotional support.
There is always a grey area of definition between restoration, rehabilitation and 
enhancement. This is the space where considerations of individual ability versus 
biological ability are raised. Particularly when large sums of money are invested, the 
assumption is that if one has the economic and/or social (or veze) capital, all options are 
available for consumption. Parts of the body become ever more replaceable and need 
and desire become blurred. How many pairs of prosthetic legs, or how many wheelchairs 
does an amputee or a paralympian ‘need’? How do we define this loaded term? Mullins 
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recently complained that she had to maintain 12 pairs of legs as part of her ‘normal’ 
work and social life (2009).
One form of consumption leads on to another, and this consumption becomes an endless 
quest to come closer to an ideal or universal citizen, so the making of the prosthetic 
citizen is, in this instance, really the closing in of the unbounded possibilities of the post-
human and the embedding of a ‘potential’ individual within the feasible realms of daily 
life; a precarious and individually prioritised network. In this prosthetising of the self, 
desires are tempered by realities, futures by presents, the ideal by the real. The prosthetic 
citizen is the cyborg bought to order within social and cultural limits of normality.
Placing cyborgs under a critical spotlight also reveals where prostheses transect the 
boundaries of enhancement, hybridity and disability, focusing our gaze at the ‘taken for 
granted’:
As a culture, we have only begun to grapple with the myriad ways 
that disability shifts our expectations and creates alternatives to that 
which we regard as ‘natural’ or, even worse,‘normal’ (Mitchell and 
Snyder 2000: xiii).
Having worked with amputees and prosthetists for 18 months, and having researched the 
place of prostheses in academic discourse, I feel that I can safely say that cyborg culture 
and prostheses are not interchangeable, although there are many areas of life where they 
can be seen to overlap. Mullins’ legs do not ultimately extend the capabilities of her legs 
anymore than a pair of running shoes do for me. They certainly do not allow her to run 
at the speed of light, or even beyond the realm of what is biologically possible. They 
may allow her to alter her height, but each centimetre upwards means more effort spent 
on balance. Each ‘enhancement’ has its disruption. Indeed medical prostheses, rather 
than surpassing the boundaries of the body, attempt as best they can to give wearers 
access to ‘normal’ activities in life. Running, walking, driving a car, kicking a ball, 
swimming, holding a knife, a pen, a glass. These are not the desirable sexed up activity 
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of a cyborg. To say that Mullins’ legs are in some way like a mobile phone (as Case 
implies in 2009), extending her legs into an abstract space is to me ill thought out. 
Cyborg anthropology takes human - non-human relationships as unproblematic, and as 
universally equal. When cyborg enthusiasts talk about the history of prosthetic 
modifications to the body, they cite tools, glasses, pens, and while I agree that these do 
further the limits of the body, allowing parts of ourselves to be expressed beyond the 
limit of physical body, it seems more than a little facetious to call someone a body-pen 
hybrid, or a contact-lens person hybrid. Prostheses, whether structural, physical or 
literary are always trying to ease communication, to contain and control the unruly 
external limits of the body, whether attempting mimicry of those minutiae of muscular, 
skeletal, neurological and physiological details that exist within the structure of our 
bodies, or trying to direct and legitimate the networks flowing from them. Ask any 
amputee about wearing their prosthesis. It is difficult work. There is no ‘adaption for a 
the purposes of a new environment’96 as Clynes and Kline (1960) posit in the their 
original text on cyborgs. Even the Cheetah® and the bionic C-legs’ impressive 
‘muscular‘ response systems pale in comparison to a biological leg. 
Increasingly, scholars involved in studies of cyborgs talk about a ‘modern life’ where 
we, more than ever before, are defined by our relationships with non-human objects, for 
as Haraway has claimed, we are all cyborgs now. To me this seems tinged with more 
than a smattering of self importance. Were we to ask scholars of any given decade, 
would they not answer the same, that modern life proceeds at a faster speed than that of 
the generation before? That new technologies have meant that tasks can be 
accomplished faster and with more precision? Jain (1999) argues that technology is 
really the speeding up of time. Each generation defines itself as the most modern, 
because, chronologically speaking, it is (Latour 1993) We imagine that new technologies 
supersede older ones, though the reality is not always so clear cut. We have always been 




As cyborgs (and researchers writing about them) are to be found wherever new 
technologies are located, it is possible to identify an increasingly large area of interest in 
cyborg studies from within the computer gaming and virtual reality universe. Here 
avatars (representations of individuals with cybernetic worlds) represent the ultimate 
virtual cyborg. As the internet becomes more accessible to a growing number of people 
in the western world, so we also see a rise in cyborg studies of virtual prostheses.
These are the worlds of online gaming, second life communities, and involve an 
increasing interaction with cyberspace, mediated through what authors called ‘virtual 
cyborg bodies’ (Cleland 2010). Avatars are visual representations of individuals, who 
interact with one another in digital environments created to resemble some form of solid 
physical surroundings. Cleland suggests that these 
Prosthetic technical extensions enable us to amplify and extend 
ourselves in ways that profoundly affect the nature and scale of human 
communication and, therefore, of human consciousness and subjectivity 
(ibid.: 75). 
This is indeed a grandiose statement to make. These cyborg theorists seem to feel that 
we, as humans are no longer limited by our physical selves, and can (in this case) be 
liberated from our bodies through the creation of new ‘selves’ which project the essence 
of ourselves out into a new public area. However, it is an incomplete transition, because 
the mundane and boring fact is that we must still deal with the matter of our own 
continuing corporeality. Much as one might wish to reinvent oneself in the digital realm, 
we still have to buy food, eat, to digest and defecate, and to work (or be compensated for 
this) to pay for power and internet networks that allow us to link in to online 
communities. In all these cases, throughout literature and my fieldwork it is always 
technology itself that is the implicit prosthesis that we all use to support and prop up our 
physical selves. 
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Cerqui (2002) notes among his engineers that one may consider what is to be human 
from two points of view. From the first vantage point, one may consider that the body in 
its natural form, whatever that may be, is already complete, and that while we are 
physically unspecified (there are many animals and plants containing technologies and 
skills greater than our own - the cheetah for example is a better runner, the crab a better 
pincher, the ant able to lift proportionally greater loads, the whale able to hear for 
kilometres underwater), our specific evolutionary skill is found in the specificity of our 
brains, which allow us a greater level of thought, and means that we can conceive of 
technologies to make use of all these skills, externalising our bodies and creating 
prosthetic assemblages to our own advantage. Alternatively from another vantage point, 
one may consider that all of us are disabled in some way, due to the indeterminate nature 
of our bodies, so that technologies are required to improve our physical forms, making 
them more robust, less fallible, less prone to the illnesses and diseases that ail us, and to 
early death, to which we must all eventually succumb. Thus, for Cerqui, the difference 
between these two views, also leads to the difference in moral positioning over 
technologies of restoration versus enhancement (2002). Cerqui further notes that among 
the engineers involved in the research and development of transplant and implantation 
technologies, the latter view (which considers that humankind [sic] is in need of 
improvement) is the dominant one (2002). 
Cerqui concludes by considering whether there are limits to the plasticity and 
malleability of the human body, wondering if so called intelligent neural and mechanical 
implants will be able to internalise prostheses, so that we are no longer ‘externalising’ or 
extending ourselves outward, rather, our bodies might simply become housings for our 
endlessly networked and social minds. Throughout the duration of this dissertation, what 
has struck me constantly is precisely that the limitations of body plasticity are much 
more commonplace and mundane than this philosophical conception. The limits of the 
body are defined by the conditions in which individuals find themselves and the framing 
of the body. For example the ‘eyes’ of a blind individual (expanding upon Merleau-
Ponty’s original 1962 example) may be any or all of the following; a physical artificial 
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cosmetic eye, a sensory prosthesis attached to the tongue, the tip of a cane, the tip of 
one’s fingers, a ‘seeing-eye’ dog, a relative, a shopping assistant in a supermarket, 
benefits that pay for home help if required, the audible text function of a computer, 
speak-to-text telephone services, or any combination of these categories, or others. A 
distributed agency approach to individuals allows us to see how the limits of the body 
are also the limits of prosthetic citizenship. If we consider the individual as a central 
node in a flexible network of structuring prosthetic elements, perhaps this will become 
clearer, as, in the above example, some of these elements are more pivotal, depending on 
the desires of the individual for what kind of citizen they wish to be, the desires or limits 
of the state for creating particular kinds of citizen, and what practical options are 
available for consumption. The government for example may provide funds for a service 
dog, but the living conditions of the individual may prove a deterrent, the cosmetic eye 
may rub uncomfortably, the relatives may be unreliable, relationships between countries 
or markets may limit the flow of goods. Individuals are never bounded units, rather body  
plasticity may be considered to be a consequence of citizenship plasticity - as the ability 
to affect action, in much the same way that we have considered desires for normalcy in 
citizenship. 
A cyborg anthropology database exists as an open source on the internet, and in 
December 2011 I watched a young anthropologist named Amber Case via a link on the 
global video user generated file sharing site youtube. Case is a self proclaimed cyborg 
anthropologist, writing about our prosthetic culture. The clip that I watched was an 
introduction to cyborg and prosthetic anthropology, which as we enter an ever more 
technological age is becoming increasingly popular. The lecture that Case gave started 
with a photo of Aimee Mullins, double amputee darling of prosthetic culture studies97. 
Case opens her lecture by noting that prosthetics extend the capabilities of our bodies. 
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97 Mullins herself, perhaps tired of being deconstructed, re-constructed, decoded and 
demystified by a great variety of fields, feminists, fashionistas, filmmakers, disability scholars, 
media studies, prosthetics, sports scientists, you name it, has for better or worse become a 
symbol of the cyborg female, and embraced the enhancement of her body fully, via a series of 
TED talks available open source on the internet at 
www.ted.com/speakers/aimee_mullins.html
She cites Mullins’ legs first, then moves on to note how cell phones extend the 
capabilities of our hands (our ears as well if we are going to be picky), and how 
computers extend our personalities into cyberspace. 
Cyborg studies do not often take into account the production of social norms and the 
consequences of deviation from them, assuming instead that enhancement is always 
desirable. Also, cyborgs are, as mentioned previously, morally ambiguous, due to their 
location of the crux of relationships between technological values of rationality, clinical 
precision and enhancement, and human values of emotionality, sociality, and desires for 
‘normalcy’. 
Even though it has not been an explicit focus in my PhD, in understanding these desires 
for normalcy, I feel that an old, although still relevant source can be used to counter 
some of the hype surrounding cyborgs. I hope that Goffman’s (1959, 1963) theories of 
self presentation and social stigma shall help us to synthesise how it is that cyborgs, 
prosthetics, the Serbian context and the production of normalcy are entangled. 
Cutting through the techno-dazzle that surrounds cyborgs is important, as, in a self 
perpetuating industry, the choice to question the application of new technologies that are 
offered to us ‘for our own good’ becomes rapidly a choice about looking toward the 
future, or against it. Zoran, the young patient whose story I described on page 123, was 
regularly irritated at the insinuation by Bela clinic staff that he was ‘stupid’ to not trade 
his limb in for a newer model, which he argued, worked perfectly fine for him. 
The neutralisation of stigma and admission to what Goffman refers to as normal life, 
after all, plays an important implicit part in the production and usage of both physical 
and technological prostheses, and of prosthetic citizenships. This is something that 
Nikolina also makes references to when, during our discussion over what a prosthesis is 
able to achieve, she describes the prosthesis as compensation for the ‘negative image’ 
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that an able bodied person may have upon seeing an amputation for the first time98. Even 
while post (or trans) -human theorists are proclaiming the ways in which we can become 
enhanced or exceed the human condition, we seem to bypass the issue that the vast 
majority of these technologies are implemented to augment something that hinders us in 
some way. In much the same way that we have expanded on the term prosthesis, the 
ways in which not engaging with technology are disabling involves a renegotiation of 
our relationship with technology and time. 
Goffman’s first text on social stigma was published in 1959. While it has remained a 
seminal text within sociological and anthropological circles, it is his 1963 volume that 
we shall turn to. Goffman’s works have born the passage of time admirably, and even 
many of the criticisms that that have been levelled at him concern language semantics, 
his seeming naivety toward our current social norms (his understandings of gender, 
ethnicity, and sexual orientation, for example, appear all too dated). It is all to easy to 
forget that our currently held views were not developed until later in the twentieth 
century. In this sense we hold Goffman to an unrealisable standard. That is, to step out of 
his own time and cultural context. Nonetheless his work helps us to disentangle our 
cyborgs. 
Goffman breaks stigma into three forms: 
1. physical deformities, or departures from an acceptable societal body
2. deformations of personal character
3. ethnic, national or religious traits, which deviate from a prevailing majority
As our lives become ever more biomedicalised, and health becomes increasingly 
international in nature, these three forms become ever more self referential, so that 
deformations of character are seen as causative, instrumental in the creation of socially 
deviant physical bodies, with conditions such as obesity, heart disease and diabetes 
caused by poor diet, lack of exercise, or even worse, exacerbated by ‘traditional’ forms 
of health seeking (or non-seeking) behaviours. In return physical deformations are often 
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perceived as indicating a range of other deformations of character, amputation leading to 
depression for example. 
Goffman also breaks stigmatised relationships between individuals into three groups
1 The stigmatised  those who signify a particular deviancy
2 The Normals those who do not bear the sign 
3 The wise   those who are themselves in the normal category, but have a 
   special understanding of the conditions of the stigma born by a 
   particular group
He posits that, as stigma is evidenced in relationships between any individual and their 
social setting, at any given time each of us will belong simultaneously to all of these 
three groups, depending on the nature of the characteristic that we are observing 
stigmatising deviations from, and studies utilising and expanding upon his ideas 
continue to hold sway among academics today. 
Stigma can be found in my research in two main areas, first, among the kind of patients 
who are admitted to the Bela clinic, who are more likely to come from marginalised 
areas, or poorer, more rural areas of Serbia, and more likely to enter the health system in 
an advanced state of illness, having delayed seeking help until absolutely necessary. 
Their access to resources is poorer, they have less choice of prostheses, and for many, 
who are either retired and/or informal agricultural workers, working their land requires 
periods of hard physical labour, whereas the medical and administrative staff in the Bela 
clinic were largely middle class, urban and educated. Remembering Buchowski’s 
reframing of peasant heroes as peoples not suitable for modern societies99, and the 
dismissal of the urban elite as corrupted by city life, there exists the strong possibility of 
stigmatised relationships between the two. Workplaces themselves also create forms of 
uneven power, in internal relationships between physicians, prosthetists, therapists, 
social workers, psychologists and nurses, as well as between staff and patients.
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Secondly and perhaps more widely, Goffman’s stigmatising cultural traits are evidenced 
during the interactions of the various healthcare elements of Serbia itself, at moments 
when they are defined vis a vis enforced liberal democratic European health care 
reforms (Crnobrnja 2007), which consistently raise the benchmark for provision of 
health services, at the same time as they stipulate the tightening in of hospital budgets, 
the downsizing of clinic spaces and staff and the lowering of subsidies. The slow speed 
at which Serbia is progressing through these reforms is increasing seen as lack of 
infrastructure and willpower to enacts them, and stagnation has led to the provision of 
substandard equipment, as well as a general lack of education of healthcare personnel, 
lack of investment in ‘preventive’ areas of healthcare as health services, due to a lack of 
financial support. All this points to health in Serbia continuing to be skewed toward 
curative measures. Additionally, due to the conflicting nature of veze and the weakness 
of the implementation of state law, actions that reinforce health links within one 
network, have the strong potential to stigmatise individuals within the other.
Cyborgs themselves are abstract collaborations, ways of describing sets of power 
relationships that arise between humans and objects. It is in this sense that they are 
morally ambiguous. Additionally the uneven dispersal of technology, and the conditions 
under which augmentation through technology become desirable that both create and are 
a consequence of forms of stigma, regardless of whether we are accepting and 
embracing technology into our body schema, or experiencing the consequences of 
rejection or unavailability of it. 
That the prosthesis is compensation for a negative encounter with an unusual anatomy is 
also evidenced in the way that medical prostheses are often referred to as ‘fake’ or 
‘artificial’ limbs (or organs) in popular media. In so doing, prostheses are assigned a 
value, relative to the ‘real’ or ‘natural’ body parts they replace. I would argue that this 
also implies a level of trickery, or deception - the tacit understanding that the person is 
attempting to ‘pass’, as Goffman (1963) puts it, as a Normal. When it comes to passing, 
some forms of technology are more successful than others and thus more desirable, 
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although what passing might consist of under various circumstances muddies the water 
somewhat. Thus in my fieldwork, for an amputee, passing aesthetically might consist of 
a silicon skinned but technologically inferior leg, or the presence of a purely cosmetic 
arm, depending on whether a patient has need for movement, while passing athletically 
might mean the sacrificing of aesthetics for superior biomechanics, and passing as 
citizen with the capacity to labour and earn might mean the sacrifice of both aesthetics 
and biomechanics in the desire for a financially viable, robust and hardwearing solution. 
When my Serbian students, patients and friends told each other that Serbia was ‘not 
normal’ what they were at least in part doing was reminding each other that ‘taking for 
granted’ was not yet possible. Likewise, the period of learning to walk in the gait clinic 
was a period of ‘not yet normal’. This is not to say that it isn’t possible to be ‘normal’ 
without a prosthesis, simply that once the decision is made to use it, a period of 
adjustment and of hard work is required, before it can become transparent - it requires 
the acquisition of new skills, and this requires hard work. ‘Transitioning’ in Serbia now 
seems to me to be itself an extended period of alignment, where decisions about how to 
be in the world are being made, where desires for European membership are being 
weighed against desires for retaining territorial sovereignty, and more explicitly, it seems 
to me that this process has stalled, hijacked by the Crapanzano’s paralysed waiting 100, 
and fear of making the wrong, and thus irreversible, decision. This is in the end how 
states and bodies differ regarding sovereignty. 
As Kurzman notes with some irony, it is currently quite difficult to imagine a world 
where one’s own physical prostheses might rise up against their makers and wielders 
(2001). It is less difficult however to imagine a sociopolitical and economic transitioning 
that creates new categories of citizens, new markets, and new risks, at the same time as it 
alters both supply and demand of materials, ideas, and technologies located within a vast 
international network. There is also a demand exerted on citizens located in these new 
markets, to keep up, to consume, and as time speeds up in accordance with the rise of 
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new technology so those who fail to keep pace risk falling ‘out of time’, so much so that 
to be without access to technological structures - telephones, computers, television, 
public transport, a bank account, is increasingly to be seen as lacking the tools of 
modern life (itself a stigmatising condition)
The managing of stigma reveals how highly complicated and 
unsecured the continuous process of displaying our competencies as 
normals is. It is society which establishes the catalogue of normal and 
abnormal attributes and we apply these categories unconsciously. 
Bearing in mind that all members of society have stigmas of their 
own and that they all try to put on faultless performances before their 
audience, [stigma] can be seen a [sic] collective effort to sustain the 
image of normality (Misztal 2000: 6).
Bionic Beings 
Circling within prosthetics marketing, through cyborg studies and across a wide range of 
media is the idea that as people, we are becoming ever more ‘bionic’ in nature. What do 
we even mean though, when we talk about bionics, a term that brings to mind 1970s 
television programmes, such as ‘the six-million-dollar man’ or ‘the bionic woman’, 
fictional characters who gain superhuman powers through the implantation of 
electromechanical devices, not unlike the official Oxford English Dictionary definition 
of a cyborg cited at the beginning of this section. The term bionic is not nearly as new as 
we might think. Coined in 1958 by J.E. Steele, a medical doctor who worked at the 
Aeronautics Division House at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton Ohio 
(Lloyd 2008). Steele’s ‘bionic’ however pertained initially to the field of technical 
bionics, which is itself the study of how both humans and animals perform problem-
solving tasks, for the purposes of creating electronic or mechanical parts that imitate 
them. The most ubiquitous examples of bionics include products that many of us come 
into daily contact with - the hook and loop fastening system known most commonly as 
Velcro, ‘cats-eye’ road reflectors (on the centrelines of our roads), and Goretex® 
waterproof breathable fabric. Other forms of bionic research include studying and 
mapping the organisational behaviours of groups of animals - swarming, flocking or 
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foraging for example, and the creation of mathematical data based on these observations, 
for the purposes of computational mimicry and analysis. 
Much like the term cyborg, ‘bionic’ was quickly picked up by the science fiction 
community in the 1970s, where it obtained its more common meaning. Bionics as the 
enhancement of the fallible human body with superior technological parts has come full 
circle, and this sci-fi definition is now used within the pervading western (allopathic) 
medical system, where it refers much more closely to the replacement or enhancement 
of organs by devices designed to closely mimic their biological forerunners. Within the 
prosthetics industry bionic limbs are therefore those containing (powered) electronic 
parts designed to replicate closely the movements and functions of lost joints, this 
narrow descriptor existing to differentiate them from mechanical prostheses. This is why 
Össur can claim that the Cheetah® isn’t ‘bionic’ - it neither looks to nor replicates the 
lost ankle of the amputee. I would argue however that it is however a startlingly good 
example of technical bionics - where studying the technical specifics of the tendon 
structure of a wholly different species for the purposes of task solving has created a 
specific and specialised commercial product for human consumption. 
The media interest in bionic people, be they science fiction, or real people ascribed 
bionic status - such as Pistorius - does not arise in isolation. It has grown in the public 
imagination together with a series of changes in the way we imagine bodies, health, 
disability, normalcy and our relationships to them. Many of us are familiar with the term 
‘medicalisation’, defined as the means by which increasingly more broad areas of 
individual and social life are construed as falling under a medical jurisdiction. The 
medicalisation of these many aspects of life is considered by a great number of academic 
researchers to be one of the most pervasive and potent social transformations of the 
allopathic (western biomedical) twentieth century world. From birth (itself now a 
medical event, monitored and institutionalised to the point that for many, ‘home birth’ 
seems to be a radical medical choice), we are increasingly classified - whether by 
weight, gender, height, IQ, attractiveness - within a socially acceptable range of healthy 
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norms, so that to exist outside of them suggests that we have a condition in need of 
repair or restitution. 
This transformation, whilst taking place within the geopolitical spheres of what many 
scholars define as the West - or ‘developed’ world, USA and Western European nations, 
nonetheless has bearing on all consumer markets, many of which become medicalised in 
the process of consumption. 
Serbia is by no means immune to this process, despite its geographic and political 
location on the periphery of the European Union. Whilst part of Yugoslavia, health care 
was free to many citizens at the lower end of the economic spectrum, and whilst 
practices may have been substandard, the choice of treatments poor, the fact remains that 
many people who otherwise would not have been able to afford health care were able to 
(Kunitz 2004). Kunitz, examining the health consequences of the break up of Yugoslav, 
cites the following remarks by the then minister of health in Croatia in 1994.
Health services had no fixed prices and were available to everybody, 
without any financial control. The system was separated from other 
financial systems, especially from financial inspections. Health care 
was a gift of communism to the people. It was forbidden to ask about 
its cost, although it was obvious that a very high price would have to 
be paid for it someday (Kunitz 2004: 1902).
In the wake of the conflict of the 1990s, the stagnation of the economy and international 
sanctioning left the Serbian health care system devastated. Building it up again not only 
required physically restoring buildings, investing in infrastructure and educating staff, 
but also, with a change in political orientation, required the transitioning of medical 
system by way of a series of reforms, that guarantee a basic level of health care, but with 
varying levels of co-payment. A four year National Health Account (NHA) survey was 
undertaken in Serbia from 2004 through to 2008, with the intention of producing 
analytical health care records for the first time, as such data were missing in 
governmental records (as I discovered myself on a very disappointing trip to the 
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department of demographics and statistics early on in my research) though little 
information about disability was available through it. The NHA does reveal however that 
funding is still skewed massively toward curative care, and that spending on 
pharmaceuticals has increased markedly (Gajic-Stevanovic et al. 2009). 
Globally, the changing nature of the European/North American health care system places 
a premium on preventive self care. As Hjelm et al. (2005) suggest however, and as I 
experienced, health seeking behaviours in Serbia are influenced by a belief that health is 
not merely the absence of sickness or disease, but that it is evidenced when one’s body is 
strong and can carry one through life, allowing one to work and to socialise, to eat all the 
foods that one enjoys, and to drink. This rubs shoulders uncomfortably with preventive 
self-care, because in this process sickness becomes equated with badness, gaining a 
moral capacity. Smoking, excessive drinking, and overeating have all largely become 
symbolic of a moral decrepitude. However, if patients believe that it is when they are at 
their most healthy that they can partake in all the pleasures that life affords, then 
biomedically speaking this is a state which is always precarious and under attack, due to 
patients’ differing understandings of risk and health. 
As I have just mentioned, over and above these well researched areas of medicalisation, 
our lives have also become increasingly dominated by discourses of risk and health, in 
what Clarke et al. (2003) call ‘biomedicalisation’, referring to major, largely techno-
scientific changes in the way biomedicine is conceived and the technologies falling 
under its rubric. Innovations in the fields of nanotechnology, molecular biology, 
biotechnology, transplant medicine, appear to redefine what health, normalcy, and 
morality mean. These changes, which take place for the most part in the laboratories and 
medical clinics of wealthy countries with money to spend on research and development 
nonetheless influence medical ethics, media coverage, advertising, and thus become 
evidenced in Serbia, in poster advertisements, and pamphlets given out by sales reps for 
international companies. The standard of body enhancement is therefore laid out in front 
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of patients and their physicians, even as they consume (relatively) inferior quality 
products. 
Many of the ways that we encounter products deemed ‘bionic’ in nature, involve 
impairment, breakdown and/or dysfunction of the physical human body. Joint 
replacements, artificial heart valves, cochlear ear implants, all involve technologies 
designed to mimic the human body closely, replacing the biological with the 
technological. The ways in which we conceive of prosthetising the body through 
technology have become increasingly complex, from neural and sensory implants that 
work by recognising the plasticity in brain functioning, to technologies allowing us to 
manipulate objects with our minds. Anthropologists working among these engineers 
(most notably Cerqui 2002), note a discourse of post humanism is propagated among 
researchers, some of whom view the body as an impediment to the circulation of 
information. 
Cerqui also notes that technology, as I previously outlined, is really about the speeding 
up of time. For some of Cerqui’s informants, the body itself is already the imperfect 
prosthesis that the mind must operate within, and in a society governed by the 
circulation of information, the ideal and perfect ‘body’ would be a freely existing brain, 
directly connected to the internet, able to upload and download and search for 
information at will (ibid).
In 1993, Latour’s volume, ‘We Have Never Been Modern’ was published in English, and 
within its pages, he picked apart the notion that somehow we ‘as moderns’ have 
overcome the natural world. He sought to collapse the boundaries between social 
(technological) and natural worlds by arguing that the distinctions between them are 
created in discourse, rather than lived realities. For Latour, we are all hybrids, but unlike 
Haraway’s cyborgs, our hybridism is not created by the special circumstances of a 
technological revolution, instead it has always been a feature of human life, which 
Latour conceives of as an interaction of people, things, and ideas. 
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Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show that the very idea of creating and of 
using prosthetic devices is caught up in both historical ideas of personhood and 
individual experience. The ways in which we achieve legal, social and political status as 
people, and how we experience this status have been increasingly challenged in 
relatively by a variety of well known scholars (see for example Douglas and Ney 1998) 
who have argued against the construction of the ‘self’ as a singular autonomous 
individual, referring to non-western settings where humans acquire status as people 
through processes of becoming socialised into a group. While it may appear that I have 
so far avoided the topic of personhood, this is not due its unimportance as a theme, but 
rather, due to its relationship with cyborgs - there is after all, a time and a place for 
everything. 
Personhood, for many a recent philosopher of science, is challenged through the creation 
of the cyborg, a theoretical position whereby the principles of personhood are extended 
beyond the realm of the fleshy human self, through machinery and/or technology 
(Haraway 1985, 1997, 2001, Winance 2006), Studies within this field often ask the 
question as to what the limits of this relationship are. That is to say, how much of a 
person can be modified, before we lose our status as a person, or even as a human. What 
is it that defines us as people? If our brains could be exchanged out with artificial parts 
where would we be located? In this world of extended possibilities the body is sexed-up 
and sped up, this exceeding of the limits of the body considered desirable. 
Seeing as prostheses necessarily bring together humans and technology in ways that are 
remarkably intimate, it could, with reasonable ease, be argued that to speak of 
technological prostheses, it is necessarily to invoke the image of the cyborg, I would like 
to argue instead that prostheses (both physically and conceptually) show us how 
personhood is historically and continually dispersed over a number of agents, and that 
what constitutes an individual citizen is really the multifold practical negotiation of 
networks created of Latour’s trifocal relationships of people, things and ideas (1987, 
1988, 1993). The externalising of the limits of the body into objects is no indication of 
220
modern medicalisation, as when we examine the genealogy of prosthetic transfers, these 
afford us all manner of historical augmentations of the self, from passports: which 
augment citizens into state documents, and, when such citizens cross boundaries, 
augment the fleshy borders of the state, even if temporarily. The origins of prosthesis 
suggest multiple and complex understandings of the term: even that language itself can 
be construed as prosthetic, augmenting the body via the spoken and/or printed word; that 
the biological body itself is already simply the one of many prosthetic expansions of our 
minds, a view point that may yet become more prevalent amid increasing research into 
mind controlled prostheses. 
Cyborgian interest around hybrids can only make sense if one believes that society and 
nature, or politics and science (Latour 1993) were at some pre-modern stage (previous to 
the ‘modern’ world that we inhabit) separate and concrete objects; and furthermore, that 
their post-modern blending is a product of our triumph over these falsely discrete 
entities. The blurring of boundaries, or their rendering as permeable membranes 
nonetheless still assumes their historical existence. Latour simply asks that instead of 
imagining some new permeability between these categories - some of which we hold as 
natural, and some as cultural, we simply accept that they are all equally constructed in 
our imagination as defined ‘quasi-objects’ (1993). 
If we consider the qualities of prostheses, both literary and physical, it becomes clear 
why they seem to emerge as sites of production for metaphor and allegory, indeed 
prostheses are ripe with paradoxes and hybridity; they ease communication, they 
support, they augment but do not alter meaning, they mimic, replace, conceal, add to, 
they imagine a whole through the replication of parts, increase efficiency, they unsettle, 
intrigue, and reveal the porosity of our fleshy selves. Located in the near future, the 
marketing of prospective physical prostheses reveal aspects of consumerism, socialist 
principles, late capitalist associations and neoliberal moral ethics. Prosthetic 
augmentations and replacements both play on our dreams to supplant and surpass the 
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body, and when experienced in the presence of phantom limbs make clear the 
discrepancy between the body held in one’s mind, and the mind held within the body. 
It is precisely due to these potentialities that they inspire so much ambivalence. The 
reality of the uneasy marriage of flesh to machine has much more to do with 
compromise and the approximation of normal, than it does with the creation of 
extraordinary abilities. Where extraordinary capabilities are involved, they are far more 
likely to be the tolerance of pain, or social exclusion, the overcoming of social stigmas 
to acquire ‘normal’ characteristics. That these compromises and networks of ineffective 
and affective actions, people, things, and ideas affect us all as citizens is something that 
we are much less likely to think explicitly, unless the prosthetic networks in which we 
operate are themselves compromised or even broken. Even then, the fact that we are 
constantly in the process of externalising ourselves often escapes us. Instead these 
elements are simply considered to be the background noise of normal lives. 
A belief in situational normality helps an individual to form a 
trusting intention during interactions with other parties, to be ‘able 
to take for granted, to take under trust, a vast array features of social 
order’ (Garfinkel 1967: 173). 
Although it is difficult to argue against Haraway in defining cyborg relationships to all 
human-tool interactions, I would like to present an addendum to her statement that we 
are all cyborgs. Certainly we are, though not for the reasons that ‘cyborg anthropology’ 
would have us believe. Rather we are cyborgs because of our embedding in a global 
network of exchange, of flows of capital and ideas. We are cyborgs simply because we 
are people, because of the externalising of the limits of the self into the prosthetic 
structures orbiting us, without which we would not constitute legitimate people, but 
despite increasingly complex networks that we create, I do not believe that we are 
cyborgs due to a new and special relationship to technology. The networks that we 
create, and that create us in return are for the most part historically defined, they are the 
mundane and bureaucratic processes of daily life, clothes that we wear, food that we eat, 
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the elements making up transport systems, flows of capital into and out of our 
possession, the stability and predictability of the everyday, which is always, by its very 
nature, robust and precarious.
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TOWARDS A CONCLUSION: PROSTHETIC CITIZENSHIP AS 
ONTOLOGY
We are our bodies - but in that very basic notion, one also discovers 
that our bodies have an amazing plasticity and polymorphism that is 
often bought out precisely in our relations with technologies. 




Making Sense of Material Life
During the 5 years that I have been researching prostheses, there seems to have been 
even less interest in them as physical objects from the field of social science, even as 
technological innovations seem to attract increasing media coverage and researchers 
such as Henare (2005) call out for an epistemology of things. What research does come 
through now is geared toward virtual reality, to social media, and to the pressing of 
ourselves into cyberspace, such as Cleland’s 2010 article on visual first person avatars, 
entitled Prosthetic Bodies and Virtual Cyborgs, or Cerqui’s (2002) pondering about the 
fate of humankind, in an age where digital communication hopes to link minds, rather 
than people. 
The potential to expand ourselves, according to these thought provoking articles, is 
limited only by our finances. How easy it is, to simply buy our way into overcoming our 
messy bodies, our mortal selves. Or is it? Examining the histories of pragmatic and 
hardworking prostheses (expensive or otherwise) makes it immediately apparent that 
hard, physically and/or emotionally painful work is involved in their production and 
usage, and that this will always be a factor that must be accounted for, for technology 
applied to the body, as Wills (1995) notes, is a double edged sword, and it always has the 
capacity to wound. Prostheses provide people with a means to ‘pass’ within the spectrum 
of normal deviation from an ability that they are in some way disabled by. ‘Devices, 
mainstreaming and overcompensation techniques all provide means for people with 
disabilities to “fit in’’ or to “de-emphasise’’ their differences’ (Snyder and Mitchell 2000: 
3), however as technological interventions become ‘normal’ it becomes increasingly 
apparent that we also experience a disablement when we choose to live without them.
Prostheses lead on to further technological intervention, in that their consumption 
inevitably leads to further consumption of goods and services. The external limits of the 
self are increasingly dictated by elements outside of one’s own control, by patents, and 
import / export laws, by sanctioning and healthcare funding. The wounding capacity of 
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technology is also evidenced in technological replacements that are on the whole 
irreversible, not in the sense that they cannot be removed, but in that what was biological 
and removed from the body cannot be replaced with something equal to what was lost. 
The replacement limb is approximation of normal, an aid to ‘ease communication’. A 
prosthetic limb may be just as ‘real’ as a biological one, but its addition to the body 
produces a wholly different power trajectory.
New technologies and the people who write about them, are always pulling our 
imagination through to the realms of what is possible. Sometimes these technologies are 
incorporated into our lives, however most of the time they remain separate from us, 
located in the future/present, restricted to clinical spaces, military research laboratories, 
or the imaginations of their inventors. In this sense, ‘cyborg anthropologists’ are 
themselves writers of science fiction, because despite much debate over how we will 
live lives in the future, when the replication of human life in cyberspace meets the 
reality of messy human entanglements in geopolitical spaces, the question becomes, 
what is science fact? 
While introducing this dissertation, I wrote that like Jain (1999) I would not be making a 
claim for a specific prosthetic identity, as identity concerns are simply incomprehensible 
through the study of prosthetic augmentations. I stand by this, and still feel that it is akin 
to saying that identity is unable to be grasped by the study of citizenship. This is also the 
reason many issues related to what might be called a phenomenology of prosthetic 
personhood have also remained unexplored in this thesis. 
That said, there are definitely themes that have emerged, which, in a future period where 
I am less ethnographically bounded, arise as points for additional contemplation. These 
broader questions of being arise from the theories of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, on 
the nature not only of being ‘bodies in technologies’, but of being prosthetically 
constructed people, located in geopolitical and technological landscapes. Csordas (1990, 
1994) might well have claimed that the body was the existential ground of culture, but as 
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my citing of Ihde (2002) at the preface to this section reminds us, what we consider to be 
‘the body’ is itself up for constant (re)negotiation, and prostheses themselves only 
muddy the waters of where exactly one’s physical (and increasingly cognitive) limits 
even lie. Phenomenology applied to embodiment and prosthetic limbs is therefore 
difficult territory, though no less than when it is applied to ethnography. Especially when 
the two are combined, how does one go about expanding individual experiences into a 
text capable of insightful knowledge. Everyone experiences their bodies differently of 
course, and, to use Heidegger’s famous epitaph, there are no guarantees that my 
experience of ‘redness’ is the same as yours. However, the study of prosthetics has 
broadened my understanding of text, and of experience, and of the co-mingling of the 
two. 
The writing of prosthesis, [...] is inevitably caught in a complex play of 
displacements: prosthesis being about nothing if not placement, 
displacement, replacement, standing, dislodging, substituting, setting, 
amputating, supplementing (Wills 1995: 9).
Even as researchers involved in social studies of medicine have remarked on the need 
for ‘case studies of that attend to the heterogeneities of biomedicalisation practices and 
effects in different lived situations’ (Clarke et al. 2003: 185), ideas surrounding the 
provision, production and consumption of biomedically informed products continue to 
be skewed toward a neo-liberally informed European and North American capitalist 
market. 
Recently I discussed my research with a prosthetist (who was, in a continuing nod to the 
origins of the discipline, also an amputee) based in Central California. ‘How could the 
amputees you worked with stand not having mechanised knees? Not having myo-electric 
arms?’ He wanted to know. ‘How could they stand not having a full range of motion? 
Their independence to do as they pleased?’ It is perhaps telling that this exchange took 
place within a SCUBA dive vessel that I was working on, and that the prosthetist was 
himself a diver who could, he told me, simply upgrade components in his ‘sports’ leg as 
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they rusted up in the salt water. He was aware that this afforded him a certain advantage 
compared to other amputees, who he noted, would have had to pay for appointments 
through a complicated entanglement with their American health insurance company, as 
well as with one of the few insurance companies specialising in diving insurance, and 
doubtless another one to insure their personal ‘property’ (the prosthetic leg itself). Many 
he noted, would have ended up paying for components themselves, or even a dedicated 
swimming leg, a feat that would have doubtless required substantially deep pockets. 
Much like Todorova’s oppositional identities in the Balkans (1994), prostheses are also 
in many ways defined by what they are not quite able to do, neither fully abling, nor 
disabling, neither fully enhancing, nor restoring what was lost. They utilise the 
principles of bionics (in its original sense of transformative mimicry) but, in the quest to 
replicate the body, and the possibilities that ‘normal’ life offers, they instead create a 
wholly different way of being in the world, whilst at the same time maintaining a sense 
of social normalcy: the creation of order. Prostheses also speak to our desire for affective 
action, a way of locating hope in movement. These are lofty goals indeed, and so as we 
move toward these bigger themes, I find it prudent to summarise the breadth of this 
dissertation so far.
I began by investigating both the origins of physical prostheses, and of the term itself, 
finding in the process that ‘prosthesis’ began life as a linguistic term, for easing 
communication, which perhaps helps to account for some of the paradoxical qualities of 
physical prostheses, as the transfer of linguistic devices into lived experience is just as 
fraught as the ethnographic effort of translating experience into text. The terms 
‘prosthetic’ and ‘prosthesis’ were shown to have perceptible differences in etymology, 
the former denoting a relational positioning, and the latter referring to the structure being 
added. 
Physical prostheses were shown to have historical origins that are strongly connected to 
the military, and remain so, in an explicit example of Jain’s (1999) statement that 
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prostheses in fact supply the very deficiency to which they offer the solution. The 
history of prosthesis manufacturing and rehabilitation in Serbia was explained, and 
shown to also have strong links with the military; from the inception of the Bela clinic, 
where I was located, to the ‘triaging’ of a distribution of care among patients, based on 
the perceptions that staff held as to their potential for quality of life. This connection has 
been maintained, despite the provision of a specialised military welfare system for 
veterans to which I was denied access, as hospitals shared surgical staff, and thus 
patients in the civilian welfare system benefited from the better pay salaries of military 
surgeons. 
The fieldwork that this dissertation was formed upon was originally conceived to ask 
questions about memory, violence, in the presence of politicised bodies, and during the 
absence of speech. However, fieldwork, as is often the case in anthropology, led me in a 
slightly different direction, instead pointing me toward the ways in which normalcy and 
citizenship are constructed through increasingly global networks of people, things and 
concepts. This altering of focus is perhaps both the strength and the weakness of this 
PhD, and the time to ask the ‘what if’s’, of fieldwork that plague us all upon our return 
from research, for as many people during my return from the field have asked me, ‘why 
Serbia?’ ‘Why prostheses?’, and, more explicitly, ‘why prostheses IN Serbia?’. In many 
ways my fieldwork proved far richer than I could have anticipated, and despite not being 
able to access army veterans, the staff and patients at the Bela clinic welcomed my 
presence, as did Janko’s family and neighbours, my students and colleges proved to be a 
valuable source of information about ‘normal’ life, invested as they were in overcoming 
the limitations of travel and economy. In many ways the lives of my students at the 
private university were very different to those of the patients at the clinic, however, the 
discussions both groups generated about ‘normalcy’ and citizens, were strikingly similar. 
This allowed me to question the very fundamentals of normalcy. So, why prostheses and 
Serbia? To begin with the twinning of these themes allows something that is more than 
the sum of its parts to emerge. 
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In 2007, one of my initial goals was that:
At a micro level I seek to understand the construction of lives through the 
construction of limbs. I hope to trace the production of prosthetics [sic] 
from their creation in Novi Sad to their end usage on bodies of citizens, 
thereby exploring the interface of flesh and machine. Through 
ethnographic fieldwork, and collaboration with bio-mechanists, 
prosthetics makers, and the recipients of limbs and other prosthetic 
devices, it will be possible to see theories of health-as-nation building 
reproduced in small, through the human body, and embedded in networks 
of meaning (Milosavljevic 2007: 36).
In the end, the physical construction of bodies can been seen in this dissertation, serving 
as the catalyst for a realisation that beliefs about the moral attributes and capacities of 
individuals are really based on the fallacy of a singular and autonomous body that each 
of us inhabit. Instead what emerges through this work is that the edges of what we term 
an individual can be questioned, and may be dispersed through bureaucratic paperwork, 
technological structures, or even through the presence of other bodies. Individual 
citizens are created through the manoeuvring of these links. The individual that each of 
us is, at any particular moment, is the amalgamation of multiple people, objects, and 
ideas, into a grouping that allows each of us to create effective action. Whether this 
action is for or against the state is not really the point. The larger issue is simply that we 
are capable of producing meaning through action. Furthermore, this current grouping 
will doubtless require compromise on behalf of each of us, as choices to be a particular 
kind of person close down options to be another. Renegotiations of these grouping are 
possible however, and relatively frequent, as we choose, then temporarily fix our 
networks during periods of ‘trying on’ relationships to new structures (Winance 2006). 
These renegotiations can be, and often are, strange and somewhat illogical, something 
that, like Zivkovic I often found to be the case in Serbia
What my research in Milosevic’s and Post-Milosevic Serbia drove 
home for me is that the ability to simultaneously hold incompatible 
views is a normal human situation. It is only a special training in, and 
sustained focus on, coherence such as we academics undergo that 
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makes incoherence induce symptoms of motion sickness (Zivkovic 
2007: 619).
Serbia, and in particular the autonomous and ethnically diverse province of Vojvodina, 
yields a complexity of sentiments related to war, national identity, citizenship and the 
eventual positioning of the region within the ever-expanding European Union, much like 
many of the countries located on its ‘immediate’ outside. In Serbia, strong networks of 
personal friendships, familial ties and veze bisect these views, requiring both moral and 
practical negotiations that either strengthen or erode structures of state functioning 
(sometimes both simultaneously). While my fieldwork is perhaps given to more extreme 
examples, conducive with Serbia’s recent history, I maintain that the prosthetic 
structures that we all use to augment and externalise our bodies are never guaranteed 
and are always nodes in precarious networks, able to be broken and remade, either by 
ourselves, or by the collapse of external elements. 
This leads me to another of the original goals for this research, one that has had to play a 
decidedly lesser role, as I have changed focus. In 2007, one of my intents was to explore 
the positioning of Serbia as one of the ‘new neighbour’ countries (on the margins of the 
EU both politically and geographically). I wished to examine the implications for health 
policy of the eventual merging into the EU and ask how health provisioning was being 
re-conceptualised as state building. I also wanted to show how the constant interference 
of the EU was legitimated by both historical constructions of a Balkan character, and by 
an emerging global political citizenship (Milosavljevic 2007).
Health reforms have however been slowly moving forward in Serbia, away from what 
Kunitz generally describes as a ‘communist’ model of healthcare, characterised by 
terrible efficiency, and lack of innovation, yet paradoxically popular, due to the 
provision of services to all members of society free of charge. One of the surprising 
revelations of my fieldwork was the existence of the ‘American’ model at the Bela 
clinic. The implanting of a midcentury American psychosocial model of amputee 
rehabilitation at a specialised inpatient prosthetics clinic that was essentially a large 
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enough clinic to serve Tito’s Yugoslavia, was an unexpected example of how aspects of 
hybridism in medical discourse that many consider to be indicative of new global 
international health-scapes, are in many ways simply increases in flows of goods and 
information along networks that already existed. I hope that I have shown that as 
technology first and foremost facilitates the speeding up of time, these increases are 
themselves not unexpected. If nothing else, the history of prostheses shows us explicitly 
how people are created within competing tropes of aesthetics, labouring capacity, and 
mobility. Thankfully, they do much more than this. 
Researching in the Bela clinic allowed me to witness the strength of will and the breadth 
of resources required to attach a physical prosthesis to a person, and to wield a prosthetic 
limb with skill. I also observed the discrepancy between the types of future that the 
marketing of prostheses promises, and the actuality of life ‘on the ground’, learning in 
the process that technological advantage is not necessarily the most important aspect of 
prosthetic rehabilitation, which is instead contingent on one’s ability to make use of 
those resources (prosthetic, orthopaedic, financial, bureaucratic or otherwise), that can 
best provide the possibility for social normalcy and affective moral agency - two aspects 
of citizenship that I have also shown cannot be taken for granted within the Serbian 
context. 
Serbia is shown to be a site of hybridity, an oppositional space, located neither fully in 
the West, nor in the East, plagued by ‘phantom’ populations, created by the distribution 
of ethnic diaspora populations over historically mobile boarders. Post-socialist 
transformations of ideal populations are shown; from the re-imagination of the peoples’ 
hero peasantry into backward country bumpkins, to reworking of corrupted city dwellers 
into pro European business players. Serbia is additionally shown to exist in what I call 
the ‘twilight zone’, a period of ‘not-quite-there yet’. I maintain that for many Serbians 
this extended period of waiting is preferable to the alternative, as it allows a multitude of 
futures to be imagined, and the past to remain vague and relatively unacknowledged. It 
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is also a feature of the lack of ‘normalcy’ in Serbia, generated by, and in part causative 
of the quickly changing political landscape. 
In the third chapter of this first section, I began to unravel questions of normalcy, and of 
prosthetic citizenship itself, in the process asking how it is that people negotiate daily 
life from within the ‘twilight zone‘. I investigated how normalcy is construed as having 
both historical and comparative elements that become strained by citizens’ reliance on 
differing strategies for creating moral action. These actions are also prosthetic in that 
they supply their own need, as they continually support and undermine alternate 
networks of veze and of state governing. 
Citizenship in the Balkans is investigated, and I find that in Serbia, the close ties of 
legitimate citizenship to ideas surrounding ‘the red passport’ are both evidence of 
citizenship as the possibility to interact physically with the world outside the borders of 
Serbia, the fate of undetermined and over hybridised territories is the closing down of 
these channels of movement, as well as the closing down of bureaucratic channels of 
welfare. These over-hybridised populations are then shown to utilise prosthetic 
structures to bring themselves in line with a particular type of citizen, so that they can 
access the resources afforded to that group. The concept of a ‘normal’ citizen is shown to 
be based upon an abstraction, around which is an acceptable degree of variation 
historically linked to the need for nations to delineate and define classes of citizens, and 
tied to the desire to augment deficiencies and bring oneself into a tolerable range of 
difference. In Serbia I show that veze itself is a kind of prosthetic augmentation and 
investigate previous uses of prosthetic identity in anthropological texts before moving to 
the final and penultimate section.
In the second section I discuss the production of hope, linking it through prosthetic 
rehabilitation to the capacity to create forms of action that allow for ‘normal’ moral 
agency. These hopes are created and cemented through motion, or to be more precise, by 
the creation of forms of movement that fall within a tolerable standard deviation of 
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normal. Normal and legitimate forms of movement across borders are also pointed to as 
signifiers of appropriate citizenship in Serbia. The ‘work’ of hoping is shown to be 
located in the present, rather than geared toward the future, in expressions of action. 
Hope and rehabilitation are shown to be tightly bound together, requiring different 
performances at various stages in the alignment process. The rehabilitation of patients 
together with their families shows that the reconstitution of the different aspects of an 
individual person into a citizen is most often achieved through making use of additional 
family members, resulting in the propping up of the singular body with both technology 
and with additional bodies. The roles of therapists, doctors and prosthetists are 
discussed, especially where they facilitate the exchange of language for experience or 
vice versa.
Different types of prosthesis create different kinds of citizens, and this dialogue is found 
to be ongoing and ambivalent, where specific actions become possible while others fade. 
Likewise, the ways in which prostheses embody both hope found, and hope lost are 
examined. I conclude this part of the dissertation by maintaining that we are all in some 
ways abled and disabled by science, in mutable networks that constitute our bodies. 
Prosthetising hereby emerges as a transformative act.
I go on to describe how patients use veze connections to lay claim to specific 
transformative identities, when such options are not available or not considered to be 
appropriate, and introduce the principles of Actor Network Theory as a way of 
anchoring the differences between potential and lived realities. Prostheses emerge as 
sites of ‘potential’ agency, as they are a catalyst for action. Their relationship to phantom 
limbs is also explored, as is the production of risk, applied to amputation and to body 
contingency. The differing ways that bodies are read as passive or active, as disabled or 
desirable are investigated next, as is the curious way that prostheses aim to present a 
whole, based on the sum of exchangeable parts. Amputation is also shown to disrupt 
social relationships, and the period of alignment that comes during rehabilitation is as 
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much about reorganising a place in the world as it is about restoring the physical and 
gendered body. The networks involved in the creation of a prosthetic post amputation 
individual in Serbia are laid bare, and the many functions of the prosthesis itself, aside 
from its explicit point as a limb replacement are presented, as is the curious relationship 
between prostheses and phantom limbs. 
Taking my ethnographic experience and the bulk of the literature collected, I offer a 
critique of cyborgs, detailing how it is that terms now ubiquitous within the discipline of 
anthropology have actually evolved, and addressing how due to their very nature they 
have a disconnect with the mundane realities of daily life, which I see as being 
fundamental to the principles of anthropological theory. I make the claim that while we 
are all bodies in technologies, these are not necessarily the same forces that make us 
cyborgs. I conclude that the limits to the plasticity and malleability of the body are much 
more practical than studies of cyborgs would have us believe, based on networks that cut 
across a diverse flow of ideas, trade and exchange, politics, and people. Amputation in 
Serbia is shown to have stigmatising effects, as is the positioning of Serbia in the 
international health system. 
Finally I find that cyborgs are really themselves abstractions, ways of describing the 
uneven dispersal of technology into populations. As with hybridity, they are neither one 
thing nor the other, and the mixing of two tropes creates a moral ambiguity that raises 
tensions. I argue that we are always hybrids, and that talk of blurring boundaries 
assumes that at one point these were more solid. I do not believe that we have a new 
relationship to technology, rather that relationships to new technologies are always in the 
process of becoming normal, and that the propping up of the body into this category is 
an ongoing and continuously renegotiated process.
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The Situation is Always Becoming Normal
All technologies and forms of knowledge that make the transition from experimental 
clinic to community, are at first new and unknown, be they electrical lights, telephones, 
or digital televisions. Yet, at some stage, those that a majority of people find to be 
appropriate and useful, become part of the meshwork in which we live, no longer 
startling or strange, but rather familiar and mundane, regardless of whether we embrace, 
avoid, or approach them with ambivalence. Let us not forget that even anaesthetic was 
once the subject of much scepticism, as were germs, the fact that Pluto is not a planet, 
even the very concept that the earth rotates around the sun. As I write this chapter, 
scientists, lodged underground in their warrens at CERN have ‘found’ the Higgs Boson 
particle, but there was once a time when the mere existence of gravity itself was up for 
debate. 
Cerqui’s (2002) transplantation engineers consider that every human biological function 
is a physical process, even the workings of the mind. For them, every aspect of the body 
is therefore knowable.
Thus, even if we still do not know exactly how the brain works, we 
will certainly know one day. And we will then be able to construct 
an imitation/simulation of the brain. Every new scientific discovery 
brings with it new scientific questions101 (Cerqui 2002: 102).
Knowledge is power, the power to imitate, and to simulate. It is interesting also that 
these scientists use the brain as their example. As people are deeply enmeshed in their 
surroundings, they tend to use forms of knowledge familiar to them to describe 
themselves, thus it is that throughout the history of western biomedicine, the body was 
once a sacred site: containing the cosmology of the universe. Later it became mechanical 
in addition; as pumps, plumbing, levers and springs became common fixtures of public 
imagination, so did our descriptions of muscles, organs and the movement of liquids in 
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101 My emphasis.
the body. One of the many auxiliary organs that Freud described in 1930 was the motor 
engine. Still later electronics were ‘added’, in descriptions of the nervous system. Emily 
Martin (1990, 1992) has additionally shown how the public imagination of immunology 
imagines a territory under attack from external forces, in need of protection from the 
body’s ‘army’. Currently with the rise of information technology, the body is 
increasingly cybernetic in nature, where our mind functions are perceived of computers, 
with memory banks. 
Surprisingly, our physical bodies have not ‘evolved’ during these many descriptions. Nor 
have old descriptions of the body all been surpassed. Our hearts are still pumps, the 
condition epilepsy is often referred to as faulty electrical wiring. While we may live 
longer than our ancestors, given advances in diet and medicine, we are biologically the 
same. It is only our changing relationship to technology that changes how we see 
ourselves. In this respect, our great, great-grandparents were just as cybernetic as we are, 
and we are in turn just as historically constituted by our current forms of knowledge. 
A colleague once suggested to me that we were all in the process of becoming more 
disembodied, and that the aspects of ourselves that define us as legitimate people now 
exist wholly outside of the body. This colleague cited credit cards, tax identification 
numbers, and the acquisition of debt. Here too is historical precedence however, and as 
research in the Balkans has taught me, controlling the mobility of populations, and the 
movement of borders has always required legitimate external forms of identification, 
whether they be letters of introduction, birth certificates, passports or church records 
(Scott 1998). Hybridity emerges as a site of contention when there is either not enough 
evidence to support citizenship, or too much, supporting multiple citizenships (Green 
2007). It is both a cause and a consequence of ambiguity, which causes anxiety about 
what the ‘true’ nature of an individual is. Merleau-Ponty wrote in 1945 that it was not 
possible to be a human without hands or sexual organs any more than without thought. 
Perhaps what prosthetising the body - and understanding an actor defined network of 
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distributed agency does, is to allow us to expand our ideas of what hands, organs, or 
indeed thought are. 
I would like to suggest then, that we have always been in the process of externalising 
ourselves, but that this embodies rather than disembodies citizenship. Posthumanism and 
disembodiment after all, only makes sense if we work on the assumption that the 
historical limits of an individual consist of one physical body located in one particular 
location. 
Prosthetic citizenship therefore allows us a way of understanding the distribution of the 
self in multiple relationships and locations. While this is explicit in the case of physical 
prostheses, it is also implicitly the case in all forms of technology that we interact with. 
Each time we make choices (or have them made for us) about whether to adapt to new 
technologies or not we are cementing a choice to exist in a particular way, and the 
external elements of ourselves align themselves appropriately to this. Other actors make 
some of their own decisions based on our choices, or have them limited as a 
consequence. In this sense our relationship to these technologies that support and 
augment ourselves is always in the process of ‘becoming normal’. This is always a state 
of ‘becoming’ and never of ‘being’ because the result is never genuinely fixed - some of 
the networks that comprise technologies are outside of our control and subject to flux. 
The ubiquitous telephone for example, so often cited as a prosthetic device for extending 
our ears and voices across vast distances, requires not only electricity for battery 
charging (in the case of mobile phones), and bill payment by an individual, but is also 
contingent on network coverage and compatibility - both of the caller and the receiver, 
as well as the competency of the user or receiver to utilise the device. Being totally 
accessible and traceable doubtless has various disabling qualities, but then so does the 
decision to not have a phone and to remain out of contact. 
Within this dissertation, I have suggested that in Serbia, ‘becoming normal’ is about 
creating the capacity for effective moral agency, and that the popular saying ‘nisi/nej 
240
normalan’ or ‘you are/it is not normal’ is not only a way of positioning oneself on the 
‘outside’ of a desirable European future, but serves the purpose of reminding citizens 
that the mundane workings of the state are as of yet still unable to be taken for granted. 
Just as we approach normal, its limits are pushed further toward the horizon. The 
Serbian reaction to this is to approach this future and as yet unreached normality with 
irony. Serbia is almost always portrayed as an antagonistic state: quick to anger, proud, 
nationalistic to the point of fascism, backward and belligerent. From an anthropological 
standpoint, it appears often in the cladding of an oppositional orientalist identity (Bakic-
Hayden 1995), accused of being more ‘eastern’ than the West, and more ‘western’ than 
the East. It is defined by what it is not. 
Much like both Jansen and Van der Port, my experience of Serbia was governed by 
perceptions of my foreignness, with my more sympathetic moments placing me in the 
good graces of my friends and my associates, and my more antagonistic questions 
carrying me further from them. However, I often played a trump card, a blood 
connection, in a land where blood carries so much meaning. I was never told (at least 
explicitly to my face) that I could not understand the ways of Serbs. This Serbian blood 
was evidenced by my knowledge of my slava, the fact that I had been to visit my 
grandfather’s village, and not least my love of the kafana, rakija and fried pork products. 
It is Serbian blood, friends would say, that makes you one of us. Unlike Jansen (1996) 
who was told that it was ‘natural’ that he would never understand the nature of Serbs, or 
Van der Port (1998) who was told that it takes a Serb to know one, I was often embraced 
as the prodigal daughter ‘come home’, never mind my almost non-existent language 
skills upon arrival. I was my family who had come before me. Through their blood 
thundering in my veins, I was released at least in part from the trap of empathy for the 
foreigner, who could never ‘really’ understand what it was like to be a Serb. 
It made me smile at the time, especially at Janko’s home (who was, much to his 
mother’s disapproval, a vegetarian) as his wife, and mother and I retired to the kitchen to 
eat chicken soup and great clouds of cottony white bread, or reheated sarma, or drank 
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rakija distilled in their neighbours backyard. In the weeks leading up to my departure, I 
would often visit just to sit, listening to the kids chattering about their schoolwork, 
wondering at the mysterious nature of my own veze stretching across continents and 
time, stemming from a chance meeting in my parents kitchen, 6 years ago.
The practicalities of being simultaneously Serbian, not-Serbian and not not-Serbian 
make me wonder how much information and leeway I was given due to my status as a 
prodigal daughter, returning to the fatherland, always tempered by my imperfect 
language. I am also certain that as Van der Port (1998, 1999) speculates, there are 
doubtless gendered aspects to the production of what he terms obstinate others, his 
world of lumpovanje is as stark a display of masculinity as can possibly be found, and 
the Bela Clinic was headed by a succession of strong willed women. Indeed the focus on 
my Serbian-ness, the fluxes and flows of its closeness of it to me was always the case at 
the Bela clinic. In contrast, while at the university, my students knew that I came from 
New Zealand, and had come to the logical conclusion that I must have married a Serb 
and thus come to live in Serbia. Many of them longed to leave so badly that it was the 
only reason that they could think of that I might have chosen to move to Serbia.
Thus it happens that I am my own oppositional identity in this text, neither one thing nor 
the other, defined by what I am not. Far from a native ethnographer, but neither a fully 
fledged foreigner. Disabled by my imperfect language skills, my blood becomes the 
prosthesis by which I am structurally propped up into the realm of tolerable difference. It 
is an indeterminate position, and yet through it I am vitally present at all times within 
this text. I have tried to remain so, while realising that there is still much room to 
manoeuvre within the interpretations of all the raw material that I have sifted through. 
There are other ways of dealing with prostheses, other meanings, other cyborgs, other 
ways that normalcy has been defined and described. There are other relationships that 
may be explored. The few that I have elucidated here are those that I find most pertinent 
to my observational data and to interviews that I conducted whether at the Bela clinic, in 
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the gait labs or in the therapy rooms, or in the classroom, in the kitchens and living areas 
of the homes of my friends. 
  We Have to Live: Future Directions For Prosthetic Research
Phenomenological understandings of the world have been increasingly under attack in 
the last 20 years, most notably by the fields of disability studies, and from feminist 
scholars, who have increasingly raised issues of embodied knowledge and questioned 
what it means to be ‘normal’-in-the-world. From the ground breaking works of feminist 
scholars such as Young (1980) to the quieter works of Grosz (1994), Shildrick (1997) 
and Oksala (2004), a feminist phenomenology has emerged as a critical undercurrent in 
the body of phenomenologist literature. Grosz’ work of the phenomenology of feminine 
bodily comportment is of particular note here, because although I am aware that it is still 
primarily men who wear prosthetic devices, in studying how women move through 
space, Grosz notes that while the (healthy) masculine experience of being-in-the-world 
is might be summed up in terms of the rubric of ‘I can’, women’s physical movements 
are often inhibited and truncated, leading Young to posit that they experience the world 
much more ambiguously, in terms of things that cannot be accomplished (Young 1990). 
The same ‘I cannot’ might be said of amputees who must learn the physical dimensions 
of the body all over again. Furthermore, the disabled body is also dualistically paired 
against the healthy male, in much the same way as the female, and the disabled or 
pathological body is often contrasted against the normal. Though I have touched on the 
subject of gender, this is an area of prosthetic rehabilitation that I would like to explore 
further. Likewise the connection of prosthesis based research to the military could be 
explored, though probably not within a Serbian setting, given their reluctance to have 
anything to do with me. In the States, the massive budgets of military research units 
conducting research into human rehabilitation mean that technologies can be trialled that 
civilians are not likely to experience, and are the driving force behind many new 
prosthetic devices. This is also perhaps an area worth exploring. 
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Prostheses, be they linguistic, physical, cybernetic, metaphoric or otherwise, are about 
the creation of social order from the possibility of infinite choice. Though they have 
come far from their linguistic beginnings, they continue to be an augmentation to ease 
communication, whether we are talking about language itself, or communicating the 
positioning of bodies into their social, and increasingly technological milieus. 
Prostheses, in this manner, bridge the gap between the knowable and the experiential. 
They are also about the creation and maintenance of social order. A ‘normal’ gait or 
body might not exist in any real way, however there is a standard degree of deviation 
from this abstraction which is tolerable. The ways of acting and/or being that fall outside 
of this range need to be bought under control, as they pose a threat to normal social 
relations.
Ultimately, by employing a historically and culturally aware approach to understanding 
categories of health, citizenship and disability, this dissertation furthers knowledge into 
the ways in which understandings of individual bodies as both a product and a process 
are encapsulated within state and international health policy, as well as ways in which 
these policies have an impact on the daily lives of individuals. It offers up constructive 
critiques of terms now themselves normalised within social studies of science. By 
placing this research in Serbia, aspects of Serbian citizenship previously unexplored 
have also been bought to light, such as the difficulty of creating affective moralities 
when one’s access to goods and services comes at the cost of undermining the state, or 
the ways in which the production of twilight zones allows multiple futures to be 
imagined at the same time as it pushes these futures far into the distance. 
This work stands then, not in opposition to recent theories of prosthetic people (of which 
there are increasingly many), but as a constructive evaluation; a reminder that 
prosthetising is inherent in all forms of technology. I wish to make it clear that while I 
accept that prostheses may lend themselves to all matter of analysis, my choice to 
investigate human medical prostheses is for the purpose of opening up a space where 
links and relationships with the world can be tested out, to see if they are rigid and fixed, 
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or mutable and open to reinterpretation. I hope that this in return results in a work that 
emerges as both concrete, and open to renegotiation, because as we continue to plumb 
the depths of the increasing permeability of bodies and state boundaries, it seems more 
pertinent than ever to accept that in many ways we are all prosthetic citizens. 
Kurzman’s assertion that there is no language to bridge the divide between subjective 
experience and technical specificity (the language of amputees and of prosthetists 
respectively) is in the end, not altogether dissimilar to Van der Port’s informants’ 
exclamations that only a Serb is able to comprehend another Serb. Regardless of 
whether this is epistemologically true, in the difficult and uneven relationships that are 
made evident by the attempts for communication, there is space for an ethnography that 
fills this gulf with technology, morality, ethics, and with language that attempts 
comprehension. There is writing which augments experience into text. Into these 
relationships I have thrown the prosthetic limb, which, in this dissertation, has filled the 
role of a linguistic prosthesis, an augmentation to ease understanding. 
This dissertation also goes some way toward exploring the moral ambiguities that we are 
all increasingly faced with as to where the line is drawn between restoration and 
enhancement, and to explaining why these categories even matter to us. As is the case 
with so much anthropological research, I shown that multiple readings may yet open 
toward what we currently call disability (or increasingly - differently abled), but that 
body modifications are always grounded in an informed turn to the past. However, not 
only do prosthetic citizenships speak with the force of history, they also show how we 
are defined by where our limits lie, but that we are more than this alone. They offer the 
possibility of choice to be a certain kind of citizen. These choices however, are not, the 
infinite ones of cyborgs, but the mundane bureaucratic and economic navigations of 
state institutions to achieve a best case scenario. Prosthetic citizens are supported by, and 
offer support to each other, to greater or lesser extent given their own set of 
circumstances. Technologies and the daily functioning of the apparatuses of the state 
may assist or hinder, given the agendas with which an individual currently identifies. 
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Seen in these ways, prostheses are about the daily, the mundane, the ease at which the 
body can be taken-for-granted. They invoke mobility, citizenship, and hope for normal 
life, whatever that may be. This normal life may be classified differently across genders, 
geopolitical regions, cultures and historical timeframes. What prostheses try to do most 
of all however is ‘not matter.' They attempt to disappear, even though this is a paradox in 
itself. They are the catalyst for actions performed, opening possibilities to live life in a 
way that means something to us, regardless of whether this is ideologically coherent. We 
have to live after all, and we do so in pragmatic, contradictory, social, and messy ways. 
It is this that I take away from this dissertation, and this that will linger in my memory. 
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EPILOGUE (from my field notes 04.03.2009) 
I am in the gait clinic with Nikolina, and Bojana, when a couple walk past the door. 
They wave to Nikolina and she calls out to them to join us. Immediately I see that the 
woman is an above knee amputee by her walk, though she is unaided. Nikolina moves 
toward them, quietly greeting and discussing something. Bojana and I turn to examine 
the legs, and we try to decide when I can fit in time to observe the clinic, and what I 
hope to find. I hear Nikolina say my name, and as I look up, the man hops on one leg 
across the room. ‘Watch!’ Nikolina laughs, ‘you see, its just like a shoe that he 
wears...lower leg amputees have fewer deviations’. The gentleman grins at me, pulling 
up the leg of his jeans to reveal the tip of a lower leg prosthesis projecting out of the top 
of his boot, as if sharing a secret. Then they are off, murmuring an apology. The woman 
is heading to an appointment and they are late.
Nikolina explains the case. Jelana, the woman, has an amputation at the hip. Her slightly 
stilted walk needs to be understood in light of this. The fact that she walks unaided is 
impressive on many levels. The further up the leg an amputation occurs, the more 
organic movement needs to be compensated, and the more compensation one requires to 
pay for the prosthesis. From a partial amputation of the foot requiring a cosmetic 
prosthesis, an ankle amputation which shortens the leg so that a prosthetic foot and ankle 
can be worn, to a lower leg amputation, leaving the knee intact, then an over the knee 
amputation, and finally, a hip disarticulation. A hip disarticulation requires the prosthesis 
to replace three joints. This makes it a complicated piece of engineering equipment. 
Each joint must relate to not only the body but to the other components of the device. 
Each one of Jelena’s prosthetic joints is a mobile one. It takes determination, muscle 
strength and balance to control and co-ordinate such a prosthesis, and such skills are 
beyond many of the other patients at the centre. In fact, Bojana whispers to me, lowering 
the tone of her voice, many of the therapists had doubted her ability to succeed. ‘Its just 
so lucky she fell in love with Jovan’ beams Nikolina, looking for all the world like a 
beneficent agony aunt. She touches my arm, and leans in close, ‘That’s the best, when 
the patients fall in love.’
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